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Abstract 
This thesis deals with the way in which copyright law is changing in the digital environment 
and the mechanisms which are facilitating this change. It deals with these issues by 
analysing the mechanisms of this change, specifically Digital Rights Management (DRM) 
Systems and anti-circumvention legislation, and the impact which this change is having on 
the rights of copyright users. 
 
The purpose of copyright is to provide an incentive to authors to continue creating while 
simultaneously providing a public good in allowing the public to use those creations in 
certain ways. Copyright achieves this purpose by granting both the author and user certain 
rights. The author is given a limited monopoly over their work in exchange for allowing this 
work to enter the public sphere and ensuring that users of that work can utilise that work in 
certain limited ways. The success of copyright thus rests on maintaining the balance 
between the rights of these parties. 
 
The rise of digital technology has created a situation in which copyright content can be 
easily copied by any party with a Personal Computer and disseminated around the globe 
instantly via the Internet. In response to these dangers, copyright owners are making use of 
DRM systems to protect content. DRM systems include various measures of control within 
its scope. Theses systems allow for copyright owners to control both access and use of 
content by copyright users. DRM Systems are not foolproof measures of protection 
however. Technologically sophisticated users are able to circumvent these protection 
iii 
 
measures. Thus, in order to protect DRM Systems from circumvention, anti-circumvention 
legislation has been proposed through international treaties and adopted in many countries. 
 
The combined effect of these protection measures are open to abuse by copyright owners 
and serve to curtail the limited rights of copyright users. The end result of this is that the 
balance which copyright law was created to maintain is disrupted and copyright law no 
longer fulfils its purpose. 
 
This thesis undertakes an analysis of these issues with reference to how these issues affect 
copyright users in developing countries. This is done with particular reference to possible 
approaches to this issue in South Africa as South Africa is a signatory to these anti-
circumvention treaties. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1. Introduction 
DRM systems have been touted by some commentators as signalling the beginning of the 
end for copyright law.1 Some of these commentators seem akin to doomsday prophets 
standing on street corners with cardboard signs and preaching that the end is nigh! 
However, keeping in step with the digital age in which we find ourselves firmly entrenched; 
the usual placards and soap boxes have been replaced by PDF journal articles, IP blogs and 
‘Tweets’. So the question which must be asked is this, do DRM systems and the anti-
circumvention legislation with which they have become associated really spell the end for 
copyright law? 
 
This thesis aims to undertake an analysis of copyright law in the digital environment by 
examining the various implications of DRM systems and anti-circumvention legislation for 
copyright law. This research will be largely focused on the impact of DRM systems and anti-
circumvention legislation on the rights of copyright consumers or users. While copyright law 
requires the protection of the rights of copyright owners to exploit their works in various 
ways, these rights are kept in balance by the equal rights of users of those copyright works. 
 
The balancing of the rights of copyright owners and copyright users is an integral measure 
for ensuring that the purpose of copyright is fulfilled.2 Any discussions on the issues of 
                                                             
1 See for example: JP Barlow “The Economy of Ideas” (1994) Wired 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html (accessed 13 May 2010); RS Ray Ku “The 
Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology” (2002) 69 University 
of Chicago Law Review 263; L Lessig “Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace” (2006) 124-125 
http://pdf.codev2.cc/Lessig-Codev2.pdf (accessed 28 June 2010); T Gillespie “Copyright and Commerce: The 
DMCA, Trusted Systems, and the Stabilization of Distribution” (2004) The Information Society 239; P 
Samuleson “The Copyright Grab” Wired (1996) 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html (accessed 12 March 2010). 
2 The purpose of copyright can generally be understood as being “To promote the Progress of Science and 
Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
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copyright in the digital environment will, thus, need to be informed by the effect of 
particular changes on the purpose of copyright law. 
 
2. Copyright Law: Purpose and the Digital Context 
The purpose of copyright law is to allow creators of certain literary, dramatic, musical, 
artistic and other such works to benefit from their creativity. This is done by protecting 
certain rights in that creation, and through this protection an incentive is introduced to 
continue to create. This in turn is intended to promote further creativity and thus the cycle 
continues. Moore explains that “this argument *the incentive-based argument] is based on 
the economic principles of restricting access to copies of a work to increase demand and 
value through scarcity”.3 
 
In the past, analogue technology was the norm. This type of technology carried with it 
certain limitations. Perhaps one of the most obvious limitations, in the context of this 
research, and depending on whether one views the situation from the position of the 
copyright holders or the end-users, is the issue of piracy. The piracy of music is an example 
of the limitations of analogue technology.  
 
Prior to the rise of the internet and the prevalence of digital music, the copying of music was 
a cumbersome operation. Lincoff states that such copying “required an organizational 
infrastructure, manufacturing facilities, distribution channels and lots of capital”.4 He 
explains that such operations were vulnerable to the music industries anti-piracy campaigns 
at every turn.5 Furthermore, in the context of the everyday average home-user, the pirated 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Writings and Discoveries.” US Constitution Article 1 – The Legislative Branch, Section 8 – The Powers of 
Congress, Clause 8. 
3
 C Moore “Commonising the Enclosure: Online Games in Reforming Intellectual Property Regimes” (2005) 3 
Australian Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society 100 at 105. 
4
 B Lincoff “Common Sense, Accommodation and Sound Policy for the Digital Music Marketplace” (2008-2009) 
2 Journal of International Media and Entertainment Law 1 at 4. 
5
 Lincoff 2008-2009 J. Int'l Media & Ent. L 4. 
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copy which the home-user was able to produce was usually inferior to the original. This was 
due to a certain level of degradation which was inevitable when music was copied using 
cassette tapes, for example.6 This type of piracy, whilst troublesome, did not represent a 
serious threat to the music industry and various other media and entertainment related 
industries. 
 
The situation today is vastly different. Digital technology and the interconnectedness of the 
digital world via the internet have allowed for the seamless reproduction of copyright 
material. If one is to re-examine the example of music piracy in the context of digital 
technology, a very different picture emerges. The average home PC or any new PC, Laptop 
or Mac purchased today comes standard with a CD or DVD ROM. This technology allows 
anyone with access to it to copy music from any of their CDs and put it on their computer. 
This process is referred to as ‘space-shifting’.7  If people around the world are doing this and 
then sharing their music with others, which is made easy through the internet, then it seems 
apparent that the music industry will lose a great deal of revenue because consumers would 
rather get something for free than pay for it. Lincoff states rather pithily that music piracy in 
the digital age “…has become cheap, quick, easy and ubiquitous.”8 
 
The greatest problem that currently faces many media and entertainment-based industries, 
which are usually large-scale owners of copyright, is not the copying of their works through 
large-scale operations, but the fact that digital technology and the internet have allowed the 
average home-user to infringe copyright from the comfort of their own homes. An estimate 
by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry submits that 20 billion 
unauthorised music recordings were downloaded in 2006, with the ratio of illegal to legal 
                                                             
6
 Lincoff 2008-2009 J. Int'l Media & Ent. L 4. 
7
 Stammer explains that this concept allows “a person to make a copy of a sound recording for their own 
private and domestic use. They must own the original copy of the recording”. K Stammer “Internet Law – The 
new face of Copyright law in Australia” (2007) Freehills Law Firm 
http://www.ibls.com/internet_law_news_portal_view.aspx?id=1710&s=latestnews (accessed 4 January 2010). 
8
 Lincoff 2008-2009 JIMEL 4. 
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song downloads estimated to be 40:1.9 It is clear that this has resulted in major revenue 
losses for the holders of these rights and digital technology poses a grave threat, not only to 
these industries, but to the efficacy of copyright law in general.  
 
The fundamental nature of the purpose of copyright law, for the discussions undertaken in 
this thesis, requires one to understand, firstly, what this purpose is and, secondly, how 
maintaining the balance of rights between owners and users of copyright is integral to 
ensuring that purpose is being fulfilled. These issues will be discussed further in Chapter 2. 
  
3. Digital Rights Management 
In response to the threat which piracy in the digital age poses to copyright works, various 
companies have attempted to protect their rights by making use of Digital Rights 
Management.10 It is important to note that there is no globally established definition for this 
term.11 The term encompasses a number of different types of technologies which can be 
attached to a digital work. The purposes of DRM are twofold. Firstly, to control who may 
access certain works and secondly, to control how that work may be used, or what may be 
done with that particular work. These functions are referred to as access and use rights 
respectively.12 Kruger notes that “DRM provides a realistic means to limit digital piracy while 
recognizing the global nature of file-sharing”.13  
 
Two examples of DRM will be examined. The first example is encryption. An encrypted file 
requires a password or a key to unlock the information contained in that file. The concept 
                                                             
9
 “Pirates Still Have All the Best Tunes” The Guardian 27 May 2007 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/may/27/musicnews.music (accessed 12 February 2010). 
10
 Hereinafter “DRM”.  
11
 S Bechtold “Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe” (2004) 52 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 323 at 324. 
12
 Bechtold 2004 Am. J. Comp. L. 327. 
13 C Kruger “Passing the Global Test: DMCA as an international Model for Transitioning Copyright Law into the 
Digital Age” (2006) 28 Houston Journal of International Law 281 at 289. 
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behind this is that access to a file will be limited to those authorised users who have the 
password or key. This type of DRM is common with e-books.14 
 
The second example of a DRM is a watermark.  Watermarks can be seen as an identifier 
which allows a certain file to be tracked as well as controlling access to a particular file. 
Digital players are often linked with particular watermarks. So if a particular file does not 
possess the required watermark, it will not be playable on that particular digital player. A 
case in point would be Amazon’s e-reader ‘Kindle’. A Kindle is only capable of reading e-
books which have been purchased from Amazon’s website. Thus e-books which do not 
possess Amazon’s watermark, regardless of whether or not they have been purchased 
legally, will not be usable by the end-user. Amazon not only controls access to its e-books, 
but also controls the way in which these e-books can be used.  
 
As alluded to in the Amazon example above, various problems have emerged as a result of 
this DRM technology. One is that copyright holders are abusing this technology by giving 
themselves greater rights over their works than the law itself has given them. Wheatley 
notes that once “the exclusive rights of the copyright owner evanesce, DRMs continue to 
function and bar certain uses of the copyrighted work”.15 So certain rights which a consumer 
of copyright material would have over these works in an analogue world have now been 
denied to them by copyright owners in the digital world. 
 
The right to fair dealing provides an example of the way in which some of these consumer 
rights have been restricted, and in some cases completely removed. Again using the 
example of Kindle, certain fair dealing rights cannot be exercised as a result of the DRM 
attached to Kindle. One such fair dealing limitation is an inability to make a copy of or print 
                                                             
14
 Kruger 2006 Hous. J. Int.’l L. 291. 
15
 CT Wheatley “Overreaching Technological Means For Protection of Copyright: Identifying the Limits of 
Copyright in Works in Digital Form in the United States and the United Kingdom” (2008) 7 Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 353 at 359. 
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out a particular part of a book or resell that e-book later on.16 However, the rights which 
DRM provides holders of copyright, extends beyond the rights that copyright law grants 
them. A prime, and somewhat ironic, example of this was a situation which arose when 
Amazon deleted copies of George Orwell’s ‘1984’ which had been legally purchased by 
some of its Kindle users. Amazon’s Terms and Conditions of Use Agreement did not grant 
them this right but the technology in place allowed them to do this anyway.17 An analysis of 
DRM systems and the advantages and disadvantages of such systems will be made in 
Chapter 3. 
 
4. Anti-Circumvention Laws 
In a response to DRM and abuse of this technology by some copyright holders, 
technologically savvy communities have found ways of circumventing DRM. Some of this 
circumvention by consumers was said to have been done in order to make use of the work 
as their rights under copyright law allowed them to, while others did so in order to pirate 
and take advantage of these works. Thus the control over use and access of the digital 
works was again, in a practical sense, lost by the copyright holders. In an attempt to curb 
this circumvention, the World Intellectual Property Organization18 drafted the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty.19 This treaty, to which South Africa is a signatory but has not yet ratified, 
provides in Articles 11 and 12 that parties to the treaty must enact legislation within their 
respective territories to prevent circumvention of DRM. 
 
Anti-circumvention laws, depending on the territory20 and the specific legislation therein, 
make it an offence to circumvent any DRM or traffic any tools which allow for the 
                                                             
16
 “Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle” New York Times 18 July 2009 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html (accessed 21 December 2009).  
17
 “Amazon Erases Orwell Books From Kindle” New York Times 18 July 2009 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html (accessed 21 December 2009). 
18
 Hereinafter “WIPO”. 
19
 Hereinafter “WCT”. See WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html (accessed 21 January 2010). 
20 Some examples include: the Digital Millennium Copyrights Act 1998 (USA Act); European Directive 
2001/29/EC  specifically Article 6 (EU); Bill C-60 (Canada). 
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circumvention of DRM. An example of a case which took place in the US is illustrative of the 
seriousness with which these anti-circumvention laws are taken. The case of the United 
States v Elcom Ltd.21 involved a Russian cryptography expert named Sklyarov who was in the 
US to give a lecture at a conference about the Advanced E-book Processor. This was 
essentially a computer programme which could be used for the purposes of circumventing 
the DRM on Adobe Systems Inc. E-book Reader software.22 The circumvention which this 
programme would allow included the ability to “copy, distribute, print or have the text read 
audibly by a computer”.23 Some of these accessed abilities include rights which the end-user 
would have in terms of their right to fair dealing, but these rights had been denied to them 
by the DRM. Sklyarov and the company for which he worked were to be criminally 
prosecuted for their creation of this programme. The charges against Sklyarov were later 
dropped. The case against ElcomSoft went to trial and ElcomSoft was acquitted.24 
 
Thus, the only means by which an end-user can make use of their rights to fair dealing in 
certain digital works, has now been turned into an offence by anti-circumvention laws. It is 
this unsavoury situation in which copyright law in the digital age now finds itself. Some sort 
of balance needs to be struck between the holders of copyright and the consumers of these 
copyright works. Craig poignantly states the issue by asking “whether media companies are 
overzealously protecting the rights of the copyright holder while ignoring the rights of the 
end-user?”25 The above examples indicate that this question should be answered with a 
resounding ‘yes’. An in-depth discussion of these issues will be undertaken in Chapter 4.                                             
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 Craig 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 6. 
24
 Electronic Frontier Foundation “US v ElcomSoft & Sklyarov FAQ” (2002) http://www.eff.org/cases/us-v-
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5. South African Approaches to Copyright in the Digital Environment 
There is usually a great deal of confusion when one discusses user rights under copyright 
law. Many users are not aware of their rights or have misconceptions as to the extent of 
these rights. This confusion is often the result of unclear legislation concerning the rights of 
these users.26 Although the scope of these rights are not nearly as broad as most users 
perceive them to be, they still serve an important function, especially in allowing for access 
to information. 
 
South Africa’s growth, as well as the growth of numerous other developing nations, requires 
that access to information is of paramount importance. The digital environment provides a 
landscape in which the free flow of information is prevalent. Such an environment should be 
considered a positive one for developing nations as it allows for widespread access to 
almost instantly available information. It should be recognised, however, that the citizens of 
many developing nations, including South Africa, face limitations with regard to the 
prohibitive costs associated with purchasing the means with which to access this 
information, i.e. the prohibitive costs of purchasing a computer. The impact of DRM systems 
and anti-circumvention legislation, however, may serve to stifle the positive aspects which 
underscore this environment. The ultimate effect of such measures may greatly limit access 
to information in developing nations which leaves the dream of development hamstrung.  
 
In order to avoid this scenario, various approaches are discussed which may not serve to 
completely remedy the negative aspects of DRM systems and anti-circumvention legislation, 
but may alleviate some of the problems which these measures cause. The focus in this 
regard will specifically be on South Africa, as its status as a developing nation and as a 
signatory to the WCT, which it has not yet ratified, serves as the perfect arena in which to 
test some of the approaches aimed at protecting user rights. These issues will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
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6. Conclusion 
Although the areas identified will be discussed individually, in their respective chapters, the 
debate being undertaken is one in which the overlapping of concepts and problems are 
inevitable. It is important for the reader to keep this in mind when considering the 
numerous submissions and questions raised throughout this thesis, in order to fully realise 
the extent of the problems noted. It is with this in mind that the discussion of the purpose 
of copyright law begins, in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
The Purpose of Copyright Law and the Digital Environment 
1. Introduction 
The effects which the digital era, through the dual mechanisms of digital technology (in 
terms of copying) and the Internet (in terms of dissemination), is having on copyright law is 
a matter of serious contention. What cannot be denied, however, is that copyright law is 
being affected by the digital age.27 Whether this impact is good or bad is a matter which is 
largely unsettled and is a perhaps a question which evades this type of binary 
categorisation. Whatever the answers to these questions may be, the current debates 
surrounding the legitimacy of Digital Rights Management systems, and what has been 
termed the ‘digital dilemma’,28 cannot be understood unless one considers the historical 
context from which copyright laws emerged.  
 
As will be shown in this chapter, an understanding of the history of copyright law involves a 
consideration of the technologies of the time. In considering these technologies the purpose 
which copyright law served is of paramount importance. It is only through an understanding 
of the purpose of copyright in the particular context in which it emerged that one can 
determine whether that purpose is still being fulfilled in the digital era. 
 
Thus, this chapter undertakes to consider the following: the historical context in which 
copyright law emerged; its purpose in that particular context and; the position which 
copyright law occupies in the current digital environment. With these goals in mind one can 
begin to analyse the scenario which gave rise to the birth of copyright law. 
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2. The Birth of Copyright Law – A Brief History 
a. Context and Purpose 
It is widely acknowledged that the Statute of Anne29 represents the first piece of copyright 
legislation enacted in a Western legal system which was not associated with a royal decree 
or censorship.30 The Statute came about as the result of lobbying by London booksellers 
who feared that their monopoly over the market would be negatively affected by works 
printed in other areas of the United Kingdom, namely Ireland and Scotland.31 
 
One of the effects which the Statute had was that it emphasised the importance of 
‘authorship’ in the creation of original texts and that such creativity was worthy of 
protection. In seeking to provide a means of protecting this creativity, the Statute gave rise 
to the notion of these works as constituting a form of property capable of being owned. 
Both Mendelson32 and Jaszi33 note that the notion of ‘authorship’ and the theory that these 
works constituted a form of property arose out of “… the burgeoning market economy in 
England and ‘authorship’ was a result of the linguistic and ideological progeny of ‘possessive 
individualism’.”34 
 
What Mendleson35 and Jaszi36 are alluding to in the above quotation, is the context in which 
the Statute emerged and it is in this context that the purpose of the Statute needs to be 
                                                             
29 Copyright Act, 1709, 8 Anne, c. 19 (hereinafter referred to as “The Statute”). 
30 LL Mendelson “Privatizing Knowledge: The Demise of Fair Use and the Public University” (2003) 13 Alabama 
Law Journal of Science and Technology 593 at 595. See also G Davies Copyright and the Public Interest (2002) 
10, as well as ”Nature and History of Copyright” in K Garnett, G Davies and G Harbottle Copinger and Skone 
James on Copyright 15 ed Vol 1 (2005) para 2-16. 
31
 M Rose “The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship” (1988) 
Representations 51 at 52. 
32
 Mendelson 2003 Al. L. J. Sci. & Tech. 596. 
33
 P Jaszi “Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of ‘Authorship’” (1991) 1991 Duke Law Journal 
455 at 471. 
34
 Mendelson 2003 Al. L. J. Sci. & Tech. 596. 
35 Mendelson 2003 Al. L. J. Sci. & Tech. 596. 
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 Jaszi 1991 Duke L. J. 471. 
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understood. It is generally agreed that the purpose of the Statute was to provide a means of 
protecting literary works and, in so doing, provide the ‘author’ with the benefits of this 
protection.37 Ginsburg notes that the authors’ ability to control and be compensated for 
their works makes it worth their while to be creative.”38 Indeed, the long title of the Statute 
states that it was “An Act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of 
printed books in the Authors or Purchasers of such copies, during the times therein 
mentioned.”39  
 
While it is clear that the purpose of the Statute was primarily concerned with protection,40 it 
can be argued that the true purpose of this Statute was to provide a means of protection 
not for newly created ‘authors’ but for the lobbyists of this legislation (i.e. publishers and 
booksellers). Barlow states that it is not the idea for which one gets paid but rather the 
ability to deliver that idea into reality.41 In the context in which the Statute operated, this 
task of delivering the authors’ ideas into reality was fulfilled mainly by distributors. This 
remains true to this day under traditional distribution models for copyright content. 
 
The Statute protected the market for booksellers and publishers by creating a right over 
work as if it were a piece of tangible property. However, it was not the authors who owned 
these rights, but rather the booksellers and publishers who purchased these property rights 
from the authors.42 Booksellers and publishers were thus able to maintain control over the 
market through the creation of property rights. Ray Ku submits that “the law, therefore, 
                                                             
37 Davies Copyright and the Public Interest (2002) 13. 
38 JC Ginsburg “Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination” (2001) 101 Columbia Law 
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 Copyright Act, 1709, 8 Anne, c. 19. 
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 Davies Copyright and the Public Interest (2002) 13. 
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 JP Barlow “The Economy of Ideas” (1994) Wired 
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 Mendelson 2003 Al. L. J. Sci. & Tech. 596. See also T Macaulay who submits that copyright represents “a tax 
on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers”. T Macaulay quoted in S Breyer “The Uneasy Case of 
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs” (1970) 84 Harvard Law 
Review 281. 
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makes it possible to have a private market for works of authorship by artificially rendering 
those works scarce and exclusive.”43 
 
Ultimately, the importance of this Statute for the development of copyright law cannot be 
overstated. It is from this Statute that the global concept of copyright law has been 
modelled.44 Indeed, legislation in the United States of America has largely been shaped in 
accordance with Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution,45 which took its lead 
from the Statute of Anne in emphasising the importance of protection of works resulting 
from creativity. The Statute’s effect on the US Constitution has been emphasised in this 
paper because a large majority of copyright works, on which this research focuses, originate 
from the US (i.e. music and literature). 
 
b. Quid Pro Quo 
It is important to remember that the protection of the work, by providing the author with a 
limited monopoly in relation to that work, is seen to be granted in exchange for the author 
making that work available to the public. In making this work available to the public the 
information contained therein enters and becomes a part of the public sphere. The 
knowledge of the public is seen to develop and improve. Thus the author is seen as 
providing a public good and is compensated, through their limited monopoly, for the 
provision of this public good. 
 
From this relationship between the author and the public it is clear that this interaction is 
structured in order to operate on a quid pro quo basis. The competing interests concerned 
in this relationship are: (1) the rights of the authors to remuneration for their creativity as 
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 Ray Ku 2002 U. Chi. L. Rev. 279. 
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 Davies Copyright and the Public Interest (2002) 9. 
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well as for making these works available to the public and (2) the rights of the public to 
access these works in exchange for the monopoly granted to these authors.46 In the 
American case of Harper & Row, Publishers v National Enterprises the court noted that “by 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”47 
 
The success of the above relationship requires a fine balance between the interests of these 
two groups. The importance of maintaining this balance is integral to the analysis being 
undertaken in this chapter. Before undertaking a discussion of the importance of 
maintaining this balance, however, one first needs to understand what the interests of 
these groups are. It is from an understanding of these interests that the rationale for 
granting rights both to authors and to the public can be understood. 
 
In order to understand why a limited monopoly is granted to authors, it is necessary to 
undertake a discussion of copyright law theory, more specifically the incentive theory and 
the free rider problem which underlies it. Prior to an analysis of this theory, the quasi-public 
good nature of copyright requires discussion. 
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3. The Public Good 
The concept of the public good has been mentioned at various points throughout this 
chapter. It is the quasi-public good nature of copyright which forms one of the pillars on 
which the justifications for the exclusive rights of copyright holders are based.48 
 
A public good can be operationally defined by two criteria. The first is the non-excludability 
criterion while the second is the non-rivalrous consumption criterion. The non-excludability 
aspect of a public good is that once it has been made available to one person or group it 
immediately becomes available to others and cannot be easily withheld from those others.49 
This non-excludability aspect of copyright works is especially apparent when one considers 
the viral dissemination of digital content through file-sharing sites such as Napster or 
Limewire. Even where digital content is released with measures in place to protect the 
content from such viral and unauthorised dissemination, such measures do not protect the 
digital content for long. If or/when that technological protection is ‘cracked’ the work 
becomes available to all consumers. 
 
A public goods non-rivalrous aspect concerns its seemingly inexhaustible nature once 
produced.50 This nature was explained by Demsetz to mean that “it is possible at no extra 
cost for additional persons to enjoy the same unit of a public good.”51 Using the same 
example in the previous paragraph, once the technological protection has been bypassed 
then the work will usually be disseminated without any cost to other consumers over the 
Internet. This example is of course the very real problem which faces various copyright 
stakeholders. 
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Normally, due to the nature of a public good, it is something which does not lend itself to 
private production and is rather carried out by governments or special interest groups such 
as NGOs. This is largely due to the two criteria discussed above, which underlie a public 
good and lead to the inevitable free rider problem which arises from a public good and is of 
greatest concern in private production. In spite of this problem, it is these quasi-public good 
aspects inherent in works which are subject to copyright protection which forms the basis of 
the relationship between the consumer and the creator/distributor of the copyright work. 
Thus, access to the authors work is premised on certain protection being offered to the 
author. This protection offers an incentive for authors to make their works available. It is 
this incentive-based theory to which the discussion now turns. 
 
4. The Incentive Theory 
To reiterate what was discussed previously, the granting of a limited monopoly is seen as 
providing an incentive to authors to create new works. Burrell and Coleman state that the 
incentive theory relies on the premise that “a work will only be created if the expected 
revenues exceed the cost of expression and the cost of making and distributing copies.” 52A 
basic explanation of this is that if the author is able to benefit from their creativity then they 
will continue to create new works as a result of this benefit. The ability to derive some sort 
of benefit from their work is achieved by granting them this limited monopoly over 
particular usage of their works. 
 
Moore explains that the incentive theory operates on the basis of “…restricting access to 
copies of a work in order to increase demand and value through scarcity.”53 If there were no 
means in place for protecting the work then the work would not be scarce and the demand 
as well as its value would greatly diminish. Following this there would be very little incentive 
to produce these works. 
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This initially seems like a worthwhile endeavour, and it could be argued that most people 
would agree with this idea of allowing someone to derive a benefit from their labour and 
creativity in exchange for providing a public good. Ray Ku submits that the interests of both 
creators and distributors are often bundled together and therefore the interests of the two 
are treated as one in the same.54 However it must be remembered that these two groups 
are separate and thus there is a distinction between the incentive to create and the 
incentive to disseminate works. In order to understand the incentive to disseminate works 
one needs to understand how these distributors, for whom this incentive is required, 
acquire rights in the works they disseminate. 
 
In the past, the bundling of the interests of creators and distributors could be seen as 
acceptable, as this bundling was required in order for these groups to fulfil their obligation 
in providing public access to various works. The costs involved in creation were not in 
themselves prohibitive. Problems arose however, as mentioned above, in the dissemination 
of works. The analogy of protection of ideas versus the protection of the physical 
embodiment of that idea is captured in the example of wine. If one were to imagine a piece 
of work which is subject to copyright protection as wine, it is the wine bottle which is 
protected rather than the wine. In other words the wine bottle represents the physical 
medium through which the wine (i.e. the idea) can be distributed. 
 
The costs involved in embodying this creation in some form of physical medium which could 
then be made available to the public were prohibitive. Examples of these types of media are 
numerous and can be seen as including books, vinyl records and CDs. The book or CD, in this 
example, obviously does not constitute the creative work itself. Rather a book provides a 
means for disseminating a literary work while a CD provides a means for disseminating 
musical works in a tangible form. Ray Ku notes that “while disembodied ideas may spread 
freely *…+ the books and albums conveying those ideas come at a price.”55 The importance 
                                                             
54 Ray Ku 2002 U. Chi. L. Rev. 267. 
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of this issue of the physical embodiment of works will be discussed in greater detail in part 5 
of this chapter. However, returning to the incentive to disseminate, the following should be 
noted.  
 
The copyright protection of the author’s rights to his work only represents half of the 
interests concerned. An author would generally be unable to shoulder the costs of 
distributing their own works in an analogue era. As a result, authors will enter into licence 
agreements in terms of which they will assign their rights to publishers who will then 
distribute the work. Copyright therefore also serves to protect the publisher through an 
assignment of rights by the author. Thus the interests of both parties are protected by 
copyright law.56 
 
The problems which face the distributors of works are largely concerns over being able to 
recoup the often exorbitant costs involved in the process of distribution.57 Consider the 
following. A record label or publisher would be required to pay the costs of pressing 
thousands of copies of an album or printing thousands of copies of a book and then 
distributing these works. This would include the cost of the factory where the printing press 
is situated; the resources required to produce these copies; the labour involved in printing 
the books and packaging them; the carriage costs for transporting them to various locations 
to be purchased; and the marketing costs involved in making sure that the public know 
about the work. The list seems almost endless. It is unlikely that authors would be able to 
pay these costs themselves prior to the distribution of their works. The production of the 
medium to be distributed could not take place without these costs being paid. Therefore the 
distributor or publisher serves an important function in this relationship.58  
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19 
 
On this basis one could argue that the publisher would be equally as entitled to benefit from 
disseminating the work as the author would be entitled to benefit from creating the work. 
Without the author, the work would not exist, but without the distributor the work would 
not reach the public and the public good which copyright works supposedly seek to achieve 
would not be possible. Therefore a bundling of the two interests seems fair. 
 
The use of copyright as an incentive is said to give rise to the “…classic public goods problem 
as in the absence of copyright protection, others would be tempted to free ride”.59 Thus, in 
light of the need to derive a benefit from this creativity and labour, as well as the 
investment in making this work available to the public, copyright protection is provided to 
protect against the free rider problem. One thus needs to understand what the free rider 
problem is. 
 
5. The Free Rider Problem 
a. The Problem 
Like most things in western democratic societies, copyright is largely connected to an 
economic purpose. The incentive theory states that copyright operates by providing 
protection to works in order to ensure the continued existence of an incentive to both 
create and distribute certain “cultural products”60 and thus allow the public to access these 
works. Without this incentive the public good which these cultural products are seen as 
providing would be subject to the free rider problem which carries with it certain 
ramifications. So the question which arises is this: What is the free rider problem? 
 
In short, the free rider problem is an economic principle. It operates on the assumption that 
a public good will be susceptible to abuse by users who fail to internalise the costs of their 
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use and therefore the cost of the production of a particular work.61 A basic example will 
serve to better explain the theory: where people use a road without paying the toll to use 
that road, eventually there will be no road to use. The failure of these ‘free riders’ to pay for 
their use results in a trickle-down effect in terms of which the provider of the road is unable 
to pay for the upkeep of that road and recover the costs which were paid in building the 
road. Therefore the incentive to maintain current roads, or build more roads, disappears in 
the same way as the public good which it served. By putting legislation in place, however, 
which makes it an offence not to pay the toll, the road builder and the public good are 
offered legal protection. Copyright law represents the protection offered to these ‘doers of 
public good’, i.e. authors and distributors. On this point Burrell and Coleman note that 
without copyright law “others would be tempted to free ride – either potential purchasers 
would copy the work for themselves or rival publishers would emerge who would be able to 
undercut the author or first publisher…”62 
 
b. The Pre-Digital Era 
In an environment, such as the analogue era of creative works, which requires that works 
have some form of physical embodiment in order for them to be distributed to the public, 
the free rider problem constitutes a very real concern to the interested parties. What made 
this problem less worrisome in the pre-digital era was the difficulty associated with copying 
and the reduction in quality of copied works.63 Therefore, while the potential for free riding 
was present, its ultimate effect on the incentives for creation, and, perhaps more 
importantly dissemination, was not dramatic. An important point which Jensen notes is that 
“copyright law has historically been directed toward mediating relationships among a 
relatively small number of people”.64 This situation is very different in a digital environment.  
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c. The Digital Era 
In the digital environment the technology required to copy works has vastly improved and 
the costs of this technology have dramatically reduced. With this now affordable 
technology, the ability to copy is available to almost anyone who has a PC. Moreover, digital 
copies constitute a perfect reproduction of the original without any reduction in the quality 
of subsequent copies.65 The Internet provides a means for near instant dissemination of 
copied works at the cost of a PC and an Internet connection. It is this combination of 
accessible technology and cheap means of dissemination which has greatly altered the 
playing field with regard to the free rider problem. 
 
In discussing the free rider problem in the digital domain, while it must be remembered that 
the manner in which the free rider problem works is that all parties concerned are 
ultimately affected, it seems apparent that the group whose interests are most at risk are 
the distributors of works. Ray Ku notes that these groups “…fear the power of the Internet 
to distribute digital information ‘virally’…”66 It could be argued that this reduction in the cost 
of distribution would be an advantage to the likes of publishers and record companies.  
 
These reduced costs arise from not needing to produce and distribute a physical 
embodiment or physical copies of a given work.67 If one takes the example of publishing a 
book, the reduction in costs would include, but not be limited to: the cost of the resources 
to create the physical embodiment of the work, for example the cost of purchasing ink and 
paper; the maintenance costs associated with maintaining the printing presses; the cost 
associated with purchasing or renting the property on which all the books are to be printed; 
the costs involved in paying for storage of the books; the labour costs involved in producing 
the physical embodiment of the work; and the costs of packaging and carriage for 
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disseminating the work. All these costs disappear or are greatly reduced by distributing 
works in a digital form. While one can understand the fears of distribution groups in relation 
to the above scenario, as they perceive this digital dissemination to be a boon to their 
monopoly over the market, this means of dissemination can also been seen to hold great 
potential for them too. 
 
By removing the need for tangible embodiments of work the cost reduction associated leads 
to a reduction in the need for distributors, as the creators would be better able to distribute 
their works themselves. An example of the possibilities which current digital technology and 
the Internet provides to creators in terms of dissemination can be viewed by looking at 
various album releases by artists.  
 
The power of technology for the production and dissemination of creative content is 
evidenced by the success of a self-released album. In 2005 the Brooklyn-based band “Clap 
Your Hands Say Yeah” pressed and released an album under their own steam, without the 
assistance of a record label (i.e. a distributor).68 The album became a sensation via word of 
mouth and over the Internet through music blogs. Indeed, one journalist noted on the hype 
surrounding the band “…the indie success story of 2005 went from barely blipping on the 
radar to saturating it *…+ one thing was certain: CYHSY could be admired or disliked, but not 
ignored.”69 However, in this story it should be pointed out that this increase in popularity 
eventually lead to a severe demand on the band itself in terms of re-pressing more albums. 
Thus later in 2005 the band signed to a record label in order to lighten the load with regard 
to the production and distribution of its album.  
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This story serves as an example of the power of the Internet to generate interest in new 
creative works, but where the work still relies on a physical medium for its distribution then 
it seems apparent that distributors still have an integral role to play. From this the following 
question arises: How would the above the situation be different where a work was 
distributed in a purely digital form and no physical embodiment of the work was required?  
 
6. The Digital Dilemma 
The rise of digital technology which allows for copying and the dissemination of work at a 
greatly reduced cost has given rise to fears by the distribution industry as well as creators of 
works. This fear is largely related to the ease with which digital works can be copied and 
disseminated. This in turn has lead to concerns that current copyright law would be unable 
to regulate the increased threat of the free rider problem which emerges from digital 
technology. 
 
If one follows the incentivist theory, this increased free rider problem would result in 
distributors being unable to recoup their costs invested for the dissemination of works. 
Furthermore, the incentive to create would be diminished as creators would be unable to 
benefit from their creativity and labour. Ultimately, so the argument goes, the public access 
to works would be greatly diminished as the incentive to create these works and distribute 
them would have been greatly affected by digital technology stoking the fire of the free 
rider problem. Thus the public good of providing the public access to knowledge is being 
negated by digital technology. This explanation portrays a situation of imminent doom and 
gloom. Is this really the fate which awaits copyright? 
 
It is fair to say that the interests of distributors are being threatened by the rise of digital 
technology. In response to this threat these distribution groups have clearly decided to fight 
fire with fire. In other words, distributors have responded to the threat of digital technology 
by making use of digital technology to protect their rights. On this point it has been noted 
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that technology is a double-edged sword.70 Indeed, Professor Lessig notes that digital 
technology relies on computer code to function and as such this code can be used to 
regulate that technology and the uses of and access to it by the public.71 An in-depth 
discussion of the use of these technologies follows in chapter 3. It is, however, important to 
note that distributors make use of technological means of protecting their rights and, even 
further, these technologies are used to provide them with greater control over usage and 
access. Therefore, in practice, distributors provide themselves with greater rights than 
copyright law gives them. 
 
Two questions follow from the above. First, does the need for distributors exist in a digital 
environment? Of course one must realise that as the situation currently stands it is unlikely 
that digital works will completely replace their tangible counterparts. Indeed, one could 
argue that it is the tactile nature of these physical embodiments of works which will ensure 
their continued survival in the digital age. For example, the smell of a book or the texture of 
a page is unlikely to be replaced by using Amazon’s Kindle E-reader. However, for works 
which are largely based on digital dissemination, is the distributor still required?  
 
If it is possible for the creator of the work to distribute their work themselves in a cost-
effective way in a digital environment, and the public is able to internalise the cost of this 
creator-based dissemination, then surely the pre-digital role of the distributor becomes 
redundant in a digital environment? Indeed, Barlow notes that the reason copyright law 
worked in the pre-digital era was that it operated on the basis of protecting expression and 
to express was, more often than not, to make physical.72 To make physical was not an easy 
thing to do. 
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Perhaps in realising this possibility, various distribution groups have made use of a variety of 
means to ensure the survival of their business in an environment which does not necessarily 
need them.73 Through lobbying for legislation which favours the interests of distributors and 
which allows, and indeed calls for, the implementation of DRM systems into the 
technologies which threaten them, distributors have managed to retain a foothold in the 
digital environment. Through various technological measures, contractual arrangements 
and licensing agreements, these groups have not only managed to prevent themselves from 
becoming irrelevant, but have given themselves greater power than they previously 
possessed. While relevant, this discussion extends beyond the scope of this chapter and is 
discussed further in chapter 3 and 4 respectively. 
 
The second question which then follows on from the first is: What role should copyright law 
play in a digital environment? If digital dissemination of work removes the requirement for a 
work to be physically embodied in a particular medium, then the bundling of the creation 
and distribution incentives may no longer be apt.74 By removing the need for a distributor, 
in the role which they filled in the pre-digital copyright environment, the interests left are 
those of the creator and those of the public. Thus the question which needs to be answered 
is whether copyright still serves as an appropriate means of protecting the interests of these 
two remaining groups? 
 
The above question is not an easy one to answer. Indeed, part of the purpose of this 
research is to provide greater insight into this very question. Burrell and Coleman in 
discussing the free rider problem submit that without copyright “no one would bother to 
create or publish copyright works.”75 The authors go on to note that in the absence of 
copyright protection, the market for such works would tend towards cheap and faddish 
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works.76 A reliance on these types of works would provide both creators and distributors the 
opportunity to recover their costs both in creation and distribution. While copyright law 
does not necessarily concern itself with the quality of the work which it protects, a market 
for copyright works which only produces cheap and faddish works poses serious concerns. 
The main issue which emerges is that the so called cheap and faddish works may not add 
much to the public sphere and therefore public knowledge. 
 
The concerns raised by Burrell and Coleman and their emphasis on the importance of 
copyright law are valid. However, it is clear that their concerns largely stem from the free 
rider problem. As noted earlier, the rise of digital technology and the dangers of viral 
dissemination posed by the Internet carry with them the likelihood of the free rider problem 
becoming an exponential hazard to copyright works. One should however take into account 
the argument that the digital dilemma may not be a dilemma at all, and may in fact provide 
a solution to the free rider problem in copyright works. 
 
a. The Free rider problem and the Digital Dilemma 
The incentive theory recognises the importance of copyright law as a means of providing an 
incentive to create and distribute. Earlier, pre-digital technologies which allowed for the 
copying of works were seen as diminishing incentives, but the incentives were still present. 
This was in large part due to the inadequacies of earlier copying technologies.77 Therefore 
the distribution industry faced a less serious threat from older copying technologies such as 
photocopiers, VCRs and audio cassette recorders.78  
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As submitted earlier, because of the way in which digital technology and the Internet have 
altered the way in which copying and dissemination occurs, the incentive to distribute can 
be unbundled from the incentive to create. Following this unbundling, the importance of an 
incentive to distribute, as it functioned in the pre-digital era, may no longer be required in 
the digital era. This is due to the reduction in costs of digital production and in the means of 
disseminating such works. What remains then of the incentive which is provided, and 
protected, by copyright law is the incentive to create. 
 
Ray Ku notes that the artificial scarcity which copyright creates is justified by the incentive it 
provides for creation in reciprocation for public access.79 What is the situation, however, if 
the need to create that artificial scarcity is no longer required as the market is capable of 
providing incentives to create and such incentives are completely removed from the 
creation of an artificial scarcity? Will copyright law still be required, bearing in mind that the 
purpose which it fulfils is no longer needed?80  
 
Barlow argues that because intellectual property relates to a non-tangible work, it is 
obviously very different from physical property. By removing the work from its physical 
embodiment we can no longer treat that work like physical property because the 
differences between the physical and unbound are great. In an example he states “…if we 
continue to assume that value is based on scarcity, as it is with regard to physical objects, 
we will create laws that are precisely contrary to the nature of information, which may, in 
many cases, increase in value with distribution.”81 
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Ray Ku ultimately submits that “the economics of digital technology renders copyright both 
unnecessary and inefficient.”82 As to why he says this, one needs to look at the incentive to 
distribute and the incentive to create respectively in the digital era. 
 
b. Distribution Incentives in the Digital Era 
The argument of distributors can be summed up as follows: if, over time, the growth in 
income and technological advances enlarges the size of the market for any given work, and 
the cost of copying declines, copyright protection should expand.83 In other words, as the 
cost of copying decreases and the quality of copies increases, then the potential for 
unauthorised copies increases. This gives rise to a greater likelihood of more free riders and 
the bundled incentive right suffers from more free riders. Thus greater protection from free 
riders is required and this is done by granting further copyright protection to the incentivists 
groups. 
 
This issue has been termed the ‘incentive-access’ paradox by Professor Lunney.84 The 
paradox of which she speaks relates to the need for an incentive in order to create and 
distribute which in turn allows for greater public access. In an increase in the incentive to 
create and distribute the public is better able to access these works. Therefore, any 
reduction in these incentives will lead to a reduction in the creation and distribution of 
works which will diminish public access to a work. Lunney notes that limiting the protection 
of a work to ensure its dissemination reduces the incentive to disseminate such work in the 
first place.85  
 
In order to prevent the above from happening, so the argument goes, there is a need to 
provide greater protection to these incentives. However, by providing greater protection to 
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the rights of copyright holders in these works, the ability of the public to access these works 
is diminished, which defeats the ultimate goal of providing copyright protection in the first 
place. Obviously, in light of this paradox, it is not in the interests of any of the parties 
concerned to upset the balance of these interests too much. However the balance seems 
largely skewed in favour of the rights of the incentive-based groups. 
 
Bearing in mind that the history of copyright law indicates that the cost of distributions has 
consistently been identified as a barrier to distribution, the following is submitted. If part of 
the purpose of copyright law is to allow for the initial distributor to recover the costs of their 
investment, then surely as digital technology reduces the costs of copying, this would mean 
that the investment in the initial distribution would be reduced by the reduction in the costs 
of manufacturing and distributing these works. Consequently, with a great reduction in this 
cost barrier, the costs which a distributor needs to invest in a work will be reduced.  
 
Following this, the costs which distributors would need to recover from their investment in 
the production and distribution of works would not be as great as they were in the pre-
digital era. It follows that a decrease in the cost of copying should be accompanied by a 
minimising of copy protection rather than an expansion thereof. Instead it seems that the 
public aspect sitting at the heart of copyright law has been ignored, as the public are merely 
viewed as potential infringers while the distributors are viewed as helpless victims. This 
situation is far from the truth.  
 
Ginsburg notes that the rise of digital technology, and copying technologies in general, can 
be seen as having initially shifted the balance of control in favour of the user. She goes on to 
note however that legislative response to this threat, especially in the USA, has swung the 
pendulum greatly in favour of the copyright owners.86 
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Indeed one could argue that a reduction in the cost of copying is a good omen for public 
access rights and that the response of the major stakeholders in the copyright industry 
represents their fear over a loss of control through a reduced need for distributors as a 
result of the reduced need for distribution incentives. Given the historical background of 
copyright law and the constant presence of the hand of distributors in various legislative 
enactments, it is submitted that the rights of the public to access works have taken a back 
seat to the need of distributors to recover the costs of their investment. 
 
An interesting argument raised against the expansion of copyright in order to provide 
greater incentives is based on the submission that digital technology gets rid of the free 
rider problem which plagued the pre-digital era. The submission made by Ray Ku is that the 
public internalise the costs of distribution in a digital environment and as such the content 
of works is disseminated to the public without the need for a distributor. The question 
which arises from this is how exactly does the public internalise the costs of distribution? 
 
The argument submitted is a simple one. The public internalise the costs of distribution by 
purchasing the equipment with which to distribute. Thus the answer to the question of how 
the public internalises the costs of distribution has been stated throughout this chapter and 
is in fact part of the problem. With the rise of relatively cheap digital technology which 
allows for the inexpensive and efficient reproduction of a work which produces a near 
perfect copy of the original, the public carry with them the means to distribute work 
without needing a separate distributor. It has been noted on this point that in purchasing 
the various technologies which allow for reproduction and dissemination the public “…form 
the distribution channels for disseminating digital content.”87 
 
Of course, the success of the above argument relies on the need for some form of royalty or 
licensing system being in place in order to allow the creators of works to benefit from their 
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creative endeavour. Ray Ku identifies that, in the US, revenue will also be received indirectly 
from the royalties provided by the Audio Home Recording Act88 for the sale of blank CDs, 
digital recording devices, and computer hardware.89 Therefore mechanisms are, or can, be 
put in place to ensure that distributors can reap the benefits of their monopoly. Thus the 
current approach to distributors in the digital environment is one of protecting an industry 
which can no longer be seen as a necessity. Yet they still wish to reap the benefits from 
work which is not their own, whilst not being required to distribute this work in a digital 
context.  
 
With the submission that the incentive for distribution is no longer required for digital 
dissemination, one should be wary not to throw the baby out with the bath water. In other 
words, the incentive to create should be viewed as something separate from the incentive 
to distribute, as was the purpose of unbundling the two incentives. If the distribution 
channels of old disappear then so should the rights of distributors. The issue which then 
arises is whether or not the incentive to create is still present in a digital environment. 
 
c. Creation Incentives in the Digital Era 
Throughout most of this chapter the focus on the incentives which copyright provides has 
largely been on distribution. However, with distribution in the digital era no longer entirely 
dependent on an independent distribution industry, it remains to be seen whether 
copyright still serves the purpose of providing an incentive to create. The importance of the 
creation of new works is indeed something which should be of concern, as the ability of the 
public to adopt the distribution role is meaningless without there being any content for 
them to distribute. Furthermore, a market is likely to stagnate where no new works are 
being produced and only old works circulate amongst the public.  
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Ginsburg notes that “economic incentives to create may be needed to achieve *...+ the goal 
of public instruction, but those incentives should be as modest as possible.”90 So does 
copyright provide an incentive for the creation of works in a digital era? In order to answer 
this question one needs to look at the various avenues through which a creator might earn 
revenue from their creative endeavours. 
 
i. Royalties 
The question of whether copyright still provides an incentive to create is difficult to answer 
without looking at how this incentive operated in the pre-digital era. In taking the example 
of a musician, Mann states that it is very rarely that a musician will earn royalties from the 
sale of a CD.91 He notes that musicians, under a standard contract with a record label, may 
often be in debt to the record label that produced their album. This debt relates to the costs 
of “production, marketing, promotion and other expenses” to name a few.92 Mann goes on 
to note that a musician will be required to sell roughly a million copies of an album before 
they will receive any royalty payments. This is due to their debt to their record label. Ray Ku 
notes that “meanwhile the same million copies will have earned the record company 
approximately $11 million *US Dollars+ in gross revenue and $4 million net.”93 This is a 
startling figure given that RIAA research states that less than 1 percent of the audio releases 
between 1992 and 1999 sold a million copies or more.94 On this basis, very few if any 
musicians earn any income from the royalties of album sales. If these artists do not receive 
much of their income from royalty payments then the question arises: Where do they get 
their money? 
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ii. Live Performances 
The greatest asset which a musician has in their arsenal is their monopoly over the 
performance rights for their music. Following this, it has been suggested that most of the 
money which musicians earn comes from touring and live performances.95 Indeed, in North 
America concerts generated over $1 billion in revenue during the year 2000.96 The album 
recordings merely generate publicity to get people to go to the live performances.97 If 
musicians are not earning any income from CD sales then free music serves as a form of 
advertising in that it promotes their main source of income, i.e. ticket sales.98 Besides being 
one of the main forms of income for musicians, touring is also seen as providing other 
benefits to the musicians. 
 
Barlow states that a musician’s greatest means of protecting their intellectual property is 
that they are “the only real-time source of it.”99 He distinguishes between the actual 
experience of being at a live performance and a recording of that performance.100 His 
example specifically refers to the Grateful Dead for whom he wrote lyrics. He submits that a 
recording of a live performance and recordings in general merely represent a ‘thin 
projection’ of the music as a whole, as the music cannot easily be separated from the 
experience of viewing the performance. The power of live performances serves to give 
musicians a means of generating income while album sales mainly serve the interests of 
record labels. This can be seen by looking at a recent example of a free album release by 
Prince in the UK. 
 
In 2007 the musician “Prince” entered into a deal for the free distribution of his album 
“Planet Earth” with the Mail on Sunday newspaper. The newspaper is estimated to have a 
reader circulation of roughly 2.3 million. Based on that estimate, the same number of copies 
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of the album would have been distributed to these readers. These copies were released 
prior to the album launch which was only scheduled for the 24th of July of that year. This 
free album distribution was followed up by 21 live performances by Prince in London’s “02 
Arena”. Free album copies were also distributed with tickets purchased for the show.101 All 
21 shows were completely sold out. One journalist noted that the stadium could hold 24 
000 people.102 Over 21 nights, that adds up to 504 000 people. That number may seem to 
pale in comparison to the reader circulation of the newspaper and the number of albums 
freely distributed, but one could argue that not all of the readers of the newspaper would 
regularly purchase a Prince album or have attended one of his shows. The free album 
distribution thus generated publicity and interest in his live performances which resulted in 
21 sold out shows. Even more interesting was the response of distributors and parties 
involved in the distribution chain to this free distribution. 
 
Sony BMG, the record label concerned with releasing the album, upon hearing the news of 
the free album distribution stated that its UK branch, Sony BMG UK, would not be releasing 
the album in that region due to the free distribution through the newspaper.103 The co-
chairman of the Entertainment Retailers Association stated that "The Artist formerly known 
as Prince should know that with behaviour like this he will soon be the Artist Formerly 
Available in Record Stores."104 He went on to say that "It is an insult to all those record 
stores who have supported Prince throughout his career. It is yet another example of the 
damaging covermount culture which is destroying any perception of value around recorded 
music.”105 It is clear that the distributors of Prince’s music were not pleased by his move to 
give away free copies of his album. The reason for their displeasure seems obvious. The 
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retailers and record label were removed from the distribution chain entirely and as such 
they lost out on revenue which the album would have generated. 
 
It should be made clear that what is being argued here is not that creators do not deserve to 
benefit from their works. Rather, the previous sales-based business models which relied on 
factors such as album sales to generate income provided very little income to creators 
anyway. If the digital era removes the need for the traditional distributor in relation to 
digital copies of works, then these traditional sales-based models do not serve any 
necessary interests. Therefore there should be a shift in the way in which business is done. 
This shift should allow creators to benefit from their works while allowing the public to 
access these works. 
 
iii. Secondary Markets 
The so-called ‘secondary markets’ are said to provide greater opportunities for creators to 
earn more income than their performance and reproduction rights alone would allow. Other 
forms of income generation for creators besides live performance could include, but would 
not be limited to: rights to grant licences for derivative works, trademarks as well as product 
and service endorsements.106 Furthermore, the Internet can be seen as a provider of other 
secondary markets from which creators can derive benefit from their works. 
 
There are various examples of the above which one can consider. The author Stephen King, 
for example, self-published novels including “Riding the Bullet” and “The Plant” and 
released them in instalments through his website.107 This instalment system cost purchasers 
$1 per instalment and $2 thereafter for subsequent instalments. King did not require these 
payments to be made upfront but rather adopted what has been termed the “honour 
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system” or “ransom approach”. King stated that if he did not receive payments from at least 
75% of the purchasers then he would withhold releasing subsequent instalments. Therefore 
fans would ensure that this minimum threshold was reached so that they could purchase 
the subsequent instalments.108 One author noted that “The pass-around dynamic of Web 
publishing will create demand the way radio generates demand for new songs”.109 One issue 
which arises is whether the success of this particular example of self-publishing is due to the 
way in which it was carried out or the author’s fame which created the publicity and 
ultimately the sales. 
 
In literary works, deals between publishers and authors operate on a royalty basis. 
However, these royalty agreements suffer from similar ills to those of musicians and record 
companies. The services provided by publishers are similar to those provided by other 
distributors of copyright works. Examples of these services include in-house editors, 
printing, cover design and distribution. These could be likened to music industry examples 
of producers, album pressing, album artwork and distribution. So in self-publishing their 
work and in making use of the Internet as a distribution tool, an author does not need to 
rely on the distribution services offered by publishers.  
 
Arguments on the viability of the self-publishing route seem to depend on who is being 
asked. On the possible success of the self-publishing model, one author notes that the 
increased profitability of the self-publishing model will likely draw more authors into 
distributing their works in this manner.110 Unpublished authors or so-called ‘slush pile’ 
authors would be drawn to this distribution method because it is cheap while the best-
selling authors would make use of this method of distribution because of the greater 
income to be made.111 Publishers are however quick to point out that “big publishers' 
economies of scale allow them to do business more cheaply and effectively than authors 
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could by paying editors, printers and everyone else.”112 They further point out, that most 
authors are concerned with the creative process of writing and do not really have any desire 
to be involved in the actual mechanisms of distribution. This argument could be extended to 
the authors of other copyright content such as music. It is therefore submitted that the 
success of these kinds of distribution models, for example self-publishing, will largely be 
determined in time.  
 
A music-based example of adopting alternative distribution methods which does not rely on 
the sales-based revenue model could be seen in the album release of Radiohead’s seventh 
album “In Rainbows”. The band initially released the album in a digital format on October 
10th  2007 and a pre-order ’discbox‘ which cost £40.113 The album in its digital format could 
be downloaded from the band’s website on a ‘pay-what-you-want’ basis. According to one 
report, most fans paid nothing to download the album. It was however noted that the 
money it had generated purely through its digital distribution was greater than the total 
money generated by their previous album “Hail to the Thief” in 2003.114 
 
d. Conclusion 
On this basis, can it really be said that copyright provides an incentive for creators to create? 
If very few musicians receive royalties from their album sales and rely largely on touring and 
live performances for income, then surely the copyright protection of the physical 
embodiment of their creation, e.g. CDs, provides them with no financial incentive. It is clear 
from the above examples that the only financial interests that the sales of CDs serve are 
those of the distributors. Ginsburg suggests that “digital media, by making the means of 
production and dissemination available to any computer-equipped author, gives authors a 
realistic opportunity to bring their works to the public without having to put themselves in 
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thrall to traditional intermediaries.”115 If the digital era no longer requires these traditional 
distributors, then what purpose does copyright serve in this regard? 
 
If the free rider problem is not in fact a problem anymore, then the means of protecting 
against the problem may not be required. Thus, while it is acknowledged that the digital 
dilemma represents a very real threat to the interests of distributors, it remains to be seen 
whether the ‘dilemma’ will have as dramatic an impact on the interests of creators and 
ultimately the public. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Davies notes that the Statute of Anne arose as the result of “a new communications 
technology, the printing press, and modern copyright laws have to be regularly fine-tuned 
to adapt to the new communications technologies of the day.”116 Ginsburg explains that 
“...each significant technological progress may alter the balance of control between authors 
and users, in turn eventually prompting a new legal calibration.”117 This is a fine idea in 
theory but the situation does not appear as rosy when one considers that this slow 
incremental tweaking of the law will be rapidly outpaced by technology which advances and 
evolves “in lunging jerks, like the punctuation of a biological evolution grotesquely 
accelerated.”118 
 
This is one of the contradictions present in the use of copyright law as a means of protecting 
digital content. Copyright works have a public good quality to them. The physical 
embodiment of a copyright work is subject to a property right which in turn protects the 
content. In the absence of this physical embodiment and the limitations which they entail, 
various measures are used in order to attempt to protect these rights. 
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In an environment in which the, so called, ‘wine bottle’ is disappearing, how is one to 
protect the ‘wine’, where the previous methods of protection only worked because of the 
bottle? The digital era in which the world largely finds itself has lead to an increased 
removal of the physical embodiments of copyright works. In the absence of these physical 
embodiments, copyright law is now attempting to protect the idea itself. This protection of 
an idea becomes ever more difficult by claiming such protection on the basis of a property 
right. How can one claim a property right over something which is for all intents and 
purposes an abstraction?  
 
It is clear that the very thing on which copyright law once relied in order to claim legitimacy 
over the property rights which it protected is disappearing. In an attempt to hold onto and 
protect rights which are rapidly eroding in the face of the digital era and social norms, 
copyright holders protect their rights by making use of litigation, Digital Rights Management 
Systems and legislation. It is these means of protection and their advantages and 
disadvantages as well as their possible success which will be examined in chapters 3 and 4 of 
this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 
Digital Rights Management Systems 
1. Introduction 
Amidst the myriad of articles and discussions by commentators about DRM systems and 
their implications for copyright law, it is easy to get lost as to the meaning of the term 
‘DRM’. From the outset of this chapter it is necessary to note that the term DRM is not one 
which is easily defined. Bechtold states that “DRM architectures range from simple copy-
protection technologies to comprehensive secure distribution systems.”119 From this it is 
apparent that the term does not comprise of one over-arching definition, but is rather an 
umbrella term which incorporates a number of different aspects. These include various 
technologies, economic theories, legal implications and business models. These aspects will 
be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
   
In undertaking an analysis of DRM systems, it is important to understand why these systems 
have become so prevalent of late. In examining this prevalence a basic understanding of 
how these systems work is required. Through this understanding the advantages and 
disadvantages of these systems will become apparent.  
 
This chapter will examine DRM systems. In undertaking this analysis, it is intended that the 
reader is made aware of the complexity of these systems and, ultimately, both the positive 
and negative effects which these complex systems have on copyright laws in various 
jurisdictions throughout the world.  
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2. What are DRM systems? 
To reiterate what was noted in the introduction to this chapter, DRM is an umbrella term 
incorporating various aspects. Therefore, ascertaining what DRM systems are requires an 
analysis of the intertwined relationship between the various components which make up 
the whole.  
 
While DRM systems have recently become something which are rather in vogue in the world 
of digital property of late, it is important to realise that these systems are not as novel as 
many might think. Various commentators identify numerous examples of attempts to make 
use of technological protection of content throughout the 20th century.120  
 
a. Examples of technological protection in the Pre-Digital Era 
Examples of these include the “Xanadu” project. The concept on which this project is based 
started in the 1960s as the brain-child of Theodor H Nelson. The “Xanadu docuverse” is a 
digitized and decentralized library. This site allows for authors to be automatically 
remunerated for any of their works which are accessed or used via the site.121 
 
A further example was the use of dongles. This usage was largely prevalent during the 1980s 
but has since given way to other technologies. This technology protected content by only 
allowing access where the necessary hardware, i.e. the dongle, was present. In a practical 
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sense, dongles are pieces of hardware that are similar to USB drives in their appearance and 
which are attached to a port of a computer in order to allow secured software to run.122 
There are numerous other examples which one can to look to when examining this issue.123 
What is important with regard to this research is how the law has reacted to these new 
technologies and the changes which they generate. 
 
b. The law’s response to technological protection 
Ginsburg identifies two types of cases in the US relating to the issue of the protection of 
copyrighted content when such content is confronted with a new technology.124 The first 
are cases where the copyright owners seek payment for the exploitation of their works 
through new technologies. The second types are those cases in which the copyright owners 
try to prevent new means of dissemination from becoming available to the public. These 
two types of cases indicate the willingness of courts in the US to protect such content in 
certain situations and not in others.  
 
In the first type of case, the copyright owners are generally successful in enforcing their 
rights and being compensated for the use of their works. Early examples of such cases 
concerned radio stations and public performance licences.125 These stations claimed that 
they did not require a performance licence to broadcast music. Their argument focussed on 
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the requirement that a licence be obtained for the public performance of a work which was 
subject to copyright where the public performance was for profit. In the various noted 
cases, the radio stations argued either that they were not required to obtain a licence as 
their broadcasts were free and therefore not for profit or that the performance was not 
public as the broadcasts were received in private residences.126 
 
The courts in these cases disagreed with the arguments advanced by the radio stations. The 
definition of ‘for profit’ was seen to include transmissions which were received in places 
open to the public regardless of whether or not an entrance fee was charged. So for 
example, if one was in a shop or a restaurant and the radio was playing, this would 
constitute a ‘public performance for profit’ and as such a licence would be required by the 
shopkeeper. As for the argument that a broadcast to a private residence was not a ‘public 
performance’, the court adopted the approach that a broadcast or ‘performance’ which was 
received by the public constituted a public performance. The end result of these types of 
cases was that US courts would support the copyright holders’ protection of their rights 
where it was clear that these groups were attempting to exploit the new technology in 
order to derive a benefit from their copyright. 
 
With regard to the second type of case, the courts have been less sympathetic to copyright 
holders. In these cases copyright holders who were seen as trying to block a certain type of 
reproduction or means of dissemination which had arisen as a result of a new technology 
were less likely to succeed with their claims. Ginsburg states that the courts would be 
hesitant to give full protection to the copyright where copyright holders “…were seeking to 
prohibit a new form of reproduction and distribution, or to leverage their exclusive 
reproduction rights into monopoly power over the device employed to effect the new kinds 
of reproduction.”127 Examples of these types of cases include cable television and the 
retransmission of local signals128 as well as cases of importing a distant signal.129 These cases 
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will not be discussed in any sort of detail but rather their decisions and comments thereon 
serve to illustrate the point.  
 
It has been noted on these two types of cases that the decisions seem strained and are 
more a means to an end in allowing the courts to correct behaviour which it perceived as 
television companies trying to prevent the emergence of rivals, rather than protect its 
content or the means through which it was broadcast.130 
 
Perhaps the best example to deal with in relation to this second type of case is the US case, 
Sony Corporation of America v Universal City Studieos, Inc.131 This case, also referred to as 
the “Betamax case”, serves as an example of how holders of copyright have attempted to 
use technological protection measures as well as license agreements with the producers of 
electronic devices in order to control usage and protect their content. These two measures 
of protection will be discussed in greater detail in parts B and C of this chapter. The case also 
provides an example of how the holders of copyrights attempt to throw their weight, and 
money, around in order to get the maximum control over their content. This exercise, as will 
be seen, is often done at the expense of the consumer. 
 
c. The ‘Betamax’ case 
The facts of the case were that the respondent, Universal City Studios, had sued the 
appellants, Sony, for manufacturing and distributing certain technology. This technology 
was a mass market VCR which, the respondents alleged, allowed for home users to create 
unauthorised copies of works. These unauthorised works, it was alleged, had the effect of 
infringing on the copyright of Universal City Studios and as a result Universal sought to hold 
the manufacturer of the VCR liable for this possible infringement. The majority decision held 
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that the manufacturer could not be held liable for creating a technology which some users 
may use to create infringing copies.132 This was qualified by the fact that the device was 
capable of a performing a substantial number of functions which did not infringe on the 
copyright of Universal City Studios.133  
 
Put differently, “where a technology has many uses, the public cannot be denied the lawful 
uses just because some (or many or most) may use the product to infringe copyright.”134 
This judgment may seem to be heavily in favour of the producers of technology. The overall 
effect of this decision, so it has been argued, amounts to an acceptance of devices which 
allow for infringing uses and ultimately condoning piracy. While this is partially true, it does 
not tell the entire story. 
 
In order to truly understand this decision, one needs to consider certain factors. On this 
point Ginsburg identifies that the ‘Betamax’ case shares certain common features with the 
cable television cases mentioned in part b above. The author first notes that the 
respondent, in suing the appellant, was trying to prevent the VCR from being distributed. 
This was not purely due to the device’s ability to create infringing copies of works. Rather, 
this attempted prevention was also based on the fact that the movie industry was 
attempting to surpass the VCR with a different device which it approved of. This approved 
device was a non-recordable videodisc player.135 Furthermore, the author notes that “the 
majority of the court found no economic harm to the existing markets from ‘time-shifting’ 
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of free broadcast television (having excluded other kinds of copying or programming from 
its analysis).”136 One could also note that, in spite of their protests, the movie industry had 
failed to realise the dramatic economic potential which it may, and ultimately would, realise 
in this new market.  
 
d. The effect of the ‘Betamax’ case 
The importance of the decision in the Betamax case cannot be overlooked. The judgment 
provides a safe haven by offering protection to inventors and producers of devices that may 
allow for both infringing and non-infringing uses. This case ensured that technological 
progression is not hampered by the entertainment industry’s efforts to completely control 
usage of its works. The Electronic Frontiers Foundation notes that “It's thanks to the 
Betamax ruling that the makers of VCRs and every other technology capable of infringing 
and non-infringing uses (e.g., personal computers, CD burners, the TiVo DVR, Apple's iPod, 
and Web browsers) can continue to sell their wares without fear of lawsuits from copyright 
owners.”137 
 
It should be noted that the author is not suggesting that copyright works do not require 
protection. Rather it is submitted that a balance needs to be struck between copyright 
holders, innovation and consumer rights. It is believed that a finding in favour of the movie 
industry in the ‘Betamax case’ would have greatly shifted this balance in favour of the 
copyright holders. It would have allowed the holders of copyright to determine what devices 
could be used in order to play their works. From this, the holders of copyrights would have 
far greater control over the usage of their works as well as access to their works. This would 
ultimately leave the consumer with very few rights over the work which they purchased. 
Furthermore, it would leave inventors in the unfortunate position of having to ask the 
entertainment industry for permission every time they wished to invent something which 
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may allow for unauthorised copies of a work to be made or face possible litigation and 
liability.138 
 
While it is understood that copyright law is meant to grant the author a limited monopoly 
over their work, it is submitted that a majority decision in favour of the movie industry 
would have allowed copyright holders to greatly over-step the bounds of that limited 
monopoly.  It is further submitted that a decision in favour of the movie industry in the 
Betamax case would have stifled technological progression. This would be 
counterproductive for copyright holders as new technology has been shown to provide 
these groups with a new and/or slightly altered market which may allow them to realise a 
greater economic benefit from their copyright works. 
 
e. The Rio case – an audio example 
The case of Recording Industry Association of America v Diamond Multimedia Systems139 
was a decision which followed on from the ‘Betamax case’. The case concerned a portable 
MP3 player called “Rio” which was manufactured by the respondent. The statute under 
which the case was decided was the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992.140 The purpose of 
this Act was largely to protect the music industry from the threat posed by the emergence 
of Digital Audio Tapes, especially in the wake of the ‘Betamax judgment’.141  
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In terms of subchapter B section 1002 (a) of the Act, a prohibition was placed “on the 
importation, manufacture, and distribution of digital audio recording devices or digital audio 
interface devices that do not conform to *some form of copy control+.”  The copy control 
incorporated into the device must either have been the Serial Copy Management System 
(SCMS) or a similar type of copy control.  
 
Subchapter 3 sections 1003 - 1007 further requires that manufacturers of digital audio 
recording devices or digital audio interface devices pay a statutorily imposed royalty for 
each device sold. The purpose of this royalty seems to have been to allay the fears of the 
RIAA and other associations of entertainment groups which feared the loss of revenue they 
might face as a result of unauthorised digital copying of their works. 
 
It was apparent that the respondents did not intend to pay royalties as required by the Act. 
The appellant contended that they were entitled to royalties from the respondents in terms 
of the Act. They further argued that the respondent’s Rio product did not incorporate the 
SCMS copy control, nor any other form of copy control, and therefore did not meet the 
requirements in terms of the Act. As a result of both of these failures to comply with the Act 
the RIAA enjoined the respondents by way of an injunction. This meant in a practical sense 
that the RIAA was attempting to block the distribution of the respondent’s device.  
 
The Ninth Circuit court which heard the appeal, found that although the Rio device did not 
incorporate the measures of copy control required by section 1002 (a), this was irrelevant. 
The court held that the Rio product was not a digital audio recording device as defined by 
the Act. Therefore the provisions of the Act did not apply to the respondent and their 
product did not require copy control, nor were the respondents required to pay any 
royalties to the appellant for each device sold. 
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Whether or not this decision is correct is open to debate. A digital audio recording device is 
defined in subchapter A section 1001 of the Act as  
“…any machine or device of a type commonly distributed to individuals for use by 
individuals, whether or not included with or as part of some other machine or 
device, the digital recording function of which is designed or marketed for the 
primary purpose of, and that is capable of, making a digital audio copied recording 
for private use…”  
In terms of this definition the Rio device did not strictly fall within its ambit. The court in this 
case held that “…a device falls within the Act's provisions if it can indirectly copy a digital 
music recording by making a copy from a transmission of that recording.”142 The way in 
which the device worked was that MP3 files would be placed on the internal memory of the 
device or on a memory card supported by the device. The actual Rio device did not record 
the music itself, but rather music was transferred onto it from a PC. On this point the court 
found “because the Rio cannot make copies from transmissions, but instead, can only make 
copies from a computer hard drive, it is not a digital audio recording device. For the 
foregoing reasons, the Rio is not a digital audio recording device subject to the restrictions 
of the Act.”143 
 
On this issue Ginsburg notes that the argument could be made that the transfer of those 
MP3 files from a PC to the Rio meant that the Rio created its own copies of those files.144 
This argument was rejected by the Ninth Circuit as the court held that the Rio device was 
only indirectly capable of reproducing a transmission. 145 Because of this finding Ginsburg 
submits that the judgment was influenced to some extent by the courts perception that the 
RIAA was attempting to prevent the dissemination of the Rio. This harks back to Ginsburg’s 
second type of case as discussed in 2.ii above and serves as an example of the courts 
reluctance to provide protection for copyright holders in such circumstances. 
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f. Conclusion 
The above provide examples of attempts to protect copyrighted content from new 
technological means which allow for both non-infringing as well as possible infringing uses. 
What must be taken from these examples is that the previous measures used by copyright 
holders to protect their content from technology capable of both types of uses were largely 
unsuccessful. It was from the limited success of these previous measures that the arrival of 
digital content, while posing a serious threat to digital content, also provided a platform for 
copyright holders.  
 
New means of protection had to be sought which allowed for a secure platform from which 
the greatest degree of control over the content could be retained by the copyright holders. 
It is through this need that DRM systems should be viewed. In other words, the nature of 
digital technology allowed copyright holders to take protective measures into their own 
hands without much concern for the decisions in the Rio or the Betamax cases. 
 
It is important to note that while technological protection is an integral part of a DRM 
system, it is not its sole means of protection. Rather, a complex DRM system will make use 
of technology license agreements, usage contracts (in the form of shrink-wrap and click-
wrap agreements), as well as technological means of protection. It is the 
interconnectedness of these components which, along with anti-circumvention legislation 
(which will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 4), make DRM systems so 
formidable. 
 
Bechtold notes that DRM systems do more than merely offer protection against the copying 
of content; they also offer a means of identifying and managing that content. If a DRM 
system allows for the above then it provides “a secure distribution platform” for this 
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content.146 The ability to manage and identify this digital content is mostly done through the 
use of metadata. When content can be identified and managed, then an environment is 
present which facilitates the trading of digital content and digital rights. Thus metadata 
plays a vital role in DRM systems. The following subsection will provide greater detail as to 
how metadata identifies and manages digital content and how it allows for the facilitation of 
trade in digital content and rights. 
 
3. Metadata 
Metadata literally means data about data.147 The International Federation of Library 
Associations and Institutions (IFLA) defines metadata as follows. “The term refers to any 
data used to aid the identification, description and location of networked electronic 
resources. Many different metadata formats exist, some quite simple in their description, 
others quite complex and rich.”148 
 
Bechtold explains: 
 “…the machine-readable identification and description of 
1. Content, content providers and rights holders; 
2. Usage rules under which content may be accessed and used; and of 
3. Users of protected content.”149 
 
What does all of this actually mean? As stated earlier, metadata is literally data about data. 
This means that a file on a computer such as an MP3 file (music) or an AVI file (video) is in 
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and of itself data. Metadata is attached to that file and serves to provide certain information 
about that file/data. A very basic example of this can be obtained by right-clicking on a file, 
using a Microsoft Windows operation system,150 and clicking on properties. Those file 
properties constitute metadata as they provide information about the data/file.   
 
Further examples will help to clarify this concept. The information contained in the 
metadata of an MP3 file could include: the artist’s name, the song title, the album title, the 
track number, the writer of the song, the year in which the album was released etc. The 
metadata relating to a PDF or an EPUB file could include: the title of the book, the author’s 
name, the publisher, the cover artist, the year it was published etc.151 This information 
allows for the uses described above, i.e. identification and description of the file, which in 
turn provides a platform for the rights holder to manage their rights more effectively. 
  
Thus metadata serves to provide a means of identifying and describing data. However, 
metadata alone cannot control usage of and access to data. It is only when used in 
conjunction with certain DRM technologies that it allows for the rights holder of digital 
content to control the use of and access to that digital content.152  
 
For instance, a holder of copyright for an e-book, such as the latest Bret Easton Ellis novel, 
would not be able to control who could access that novel and how that novel could be used 
by that purchaser by making use of metadata alone. Some means of capturing this 
information is required, and once that information has been obtained some means of 
distinguishing authorised from unauthorised users of the content is required. Furthermore, 
a method of restricting the use of that content between authorised users is needed. This is 
where DRM technology steps in. 
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The means of controlling access could be carried out in various ways, but one of the most 
common methods for e-books is encryption and password protection. Any customer wishing 
to read an e-book would only be able to do so by purchasing the novel through the proper 
channels. With this being done, the consumer would then receive a medium (usually a 
decryption key which will be hidden to the purchaser) through which the novel could be 
decrypted and read.153 Thus, access to the copyright content is limited by the holder of the 
copyright in that novel to those consumers who purchase the content through the correct 
channels, i.e. those consumers who have paid for the novel.  
 
The ability of these systems extends to allowing for a compromised consumer device to be 
revoked and or disabled by the device manufacturer.154 Such control is usually granted 
through the end-user licence agreements or terms of service agreements which are 
discussed in greater detail in part 6 of this chapter. A good example of this ability to revoke 
or disable a compromised consumer device can be seen in the the recent situation where 
Amazon deleted copies of George Orwell’s classic “1984” from Kindle users’ devices due to 
copyright issues. This revocation was made without the affected consumers being warned 
of the deletion and without any apparent recourse in terms of the end-user agreement 
which the customers had entered into with Amazon.155 
 
The holder of copyright in digital content also has the ability, through a DRM system, to 
control how that content is used. This usage control includes under what circumstances the 
content could be used and for what purpose.156 So if we look at the Bret Easton Ellis e-book 
example, the holder of the copyright in that novel would be able to control what devices 
that novel could be read on. Furthermore, they could control whether or not a ‘loan’ of that 
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novel could be made to others for a limited period of time. Further limitations include 
limitations on copying and printing of e-books.157 
 
Determining these usage rights largely comes down to the devices on which the digital 
content can be used. Each device will have certain usage limitations placed on them in 
terms of various agreements between the manufacturers of those electronic devices and 
the holders of the copyright in digital content to be used on those devices. These 
relationships, referred to as technology licence agreements, will be discussed in greater 
detail in part 5 of this chapter.  
 
An example of the above would be if one were to purchase an e-book from Amazon.com, 
only to find that the e-book can be used on Amazon’s Kindle e-reader only. Another 
example would be Apple’s digital music player the ”iPod” and its associated software 
‘iTunes’. Apple made use of a DRM system called ”FairPlay”.  
 
This FairPlay DRM system did not impose overly stringent limitations on the usage of 
content.158 The controversy surrounding it, however, was that Apple refused to licence it to 
others. This effectively meant that songs downloaded by users, which incorporated the 
FairPlay system, could only be used in conjunction with the iTunes program and/or on 
another Apple product, for example an iPod. The problem with this is apparent. Apple had 
effectively cornered the online digital music market by controlling the devices on which 
content was available. This had the effect of determining what devices users would be more 
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likely to purchase in order to allow them to properly use content which they had purchased. 
The FairPlay system is no longer in effect as Apple began phasing it out in 2009. The 
example is still of interest when considering the way in which a DRM system was used to 
control the market.159  
 
These examples indicate that the usage rights of digital content are not only controlled by 
the content, but also by the devices associated with the use of that content. 
 
The relationship which exists between copyright holders, electronic device manufacturers 
and makers of DRM systems requires greater investigation as this relationship has a 
tremendous impact on the DRM market. Furthermore, these relationships ultimately have 
an effect on consumers and their enjoyment of copyright material and, as such, are worthy 
of further analysis. 
 
4. Serial Copy Management System – An example of technological protection 
In the earlier discussion of the RIAA v Diamond Multimedia160 case it was noted that the 
Audio Home Recording Act for the first time required a form of copy protection to be used 
in relation to certain audio devices. SCMS represents the copy protection agreed upon 
between the RIAA and manufacturers of electronic devices. It serves as an example of 
technological means of protecting digital content. In terms of the Audio Home Recording 
Act, SCMS is required in both recordable CDs as well as digital recording devices.  
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This DRM operates only in respect of digital audio and does not effect analogue audio 
copying. The purpose of SCMS is twofold.161 Firstly, it controls the number of copies which 
can be made from the original audio content. Secondly, it prevents serial copies from being 
produced from those first generation copies. It should be noted that SCMS allows for 
unlimited first generation copies to be produced from a digital master.162  
 
In very basic terms, the system operates by placing a copy protection bit into a digital 
recording. This bit is present in both the digital master as well as subsequent copies. The 
copy protection can be varied by toggling the copy bit on the CD. If the copy protection is 
set to a high frequency then only one copy may be made from the original, whereas if there 
is no copy protection the copy bit will be toggled to ‘off’ or to a low frequency.163 Therefore 
a high frequency indicates a high level of copy protection where a maximum of one copy of 
an original CD could be made for personal use, while a low frequency represents little or no 
copy protection where any number of copies can be made from an original. Subsequent 
copies feature copy protection bits which are toggled on and off and prevent further copies 
from being made from these subsequent copies.164 
 
What this means in practice is that this system would allow one to purchase an original 
music CD, for example a copy of David Bowie’s “The Rise and Fall of Ziggy Stardust”. If the 
CD has a high level of copy protection, one would be able to insert it into a PC and make a 
single copy for private use. However, subsequent copies could not be produced from the 
personal copy which was made from the original. Furthermore, depending on the level of 
copy protection, I might not be able to create a subsequent copy of the original CD.  
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However, if that original David Bowie CD I purchased had a low level of copy protection or 
no copy protection at all then I would be able to make any number of copies from that 
original. Although the SCMS protection would still prevent me from making further copies 
from those first generation copies which I had made.  
 
Ultimately the purpose of the SCMS scheme is to limit unauthorised copies of musical 
copyrighted works.165 This is achieved through legislative requirements that certain audio 
devices which are capable of making digital recordings make use of copy protection. While 
the Audio Home Recording Act provides an example of one way in which DRM systems are 
implemented, it must be noted that such legislative means are not the only form of 
implementing these systems. A further example is the way in which certain DRM systems 
are linked to certain licensors and technologies. It is these relationships to which this 
chapter now turns its attention. 
 
5. Technology Licences 
a. The parties 
In an analysis of the technology licences within the DRM context, one needs to have an 
understanding of the relevant role players in relation to any DRM system. Firstly, there is 
the holder of the copyright in the particular content for which protection is sought. This first 
party will often have their interests represented by an association of similar rights holders, 
for example the RIAA. Secondly, there are the manufacturers of electronic devices on which 
the particular digital content will largely be used. An example of such a manufacturer would 
be Apple, who manufacture consumer devices such as iPods on which MP3 files can be 
played, or the iPad which performs a number of roles including being e-book reader. Finally, 
there are the developers of DRM technologies. These developers create the DRM 
technology which goes into the manufacturer’s device, or it is embedded into the digital 
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content. Therefore, licence agreements are required between these parties to regulate their 
relationships with one another in this complex context. 
 
With reference to these licences, Bechtold notes that the licensees will usually include 
“…manufacturers of consumer electronics, computers, storage media and other DRM-
enabled devices and components as well as content providers.”166 He goes on to note that 
the licensors of these technologies are the developers themselves or a specialised licensing 
agent.167 It is these relationships between the licensors and licensees that require further 
attention. This is especially so in relation to the balance of bargaining power which the 
various parties have when setting up these license agreements. 
 
The following provides a general scenario of the way in which the relationships between the 
parties will generally operate. The association representing the rights holders will require 
that the content which it releases be encrypted prior to its release. The onus is then placed 
on the manufacturer to make use of some form of DRM technology in order to decrypt this 
encrypted data. The particular DRM technology to be used will usually be specified by the 
association of rights holders in terms of the type of encryption it uses for its content. The 
manufacturers, in order to use that particular digital content on their devices, are then 
required to approach the developer of the specified DRM technology or a licensing body and 
enter into a licence agreement with them for the particular decryption system they require.   
 
In a practical sense, if the RIAA were the association of rights holders concerned, then the 
RIAA would require that all digital audio files which it released be given some level of 
encryption prior to its release. If Apple, as the device manufacturer, wishes to make use of 
the RIAA’s content then it will be required to incorporate the appropriate DRM technology 
which is capable of decrypting the encrypted content, which in this case would be SCMS. 
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Apple would then have to approach the particular developer or licensor of SCMS technology 
and enter into a licence agreement in order to incorporate SCMS technology into its devices.  
 
There are problems which must be noted with this particular example. The Audio Home 
Recording Act creates a statutory requirement which means that the manufacturers of 
electronic devices, such as Apple, are required to make use of a particular DRM technology 
that has been agreed on and recommended to the government by the RIAA. Therefore a 
situation is created where the parties to these licensing agreements are not entering into 
these agreements on an equal footing. This inequality in terms of bargaining power means 
that at least one of the parties to these agreements is going to be prejudiced in some way 
by the agreement. 
  
In turn, the licence agreements between the developers or licensing bodies with the 
manufacturers will incorporate various terms and conditions which safeguard the interests 
of rights holders. This scenario can be seen as operating on a quid pro quo basis. In other 
words, the rights holders will make use of a particular DRM technology and in exchange the 
DRM developer will ensure that its license agreements with manufacturers have the best 
interests of those rights holders at their foundation. Bechtold submits that in order for a 
DRM system to be successful, it requires a large amount of available content to be used 
within that system.168 In other words, device manufacturers are not going to make use of a 
DRM technology where this technology will not be capable of decrypting the majority of 
digital content which could be available for that device. 
 
In order for the manufacturers to have a commercially successful device they require an 
appropriate amount of content to be used on that device. In order to have this content they 
will need to enter into licence agreements with the developers of DRM technology. 
Therefore the manufacturers appear to be at the mercy of the developers of DRM 
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technology, while developers are themselves subject to the wishes of the content holders. 
In fact, it could be said that both manufacturers and developers are ultimately at the mercy 
of content providers.  
 
The rights holders decide which DRM technology to use in relation to their content. It is on 
this basis that Bechtold argues that these licensing agreements protect the interests of 
rights holders despite the fact that they are not usually the licensor.169 He further submits 
that this issue is largely overlooked in debates regarding such licence agreements.170  
 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the term ‘DRM’ does not have an exact definition. 
The term does not refer to technology in general but rather to interlinked components 
which make up a DRM system. This interlinked aspect is notable when looking at DRM 
technology licence agreements. These agreements often require that when making use of 
one DRM technology, various others must be used in conjunction with it.171 While this can 
be seen as ensuring a level of uniformity with regard to the protection of their digital 
content, it can also be seen as anti-competitive behaviour as certain DRM developers will be 
excluded from these deals. This anti-competitive issue, while noteworthy, is beyond the 
scope of this research.172 
 
Examples of these sorts of licence agreements include the Content Scrambling System (CSS) 
used in DVD players. This licence agreement for CSS requires that manufacturers implement 
regional coding technology into their devices. This sort of regionally-based coding, as 
alluded to in the Australian case of Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer 
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Entertainment,173goes further than protecting the content from infringement and steps into 
the realms of price discrimination based on different regional business models.  
 
In this case the High Court of Australia confirmed an appeal in which the developer of a 
modification chip,174 which was used in a Sony Playstation gaming console, was found not to 
have infringed s116AO of the Australian Copyright Act.175 This section prohibits the sale or 
distribution of devices designed for the purposes of circumventing a technological 
protection measure. This in turn had the effect of bypassing the access coding built into 
authentic Sony Playstation games. Put simply, the mod chip allowed for games from other 
regions as well as copied games to be played on a Playstation console which had this chip 
installed. Thus in effect it allowed for both infringing and non-infringing use of the console. 
 
The mod chip also had the effect of allowing legally purchased and fully licensed Playstation 
games which had been purchased in different geographical regions to be played in a region 
for which the access codes which had been built into the CD would otherwise not allow. 
 
b. Licence agreement terms and conditions 
The DRM technology licence itself places various obligations on the parties involved. These 
obligations relate to the way in which the DRM technology is implemented and used by the 
manufacturers of electronic devices. They further allow for the exercise of some level of 
control over how the end-user of the device and the content can use both that device and 
that content. Indeed it has been noted that these licences “…are used to establish a 
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comprehensive DRM system architecture that enables secure transmission from the content 
provider to each consumer.”176 All of this is done with the aim of, and some might argue 
under the guise of, preventing copyright infringement through the piracy of the digital 
content concerned.  
 
There are numerous examples of these sorts of technology licence agreements. In analysing 
these technology licences, the Content Protection for Recordable Media (CPRM)/Content 
Protection for Pre-recorded Media (CPPM) licence Agreement will be examined. A brief 
description of these systems will provide a basis for understanding the terms and conditions 
of these agreements.  
  
i. CPRM/CPPM – An example 
These DRM systems were developed by “The 4C Entity” which is a group comprised of four 
large technology manufacturers, specifically: IBM, Intel, Panasonic and Toshiba. The 
company claims that these systems can be used in a vast number of electronic devices to 
protect entertainment content. The company states that their CPRM and CPPM systems 
“define a renewable cryptographic method for protecting entertainment content when 
recorded on removable and portable physical media including, but not limited to, DVD 
media and Flash memory.”177  
 
The way in which these DRM systems protect content is by making use of a cipher (the C2 
Cipher) which is capable of encrypting and decrypting content. The circumvention of this 
cipher, so the developer claims, would require the use of the C2 algorithm which can only 
be obtained from the developer under a licence agreement.178 This agreement however 
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expressly prohibits the dissemination of such information179 or the use of this privileged 
information for the use of circumvention.180 Therefore, even greater legal protection is 
provided by the licensing agreement.  
 
This system also makes use of media key blocks. Media key blocks are placed on DVDs which 
make use of CPRM protection. These key blocks are ultimately device keys. Thus protection 
is offered by this DRM system through the use of two different technologies: device keys 
and encryption. 
 
In practice these systems operate in the following manner. The pre-recorded content is 
placed on a DVD and encrypted using a key. The media key blocks are placed on the DVD in 
a sector which is not subject to copying. Device keys are given to licensed products, i.e. 
devices such as DVD players. These licensed products will then be able to make use of DVDs 
which use the CPRM system. The device keys and media key blocks built into the devices 
thus allow for decryption of the encrypted content.181 
 
The terms and conditions of these licence agreements often require that the DRM 
technology be implemented by the manufacturer in “a robust and secure way”.182 These 
robust measures extend to both hardware183 and software.184 An example of the kinds of 
measures used to protect the integrity of a DRM system through the use of software 
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includes self-checking (which protects the data where the system has been altered).185 This 
prevents the system from performing its task in authorising use and decrypting or 
encrypting the content. 
 
The use of hardware to protect the integrity of a DRM system includes: the embedding of 
device keys in the silicon of the hardware;186 making use of a hardware construction which 
poses a greater degree of risk of material damage to the device should it be tampered 
with187 or should a security function fail.188 The example of this type of approach which is 
used in the CPRM Licence Agreement, is soldering something onto a circuit board rather 
than making use of a socketed item which can be replaced or taken out easily.189 
 
These licence agreements do not stop at specifying what measures should be used to 
protect the integrity of the DRM system. They further specify that the measures used to 
implement all of the software and hardware protection used must meet a certain level of 
robustness. In other words, the hardware and software protection must be difficult for a 
user to overcome.190 The CPRM Licence stipulates that the levels of robustness that must be 
met are as follows. The Security Functions cannot be defeated by or circumvented through 
the use of widely available191 or specialised tools192 and can be defeated, with difficulty, by 
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professional tools.193 Therefore these licences not only determine the means to be used to 
protect the integrity of the DRM system but they also determine the level of protection 
which the means used require. 
 
Apart from the above requirements, if new circumstances arise which would have 
prevented the device from passing the standards required by sections 3 and 4 of the 
Robustness Rules, then the licensee will be required to rectify these issues. This is to be 
done by incorporating upgrades into their product which are in compliance with the 
robustness rules or redesigning their product so as to allow it to meet these 
requirements.194  
 
The above Robustness Rules have been used as an example of the level of control which is 
present in these DRM systems on the part of the developers. The developer of the DRM 
system controls the way in which their systems are to be used in a device, how that device 
will implement these systems and how that device will continue to implement these 
systems in the future. This control carries through from the construction of the device to the 
required level of robustness and even allows for the licensor to inspect manufacturer’s 
devices which it reasonably believes are not complying with the required standards. 
 
It is important to remember the power which the rights holders in digital content have in 
respect of these works. This power allows them to largely determine which DRM technology 
to use to protect their content. The developers of DRM technologies thus go further than 
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merely creating technologies to protect this digital content, but also incorporate and 
enforce terms and conditions in their licence agreements which protect the interests of 
these content holders. Added to this is the continuing trend by rights holders in digital 
content to litigate against “producers and suppliers of technology that has both infringing 
and non-infringing uses”. Recent court decisions have been holding these ‘producers and 
suppliers’ liable for infringement by their users.195 This all ensures the survivability of their 
business in an exceptionally competitive market. 
 
The level of control exercised by the developers of DRM technologies, when coupled with 
the notion that the holders of rights in digital content have a great amount of say in the 
DRM system to be used to protect their content, may create the impression that the 
manufacturers do not have much power in terms of these relationships. It is submitted that 
this is not the case. One should not underestimate the power which a manufacturer may 
hold in these situations. The following example from Apple illustrates this point. 
 
ii. Apple Inc. – The manufacturer’s position  
The Apple brand wields a tremendous amount of power in the field of consumer electronic 
devices.196 They have a dedicated consumer base commonly referred to as ‘Macheads’197 
and a range of products including the iPod and the iPad. Apple’s devices are seen as 
trendsetters in their particular areas. Indeed, one author noted on this issue that the “iPod 
came into a market that was small; reshaped, established and dominated it.”198 Many 
content providers will develop content to specifically be used on these devices prior to their 
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release in order to profit from this market power.199 So in order for a content provider to be 
able to ride on the coattails of this success, they would be required to create terms and 
conditions of a licence which Apple would find beneficial.  As a result of this market power, 
a company such as Apple would not be the powerless manufacturer which the earlier 
relationship analysis represented. It is of course important to note that not all 
manufacturers enjoy the select position in which Apple finds itself. Thus companies like 
Apple may be the exception rather than the rule. 
 
From the above it is clear that the technologies involved, as well as the licensing of these 
technologies, play a major role in the protection of the rights of the content holders. DRM 
technologies, such as CPRM/CPPM and SCMS, provide a means of preventing or at least 
making it difficult to violate copyright by making use of or producing infringing copies. The 
licence agreements then step in to ensure that these DRM technologies are implemented in 
such as way as to ensure that the integrity of this protection is maintained by 
manufacturers. The end-user will ultimately be affected by these technology licence 
agreements through manufacturer’s attempts to fulfil their role in ensuring the robustness 
of the system. These two aspects alone are not the only means through which a DRM 
system protects copyrights.200 The third aspect which must be considered is the important 
role which contracts play in adding another level of protection to the overall DRM system.  
 
6. Contracts and End-User Licence Agreements 
The use of contracts plays an integral role in protecting the integrity of a DRM system and in 
turn protecting copyrighted digital content from infringement. As mentioned previously, 
many of the terms and means of ensuring robustness of a DRM system are carried from the 
rights holder through to the developer and from the developer to the manufacturer. The 
final link in this chain is that between the manufacturer and the consumer. Therefore the 
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various relationships between the parties involved each give rise to another level of 
protection and means enforcement.  The most common way in which this is done between 
manufacturers and end-users is through usage contracts.201  
 
Usage contracts stipulate the ways in which the end-user of a device may use that device 
and/or the content thereon. By ensuring that devices and any associated software are 
regularly updated, the manufacturer can fulfil the terms of its licence agreement with the 
DRM developer and ensure that any issues which threaten the robustness of the security of 
the DRM system can be corrected.202 Thus usage contracts serve two main functions. First, 
as the name suggests, they control the usage of content or the device in question by the 
end-user and, secondly, they maintain the integrity of the DRM systems as a whole by 
regulating the user’s usage of the content and the device. 
 
a. Shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements 
These usage contracts will often take the form of a shrink-wrap agreement or a click-wrap 
agreement. The contract will, in these cases, stipulate that by removing the wrapping from 
the packaging (in the case of a shrink-wrap agreement) or by checking the accept box (in the 
case of a click-wrap agreement) the user accepts the terms and conditions of the agreement 
and is willing to abide by the terms and conditions of usage which the contract requires. 
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Examples of a shrink-wrap agreement would be the end-user licence agreements in shrink-
wrapped software. So if one were to purchase the latest copy of Microsoft Windows 7, then 
the box would usually be accompanied by terms and conditions of use which would be 
attached to the packaging of that software. By opening the packaging the user agrees to the 
terms and conditions which Microsoft has stipulated. A problem which can be noted with 
these sorts of agreements is that in many instances the usage contract is not attached to the 
packaging and as a result the end-user is unable to know what it is that they have just 
agreed to.203 
 
Click-wrap agreements have been defined as requiring “a user affirmatively to manifest 
assent to conditions proposed by the software provider in order to continue with the 
installation of the software.”204 An example of such an agreement would include the long-
winded terms of service agreements and end-user licence agreements which pop up when 
one is installing software. Most users merely scroll down to the end and click on ‘accept’. By 
doing so, the user is actually agreeing to the terms and conditions of that agreement. So, for 
example, when one installs iTunes a ‘terms of service’ agreement will pop up asking the user 
to accept the terms and conditions in the terms of service licence before the installation will 
continue. A failure by the user to agree with the terms of service will result in a cancellation 
of the installation process. So an end-user cannot install the software, and in some cases, 
use the device associated with that software, unless they accept the terms. 
 
The usage rules of these contracts will often specify whether or not the user is permitted to 
make copies of the copyright content and, if so, how many copies can be made and for what 
purpose these copies can be made.205 So if one wishes to make a copy of digital content 
downloaded from the ‘iStore,’ they will be limited to only a certain number of copies of that 
content and those copies will only be allowed for personal use of the user. Bechtold notes 
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that “…many DRM usage contracts expressly forbid the consumer to copy, distribute, 
transmit, broadcast or modify protected content or to alter or delete attached metadata 
and usage rules.”206 
 
The problem which arises in relation to these contracts is that in order to use the product 
(be it hardware, software or both) the end-user must agree to those particular terms and 
conditions. This raises the concern of whether the user actually has any real choice in this 
matter. The general explanation on the Apple website for the use of any of its products 
states the following  
“Your use of Apple-branded hardware and software products is based on the 
software license and other terms and conditions in effect for the product at the time 
of purchase. You will be asked to agree to the terms of the applicable agreement at 
the time that you obtain or install the software or setup the hardware product.”207 
 
Furthermore 
“… your purchase is subject to the particular agreement that accompanied the 
software or hardware product at the time of purchase and that you must agree to 
the terms and conditions of that agreement when you install the software or set up 
the product.”208 (emphasis added). 
 
While it is obvious that the user may ‘choose’ not to agree to the terms and conditions of 
the usage agreement, it does not seem appropriate to refer to this as a choice. The 
agreements are full of legalese with the effect that the user has no real idea about what 
they are agreeing to. If the end-user wishes to use the product then they are forced to abide 
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by the terms of usage which often results in a limitation of rights that they would normally 
have in such content under copyright law. These kinds of problems raise concerns over the 
enforceability of shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements.  
 
b. The enforceability of these agreements 
It is perhaps trite to point out that in order for a contract to be successful in fulfilling its 
purpose, the contract needs to be enforceable. In this case the purpose of the contract is to 
control usage, protect the DRM systems integrity and ultimately grant personal rights to the 
manufacturers and content providers. As usage contracts largely take the form of shrink-
wrap and click-wrap agreements it is these contracts which must be enforceable. Due to the 
nature of shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements the enforceability of these contracts has 
been questioned.209 
 
Bechtold notes that the enforceability of these contracts was largely uncertain in the United States 
as well as in Europe.210 This uncertainty was changed in the landmark case of ProCD, Inc v 
Zeidenberg.211 In that case Judge Easterbrook held that “Shrink-wrap licenses are 
enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in 
general (for example, if they violate a rule of positive law, or if they are unconscionable).”212 
The position in South Africa relating to the enforceability of these agreements is largely 
governed by the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act.213 Section 13(5) of that 
Act concerns electronic agreements where an electronic signature is not required.214 This 
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section can be seen as applicable to shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements, as they are 
electronic agreements which do not require an electronic signature and the user, by 
opening the packaging or clicking on the “I agree” tab, are expressing intent.215 
 
The position of click-wrap contracts had been seen as analogous to that of their slightly 
more tangible sibling the shrink-wrap agreement. In a recent US case of Via Viente Taiwan 
LP v. United Parcel Service Inc216 the federal court in Texas held that click-wrap agreements 
were enforceable even in a situation where the agreement is accepted by an employee of 
the vendor. In order to understand why such agreements were held to be binding, one 
needs to have an understanding of the facts.  
 
This case concerned an agreement for carriage of goods to Taiwan by UPS for Via Viente. In 
accordance with this agreement, Via Viente was required to install UPS software to print 
shipping labels. The software was installed by a UPS employee. The software contained 
terms and conditions, in the form of a click-wrap agreement, which needed to be accepted 
during the installation of the software. The Court found “the License Agreement to be a so-
called ‘click-wrap’ agreement.”217 
 
A dispute arose between the parties. UPS then applied for a motion of transfer of venue 
from Texas to Georgia as they were entitled to do by a ‘forum selection clause’ in the terms 
and conditions of the click-wrap agreement. Via Viente contended that the click-wrap 
agreement was not binding because the software had been installed by a UPS employee. As 
a result they were not able to review the terms and conditions of the agreement.  
                                                             
215
 See further D De Andrade “Is the pen mightier than the electronic signature?” De Rebus (2005) 
http://nexis.ru.ac.za/nxt/gateway.dll/zkfaa/bsxha/uei9/7okka/eqkka/svbua (accessed 29 April 2010). 
216
 2009 WL 398729 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2009). Facts taken from “Memorandum Opinion & Order Granting 
Defendants Motion of Transfer” http://www.buckleykolar.com/Via_Viente_v_UPS.pdf (accessed 15 April 
2010). 
217 “Memorandum Opinion & Order Granting Defendants Motion of Transfer” 
http://www.buckleykolar.com/Via_Viente_v_UPS.pdf (accessed 15 April 2010) pg 3 footnote 1. 
73 
 
Therefore, there had not been a meeting of the minds between the two parties and the 
contract was unenforceable. 
 
Via Viente’s argument was unsuccessful on the grounds that it was the policy of UPS to only 
install the software when the installation was supervised and after “the customer indicates 
acceptance” of the terms of usage.218 The court noted that due to the size of the plaintiff’s 
company, they found it difficult to believe that they would allow someone to have 
unsupervised access to their computer system and furthermore that installation of the 
software would take place unsupervised. 219 Ultimately the court reasoned that the plaintiff 
had used the software of UPS in running its business and it would be inequitable to allow 
them to benefit from certain favourable terms of the agreement but not to be bound by 
those terms which were unfavourable. 
 
The specific facts of the case serve as an example of the approach of the courts in the USA 
to click-wrap agreements. Certain aspects of the ratio would obviously not be in issue in the 
case of a private home user. For example the software would likely be installed by the end-
user themselves and as such they would be viewed as having the opportunity to review the 
terms and conditions of usage.220 It is the court’s finding on the inequity of this type of 
conduct which is most telling and perhaps has a wider application than merely this case.  
 
Where an end-user accepts the terms and conditions of a usage agreement and benefits 
from certain aspects of this agreement, it is indeed inequitable to allow them this benefit 
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while at the same time not expecting them to be bound by aspects of the contract which 
negatively impact on their usage.  
 
The above situation seems cut and dried in its certainty, as equity would dictate that when 
one is bound by a contract that they are bound by both the beneficial and detrimental terms 
of that agreement. What happens in a situation where the terms and conditions of the 
usage contract deny the end-user certain usage rights which are afforded to them by 
copyright law? In terms of this content which is subject to copyright protection, an end-
user/consumer/purchaser has a right to deal in or use that content in a certain way. In other 
words, copyright law prescribes that an end-user has certain rights concerning the usage of 
legally purchased/obtained content which is subject to copyright protection.221 
 
c. The balance of power – user rights vs. usage terms 
It is clear that certain usage rights are restricted by end-user licence agreements and terms 
of service agreements. Therefore, it is questioned whether the above situation is as cut and 
dried where the usage contract prohibits certain uses which the users is entitled to in terms 
of their rights to fair dealing (in the South African and UK context) or fair use (in the US 
context). E-readers serve to illustrate this point.  
 
Certain e-readers prohibit the copying of even sections of an e-book or the way in which 
that e-book may be used or re-sold. Amazon’s Kindle places various restrictions on how the 
digital content purchased from them for use on the Kindle may be used by the end-user. 
These restrictions are enforced by technological measures. The technological protection 
measures, in turn, are supported by the end-user agreement which provides another means 
of legal protection against certain usage of the content. 
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The ‘Amazon Kindle: Licence Agreement and Terms of Use’ states in section 3 that “Unless 
specifically indicated otherwise, you may not sell, rent, lease, distribute, broadcast, 
sublicense or otherwise assign any rights to the Digital Content or any portion of it to any 
third party, and you may not remove any proprietary notices or labels on the Digital 
Content. In addition, you may not, and you will not encourage, assist or authorize any other 
person to, bypass, modify, defeat or circumvent security features that protect the Digital 
Content.”222 The anti-circumvention protection which is mentioned will be discussed in 
greater depth in Chapter 4. What is important to note are the restrictions placed on the 
uses of an e-book and the Kindle device by Amazon.  
 
Section 5 of the Amazon Kindle: Licence Agreement stipulates that any failure to comply 
with any of the terms of the agreement allows Amazon to terminate any rights which the 
user has under the agreement.223 Therefore acceptance of these terms and conditions 
carries with it certain obligations. It seems that these obligations which are placed on the 
user far outweigh their usage rights.   
 
It should be remembered that content in a digital form is more easily transferred from one 
person to another. With this in mind, it could be argued that the purpose of these 
prohibitions on use is to prevent the user from distributing the digital content and therefore 
infringing the copyright of that digital content. If this is the purpose of these prohibitions 
then a situation is present where the rights of content providers and those of the content 
users are conflicting. The resolution to this issue which has been adopted by the content 
providers is to basically give themselves greater legal recourse than the content users. 
 
The terms of end-user licence agreements are not limited to preventing infringing use 
however. They can also include limitations on use in order to promote certain business 
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models which the content provider and/or the device manufacturer concerned may have. 
The use of regional coding on DVDs224 and Playstation gaming consoles225 serve as such 
examples. This regional coding technology in conjunction with end-user licence agreements 
limits usage rights of the user and prevents them from using the digital content in a manner 
to which they are entitled by copyright law.  
 
The Australian Playstation226 case provides an example of this issue as a user may be 
prevented from using a legally purchased gaming CD which had been purchased in another 
region. The end-user agreement prohibits any sort of action which would circumvent the 
technology in place which controls this usage. Therefore this form of DRM can be seen as 
serving the purpose of preventing infringement, but this purpose is merely incidental to its 
main function of allowing for different pricing structures to be used in different regions. In 
this situation a user’s rights must give way to the pricing schemes of content providers. This 
provides just one example of the problematic scenario which is becoming more prevalent 
with DRM usage. 
 
The situation ultimately boils down to the following: without agreeing to the usage contract 
the end-user is unable to access the content and therefore the content remains secure. 
Thus the usage contract serves as a gateway to the content and the user is tied into 
particular usage by the contract. Jensen states that because of the way in which these end-
user licence agreements and terms of service agreements are drafted and structured, the 
end-users of digital content are locked-out of the process and have little power over the 
terms of these agreements.227  
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While the above serves as an example of how these usage contract works in theory, one 
however cannot divorce the attitudes of end-users of these usage contracts from this 
scenario. 
 
d. User Attitudes 
Mixed in with this scenario is the attitude of consumers to these end-user licence 
agreements. It is submitted that this attitude largely stems from the societal attitude 
towards copyright laws in general. Furthermore it could be argued that the intangibility of 
the rights of copyright holders leads to a view that these rights – rights to a monopoly over 
the content and the corresponding obligations of users to not infringe on this monopoly –  
do not need to be strictly adhered to. These submissions are in accordance with social 
norms and societal views relating to copyright law.228  
 
Elmer notes that the view of copyright law in society is akin to the view which many people 
have of speed limits – “people forget they are there.”229 Jensen argues that as the result of 
concerted efforts by copyright holders this statement can no longer be considered a valid 
excuse.230 Copyright issues have been making news headlines for more than a decade and 
cases such as the case of A&M Records v Napster231 have brought copyright issues into the 
public domain. “It is common knowledge that unauthorised file sharing is against the 
law”.232  
 
While it is agreed that copyright has become an issue of which many internet users are 
aware, it is difficult to take that further step and say that internet users are completely 
aware of their rights and obligations when dealing with digital content. So while it can be 
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said that end-users are likely to be aware of the general presence of copyright law and how 
it affects certain usage rights which they may have, it is uncertain whether the full extent of 
these usage rights is known. Furthermore the impact of DRM systems on these usage rights 
may not be fully known by end-users.  
 
Madison argues that DRM systems “…not only anticipate and often implement non-
negotiable terms that the user must accept in connection with access to the information, 
but also may operate as invisibly and as automatically as the flow of electrons that 
constitute the digital information itself.”233 As a result of the above factors, a situation arises 
in which copyright laws are seen as more of a suggestion and need not be followed unless 
someone is around to police their usage. 
 
These norms suggest that a consumer is unlikely to purchase a product and then not use it 
because they did not agree with the terms of usage. This perspective is submitted for two 
reasons. Firstly it is unlikely that many end-users will actually read and understand all of the 
terms and conditions in these end-user licence agreements. Therefore most users will use a 
device or content without really knowing what their rights and obligations in relation to that 
device or content entails.  
 
Secondly, even if the user does not agree to the terms and conditions, it is likely that they 
will use the product anyway. This is either because they do not believe that the monopoly 
afforded by copyright law is worth protecting or that they do not believe that it is the 
authors who benefit from this monopoly. Given the limitations placed on usage in terms of 
end-user licence agreements both of the above reasons could be considered to be valid 
excuses for infringement.  However, this would completely shift the situation in favour of 
the consumer. Some sort of balance is needed between consumer rights and the rights of 
content providers. 
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e. The problematic solution 
Madison submits that “public interest concerns must find outlets to respond to the 
“lessons” of ProCD – that by framing shrink-wrap as a nominal contract, publishers cannot 
only avoid copyright law but can define the scope of legitimate debates about what society 
values in access to and use of information.”234 In defining copyright management systems as 
the “ultimate shrink-wrap”235 the author extends his concern for the rights of end-users 
beyond his initial fears of shrink-wrap agreements to include DRM systems.  
 
Given that Madison’s article was written over a decade ago and if one is to consider the 
situation as it currently stands, then the following becomes apparent. The current 
enforceability of shrink-wrap agreements and the growing use of click-wrap agreements, 
both of which make up merely one of the strands in the protective mesh that is a DRM 
system, serves as a worrying indication of the success of publishers and similar groups in 
controlling usage and access rights of users. The interests of the user appear to have taken a 
backseat to those of the content holders. 
 
It has been noted that the problem with these usage contracts is that they are standardised 
and are offered on a take-it or leave-it basis to a mass market, i.e. end-users.236 Newitz 
argues that these agreements have little to do with consumer choice but rather represent 
legal mandates.237 Thus the end-user has very little, if any, power to effect the terms of 
usage of these contracts. It has been argued that this lack of power to influence the terms 
and conditions of usage has allowed copyright holders to create a form of private 
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legislation.238 Newitz argues that this sort of ‘private legislation’ poses a danger to 
consumers as well as innovators.239 
 
It is clear that these sorts of contracts regulate and place serious limitations on usage of the 
content which the end-user has purchased. Some of the terms in these contracts limit 
certain rights to that copyrighted work which the consumer would usually have under 
copyright law. These limitations in conjunction with the licence agreements and the 
technological protection create an interwoven mesh which gives the DRM system its 
strength, while perhaps exposing its greatest weakness –  its lack of consumer support. It is 
submitted that by not considering the desires of end-users with regard to these agreements, 
the manufacturers and ultimately copyright holders are helping to enforce the end-user’s 
apathetic attitude towards these agreements. This issue is especially prevalent in the end-
user licence agreements which govern the consumer’s use of the content. 
 
f. End-user licence agreement misuse 
The Electronic Frontiers Foundation website provides numerous examples of restrictive 
usage terms which are widespread and can currently be found in various end-user licence 
agreements.240 While all of the examples on the site provide indications of the serious 
misuse of these usage agreements, there are several which clearly show how these 
contracts are used to subvert inherent rights which consumers would usually have. These 
examples will be discussed in greater detail. 
 
The terms and conditions related to “Pinnacle studio 9 movie making” software allows 
Pinnacle to ensure that the end-user must download automatic updates. The effect of this,  
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Pinnacle admits, is that some of the updates may ‘impair’ the functioning of the Pinnacle 
software as well as any other software on a user’s computer which is reliant on or makes 
use of the Pinnacle software. Ultimately, Pinnacle has given themselves the ability to impair 
the functioning of not only their software but other software on a user’s computer in order 
to install security updates for its software.241 This greatly oversteps the bounds of what is 
reasonable in terms of these sorts of contracts and amounts to a misuse of this relationship 
which the end-user licence agreement establishes. 
 
Many end-user licence agreements prohibit reverse engineering in order to protect the 
integrity of the DRM system and thus protect the content.242 This prohibition however flies 
in the face of the US Copyright Act,243 in particular section 107244 which deals with fair use 
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laws. In cases concerning computer software the courts have interpreted this section as 
allowing for the reverse engineering of a program in order to “create a non-infringing 
interoperable program.”245 The position is similar in the UK.  
 
Section 50BA of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act was inserted to specifically 
protect this right.246 The provision even identifies the potential for terms or conditions of 
end-user licence agreements to prohibit such actions. Where these terms or conditions 
exist, they are rendered void by the provisions of section 296A.247  
 
If an end-user wanted to create a program to operate in conjunction with that original 
program, they are prevented from doing so by these reverse engineering clauses. The 
Bluwiki.com project entitled Ipodhash248 provides an example of this type of clause in 
action. 
 
The Ipodhash scenario concerned Apple’s iTunes software. This software is used in 
conjunction with their iPod and iPhone electronic devices. Certain cryptographic 
information relating to iTunes had been discussed on Bluewiki’s website. This was being 
done in an attempt to reverse engineer the software in order to allow certain electronic 
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devices to operate with software other than iTunes. The argument for this reverse 
engineering was to allow for owners of iPods or iPhones to use this technology in 
conjunction with open source operating systems such as Linux.  
 
Apple responded to this by demanding that the Ipodhash site be removed as it violated 
provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act specifically sections 1201 (a) (2) and/or 
1201 (b). They further argued that this project “threatens Apple's FairPlay copy-protection 
system.”249 
 
These sorts of limitations on the rights of users constitute a misuse where the user is 
attempting to reverse engineer software in a manner consistent with the factors in section 
107 of the US Copyright Act or section 50BA (1) of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act. The ultimate effect of this sort of usage restriction is that it inhibits innovation which is 
contrary to the purpose of intellectual property laws.   
 
g. Conclusion 
By looking at various aspects of DRM systems, from what they are to how they operate and 
provide protection to digital content, various advantages and disadvantages of these 
systems can be identified. For the sake of convenience, a discussion of these factors will be 
divided into two sections – the advantages discussed are the advantages of such systems to 
the copyright holders, manufactures and developers; while the disadvantages of these 
systems are those affecting the end-user manufactures and developers. 
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7. Conclusion – Advantages and Disadvantages of DRM Systems 
a. Advantages of DRM Systems 
The infringement of copyright is indeed a legitimate concern for copyright holders as such 
infringement poses a threat to the monopoly which has been granted to these rights 
holders. The means by which the copyright industry has generally approached the issue of 
infringement has been through litigation, legislation and licensing.250 This scattergun-like 
approach was relatively successful where the means of copying, and therefore infringing 
copyright, was something which was mainly available to large corporate entities. The 
current digital environment in which we now find ourselves can be seen as a double-edged 
sword for these rights holders. This digital environment favours both the easy dissemination 
of copyrighted content and the almost effortless ability to reproduce this content. DRM 
systems offer new levels of protection to the rights holders of digital content. 
 
The effectiveness of the old approach to infringement is greatly reduced, and has become 
largely symbolic, in a context where the tools for copying and infringing copyright are 
available to most consumers with a home PC.251 These tools allow for copyright 
infringement of digital content on a scale which has never occurred before. Lemley and 
Reese submit that “the high volume of illegal uses, and the low return to suing any one 
individual, make it more cost-effective to aim litigation at targets as far up the chain as 
possible” (i.e. the facilitators of the infringement).252  
 
One advantage which emerges out of these DRM systems is that by entering into technology 
licence agreements the manufacturers, or ‘facilitators’, can ultimately exempt themselves 
from liability in these circumstances as they would be acting in accordance with standards 
set out by the content holders. This exemption would obviously be dependent on whether 
or not the manufacturer had complied with the robustness rules as determined by the DRM 
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developer and content provider. If the manufacturer had complied with the required rules 
then they would benefit from these DRM systems due to a limitation of their liability. 
 
As discussed earlier, a DRM system confronts the issue of infringement by providing 
technological protection which provides a physical barrier to the average user infringing the 
work. It further enforces the use of these prevention technologies through technology 
licences which require that manufacturers incorporate these technologies into their 
products. Finally, the usage of the content by the end-user is limited through the use of end-
user licence agreements in order to prevent them using the content or a device in such a 
way as would lead to infringement. 
 
One needs to keep in mind that it is not one of these elements alone which gives a DRM 
system its strength, but rather the interwoven nature of these elements which ensure that 
the system as a whole maintains a level of integrity which provides the greatest amount of 
protection to copyright holders. Bechtold notes that the security which a DRM system 
provides is not the result of “technology, law or market forces alone”, but rather emerges as 
a result of the interwoven relationship between various forces involved.253 
 
When one looks at the nature of a DRM system and the various elements which it 
incorporates, it is clear that these aspects provide a more secure basis for digital content. As 
a result of this stable basis the content provider can reduce infringement of their copyright 
protected content and thus an incentive is provided for them to distribute this content via a 
digital platform and benefit from the monopoly which copyright law provides their content. 
Following this submission, one could further note that the end-user benefits from the use of 
these DRM systems as they allow for legal access to this digital content in an environment 
which promotes dissemination. This advantage in particular, it is submitted, is one which is 
perhaps the most contentious.   
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b. Disadvantages of DRM Systems 
The disadvantages which emerge as a result of the use of DRM systems mainly affect the 
end-users of this content. This is due to severe limitations on their usage of legally 
purchased digital content by the DRM system, in terms of the technological protection, the 
end-user licence agreements and the trickle down effect from the technology licence 
agreements. As mentioned earlier, this limitation on usage by the content providers and 
through manufacturers and DRM developers often exceeds the bounds of what copyright 
law allows.  
 
The various situations discussed earlier in this chapter provide examples of the limitation on 
usage. For a specific example one can look at the manner in which Amazon’s Kindle 
prohibits fair use rights in the US context. The usage agreement, as well as the technological 
protective measures, does not allow the user to resell the e-book should they wish to. One 
must constantly bear in mind that this content is something which the user has legally 
purchased. In terms of copyright law in the US, end-users have certain rights in relation to 
the content they have purchased. One particularly important right which has been eroded 
by the advent of technological protection measures and DRM systems is the doctrine of first 
sale. This doctrine allows the purchaser of a work which is subject to copyright to transfer a 
particular copy of a work without the permission of the author.254 The emergence of DRM 
systems, in conjunction with anti-circumvention legislation, has rendered the practical 
application of this right an offence. The doctrine is largely unworkable in the digital 
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restored copyright for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage only during the 12-month period 
beginning on —  
(1) the date of the publication in the Federal Register of the notice of intent filed with the Copyright Office 
under section 104A(d)(2)(A), or 
(2) the date of the receipt of actual notice served under section 104A(d)(2)(B), whichever occurs first. 
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environment. Thus, end-users are denied usage rights which they have been given by the 
law because of the use of DRM systems.  
 
Usage contracts further play a role in creating this form of “private legislation” which 
inevitably requires the user to accept the terms and conditions in order to use the device 
and/or content. The end result of this is that the user is largely powerless in changing the 
terms and conditions of these usage contracts. Content providers are thus able to impose 
these limitations on usage and give themselves greater control over their content at the 
expense of the user of their content. This scenario is concerning as it is the users who have 
legally purchased the digital content that suffer from these limitations on usage. The reality 
of the situation is that users of digital content who have illegally obtained this content are 
unlikely to be caught and will find ways around the usage restrictions which technological 
protection provides. Ultimately, it is submitted that the end-users who have legally obtained 
this content are not being rewarded for this. Therefore these users are being disadvantaged. 
This argument could perhaps be taken further when pointing out that by not being 
rewarded for legally obtaining digital content, an end-user would likely be driven to illegally 
obtaining that content. Thus rights holders in that digital content will lose out on revenue by 
not rewarding their users. 
 
Manufactures are also subject to disadvantage in some ways, as they are forced to 
incorporate DRM systems into their devices in order to legally use most content provided by 
content holders. This, as discussed in greater detail earlier, requires manufacturers to enter 
into technology licence agreements which are restrictive and control how that manufacturer 
can construct its device. On this issue Lemley and Reese note that “the key policy point is 
that going after makers of technology for the uses to which their technologies may be put 
threatens to stifle innovation.”255 
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c. Conclusion 
The impact of DRM systems on copyright content in the digital environment would not be 
nearly as great without these systems being reinforced by anti-circumvention legislation. 
The relationship between these two features is almost symbiotic in its nature, as such, one 
could not fully realise the extent of the impact of DRM systems without considering the 
anti-circumvention laws which protect them. It is this aspect to which will the next chapter 
now turns. 
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Chapter 4 
Anti-Circumvention Legislation and Treaties 
1 Introduction 
In keeping with the digital era in which we find ourselves, the copyright industry has 
resolved to fight the scourge of digital technology and the problem of piracy. The approach 
adopted operates by using that very same technology to protect the content from the viral 
dissemination it faces over the Internet. These DRM systems present themselves as the 
answer to some of the problems which the content production industry faces. As discussed 
in chapter 3, these systems rely on various aspects which form an interwoven mesh to 
provide greater protection by allowing copyright owners to exercise their rights and prevent 
certain usage which the consumer would ordinarily have under copyright law. The problem 
is that the thing which gives these systems their strength, in allowing for their integration 
into most of the digital technology which consumers purchase, is also what leaves them 
susceptible to avoidance by consumers.  
 
Ultimately, these systems, whether they are hardware based, software based or a hybrid of 
the two, are merely pieces of technology and code. These codes and technologies can be 
circumvented in various ways by consumers, for example by reverse engineering. The 
inevitable outcome of this scenario is that the content can be used in a way in which the 
copyright owner did not intend or allow. 
 
The above obviously poses a threat to the rights of copyright owners and their interests in 
the content. This is especially so in situations where the protection of a DRM system has 
been circumvented by a user who does not have a legitimate copy of the work and 
therefore no legitimate usage rights. Thus the copyright industry, especially distributors, 
argues that this type of avoidance of the DRM systems present in their content should be 
prohibited. It is from this concern and the fear of piracy of their content on mass that the 
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copyright industries lobbied for greater protection of their works through anti-
circumvention laws. 
Gillespie defines anti-circumvention by stating “If a copyright owner were to distribute a 
digital work with some kind of technological protection barrier built in (i.e. password 
security, water-marking, encryption, anti-copying codes etc.), it should be illegal for a user 
to gain unauthorised access by breaking that barrier. Furthermore, it should be illegal to 
make or distribute a toll that facilitates such a breach.”256 
 
It is at this point that it is important to note that many countries have adopted anti-
circumvention laws. For the purposes of this research the main legislation which will be 
discussed will be those from the US, the EU and Australia. The similarities and differences 
between these statutes will be analysed later in this chapter. An introductory aspect which 
needs to be explored to provide a contextual background for this chapter is where such 
legislation originated. 
 
2 ‘The Copyright Grab’  
Bechtold notes that although anti-circumvention legislation is not something which is 
completely novel, it is only recently that such legislation has been adopted on a global 
scale.257 The question which one must ask is: Why? Stamatoudi notes that the importance of 
using technological means of protecting digital content protected by copyright can be seen 
in several legal instruments of both a national and international nature.258 
                                                             
256 T Gillespie “Copyright and Commerce: The DMCA, Trusted Systems, and the Stabilization of Distribution” 
(2004) The Information Society 239 at 240. 
257
 S Bechtold “Digital Rights Management in the U.S. and Europe” (2004) American Journal of Comparative 
Law 323 at 331. 
258
 IA Stamatoudi Copyright and Multimedia Works (2002) 242. The author notes “Some examples of these are 
the US White Paper, the EU Green Paper and the European Commission Communication, the two recent WIPO 
treaties, and the EU draft Directive”. Another noteworthy example would be the Australian – United States 
Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter “AUSFTA”). Chapter 17 of this agreement concerns Intellectual Property. 
Article 17.1.4 requires that “Each party shall ratify or accede to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996) and the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (1996) by the date of entry into force of this Agreement, subject 
to the fulfilment of their necessary internal requirements”. Article 17.4.7 also requires the drafting of 
91 
 
 
This sudden global acknowledgement of anti-circumvention, as a major concern for 
intellectual property rights, can be seen as having its origins in the re-election of the Clinton 
administration in the US. In 1996 the Clinton administration released a white paper on 
”Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure”. Samuelson terms this 
‘the copyright grab’. She submits that the white paper represented the fears of the 
publishing industry in relation to the rise of digital technology.259 Indeed, she notes that 
these fears were so great that the white paper aimed to strip the public of their normal 
usage rights which they had been given under copyright law.260  
 
The paper itself is a fairly large and wordy document in which various goals are discussed.261 
Those which are the most relevant to the discussion in this chapter relate to copyright 
owners and their control over the use and transmission of their works in a digital form;262 
the importance of metadata for copyright works in digital form;263 the need for the inclusion 
of technological protection of digital content;264 the elimination of fair use rights for works 
in a digital form;265 as well as the need for legislation making circumvention of technological 
protection illegal.266 
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The recommendations in the paper can be seen as being severely flawed and represent “a 
flagrant giveaway to copyright industries”.267 One must ask why the recommendations were 
pursued if they were so heavily in favour of the copyright industries and detrimental to the 
public interest. Samuelson argues, in what initially seems to be a conspiracy theorist 
proposition, that the Clinton administration exchanged the rights of consumers in relation 
to use of copyright material for funding for its re-election campaign.268  
 
When one considers the submissions made in the white paper, it is clear that the approach 
which it adopts is one which heavily favours greater control at the expense of public 
interests. Samuelson points out that the white paper focuses on implementing the agenda 
of copyright owners through rewriting copyright legislation and aggressively interpreting the 
existing legislation and even goes so far as to ignore case law which does not allow for its 
maximalist approach.269 In support of this supposition Samuelson identifies several 
examples. For the sake of brevity, only her example relating to fair use will be discussed. 
 
a. What has come before isn’t important 
The white paper adopts the view that where any potential use for a copyright work can be 
licensed then fair use is not required. This is so because technology and the Internet allow 
for licensing on a mass scale for the smallest of uses and thus fair use rights are no longer 
needed. So for example, fair use in the US allows for a party to make a copy of a CD, which 
they have legally purchased, for their own personal use.  Indeed, as discussed in chapter 3 of 
this thesis, the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992270 requires that a form of copy protection 
be put in place to prevent unauthorised copying of digital audio recordings. The Serial Copy 
Management System (SCMS), which functions as this technological preventative measure, 
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allows for a certain number of copies to be made from the original work.271 Thus the law 
and technology in place both recognised the right of consumers to use their legitimately 
purchased content in particular ways, e.g. copying of an album for non-commercial 
purposes.  
 
In accordance with the view which the white paper proposed, any unauthorised copying of a 
copyright protected work would constitute theft.272 The white paper however ignores the 
fact that this supposition was rejected by the US Supreme Court in the Betamax case273 in its 
discussion of the legality of time-shifting.274 On this point Samuelson notes that the white 
paper ignores this aspect of the Betamax decision and reinterprets the decision on the basis 
that the Supreme Court merely found no infringement because the copyright owners had 
not yet created a licensing market for this particular usage.275  
 
It is understandable that this interpretation, which the copyright holders adopt, could be 
found from the wording of the judgment where it was held that:  
“…a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or value of, 
the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author’s 
incentive to create.”276 
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Obviously where a market does not exist for the licensing of such usage then there could be 
no demonstrable effect on that market and such usage should therefore be allowed. This 
interpretation however envisages a system where every eventuality and usage should be 
licensed and therefore each usage constitutes a source of revenue for copyright owners. 
Samuelson notes that this interpretation is ill conceived as it is based on a faulty premise, 
i.e. that fair use rights will only apply where no market exists for the licensing of that 
particular use.277 She identifies that this premise, in the context of case law in the U.S., is 
contrary to public policy as well as being historically inaccurate. In support of this 
submission she identifies two cases: Time Inc. v Bernard Geis278 and Sega v Accolade279. 
 
i. Time Inc. v Bernard Geis 
The facts of this case, briefly, concerned the assassination of US President John F. Kennedy. 
A man present at the scene on the day of the shooting had happened to be filming a home 
movie. This movie was subsequently sold to ‘Life’ magazine. This magazine constituted a 
division of the Plaintiff’s Company. The magazine later published still pictures from the 
footage in several subsequent publications. One of the defendants wrote a book, “Six 
Seconds in Dallas”, about the assassination and used some of the stills. Various attempts to 
secure permission from plaintiffs for the use of the stills had failed. The defendants 
eventually used the required images without the permission of the plaintiffs. It should be 
noted that the photographic images were not themselves published in the book but rather 
artist-rendered charcoal sketches of the images.280 The plaintiffs sued the defendants 
averring, amongst other things, that the defendants’ conduct amounted to an infringement 
of its statutory copyright. Ultimately the court held that despite the copying of certain 
frames such copying amounted to fair use.  
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Two reasons for this decision can be gleaned. The first was that it could not be shown that 
the plaintiff suffered any injury as a result of the copying.281 The second was that it was in 
the public interest to allow the use of the frames.282 On this second point the court noted 
“The Book is not bought because it contained the Zapruder Pictures; the Book is bought 
because of the theory of Thompson [the author of the Book] and its explanation, supported 
by Zapruder pictures.”283 
 
Samuelson submits that when it comes to fair use, the white paper ignores important 
functions of this consumer right such as those relating to free speech and the public 
interest.284 The Time Inc. case is provided as an example of these free speech and public 
interest functions.  
 
It is respectfully submitted that the use of this case, as an example of where the public 
interest in allowing for fair use of works protected by copyright trumps the rights of the 
copyright owner, is perhaps an ill-advised choice for what the author is claiming. There are 
several criticisms which can be pointed out. In line with the first reason offered by the court, 
the case may have had a different outcome had the plaintiffs been able to show some sort 
of injury or loss suffered as a result of the copying. Had a licensing system been in place, the 
plaintiffs may have been able to show some sort of loss.  
 
Perhaps an even greater challenge rests with the second reason for the decision given by 
the court. The problem which must be noted is that the outcome of this particular type of 
case is dependant on the particular copyrighted content which it is dealing with. This is not 
purely limited to the medium in which the work is embodied, but also the subject matter it 
contains. One is left wondering how successful the public interest argument would be when 
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attempting to use fair use to justify the copying of something with reduced importance to 
the promotion of knowledge and the access to public knowledge, for example music. While 
it could be argued that music may represent a form of cultural commentary which 
encourages debate and discourse within the sphere of public knowledge, such an argument 
is tenuous at best. One could also discuss this situation in relation to an e-book, for example 
Harry Potter. In this example, could it be argued that the text can be fairly used by another 
author lacking the consent of J.K. Rowling purely on the basis of public policy grounds? The 
success of such an argument in court seems highly unlikely. 
 
Following this, the case represents a situation in which the copyright owner had repeatedly 
refused to grant permission for the use of its content.285 Would this fair use defence be as 
successful where the copyright owner is willing to allow use? Such usage would more than 
likely require the payment of a fee, but the technology in place would allow for a market to 
exist for licensing and usage.  
 
While I agree with Samuelson’s submissions, it is respectfully submitted that her use of this 
case is not suitable for the purposes for which she is using it. While the outcome of the case 
supports her claims, the particular facts which govern the reasons behind the outcome are 
not considered. Therefore the author may be guilty of the same offence as the drafters of 
the white paper, i.e. ignoring certain aspects of the case law available. The attention now 
turns to the second case which Samuelson identifies in support of her argument, that being, 
Sega v Accolade.286 
 
ii. Sega v Accolade287 
                                                             
285
 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) paragraphs [62] – [73]. 
286 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Circ. 1992). 
287
 977 F.2d 1510 (9
th
 Circ. 1992). 
97 
 
This case concerned both copyright and trademark concerns. However, for the purposes of 
this discussion only the copyright component will be discussed. The plaintiffs in this case 
develop and market video entertainment systems, gaming consoles, as well as games which 
are played on these consoles. One of the consoles was the “Genesis”.288 The defendants 
were independent developers, manufacturers and marketers of computer entertainment 
software, including game cartridges compatible with the “Genesis”.289  
 
The defendants used a two stage process to decompile the code from the plaintiff’s 
“Genesis” console and reverse engineer the code in order to allow its games to operate on 
these consoles. At the end of this process the defendants created a development manual for 
Genesis-compatibility. The defendants maintained that only functional descriptions of the 
interface requirements for the “Genesis” were present in the manual. The code which the 
defendants had reverse engineered was subject to copyright by the plaintiffs and as such 
the defendants, amongst other claims, were sued for copyright infringement.290 
 
The plaintiffs in this case had a licensing scheme in place to licence the use of the code to 
other software developers for the purposes of making games compatible with its console. 
These other games would operate in competition with the plaintiff’s game sales. The 
defendants decided not to enter into a license agreement with the plaintiff as the 
agreement required that the plaintiff be the exclusive manufacturer of all games produced 
by the defendant.291 
 
The defendants argued that they had not copied any of the plaintiff’s programs and that the 
code which had been obtained through their reverse engineering process merely related to 
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the interface specifications required for compatibility with the “Genesis”.292 They thus 
argued that this practice did not amount to copyright infringement as the code had been 
used to achieve compatibility of its software with the system and, as such, amounted to fair 
use.  
 
The district court which first heard the case rejected this argument on the grounds that the 
defendant had reverse engineered the code for commercial purposes and as a result the 
plaintiff would have suffered loss through its own game sales being replaced by those of the 
defendants.293 The district court further held that alternative means of obtaining this code 
existed, by entering into a licensing agreement with the plaintiffs, and therefore the 
defendants could not claim the defence of fair use.294  On appeal, various arguments were 
raised by the defendants but the court disregarded all of these with the exception of the 
argument that decompiling the code amounted to fair use.295 
 
In undertaking an analysis of the use of the code by the defendant the court, in terms of 
section 107 of the Copyright Act,296 held that the outcome of the four stage test favoured 
the defendants. The court noted that when new technology has rendered certain copyright 
aspects ambiguous then a purposive approach should be adopted with regard to 
interpretation. Chapter 2 of this thesis discussed the dual purpose of copyright in providing 
incentive to create with the aim of promoting further creation for the public good. Part of 
promoting this public good involves allowing public access. On the basis of this purpose the 
court in the Sega case held that the Copyright Act encourages “…the production of original 
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works by protecting the expressive elements of those works while leaving the ideas, facts, 
and functional concepts in the public domain for others to build on.”297 
 
This case, more so than the Time Inc. case, serves as an apt example of Samuelson’s 
argument that the drafters of the white paper ignored certain case law which it felt did not 
benefit its cause. It further supports her argument that fair use rights apply even when a 
licensing scheme exists for the particular use sought. This case also identifies the 
importance of the purpose of copyright when legislation is faced with new technologies. In 
doing this, the case provides a clear example of the importance of the public interest aspect 
of copyright law with regard to the purpose of copyright protection and its functioning.298  
 
b. The New Order – Potential for Abuse 
It is clear from the discussion of some of the cases which Samuelson identifies that the 
white paper indeed ignored certain decisions from case law and seemed to avoid the facets 
of the law which did not support its objectives. In doing so, the white paper ran contrary to 
the purpose of copyright law. Rather, it viewed the public solely as a market and its rights 
under copyright as an extended monopoly rather than the quid pro quo relationship, 
between creators and the public, which underlies copyright law in general. The pervasive 
nature of this market-based approach to the subject of copyright in the digital era is well 
illustrated by anti-circumvention legislation. It is in this light that anti-circumvention 
legislation should be analysed. 
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The impact of this kind of legislation coupled with the technological protection it allows for 
carries with it very real concerns over the abuse of these systems by those in control of 
them. The failure of copyright law to guard against rampant piracy has created a situation in 
which technology is being used to protect the author’s rights. The problem with this type of 
situation is that “the person possessing the technology is usually also the one setting the 
rules”.299 This kind of scenario requires that the use of these technologies be strictly 
regulated by the State concerned. The drafting of the white paper, however, seems to grant 
the copyright industry extended powers to control their works without the concomitant 
strict regulation of that power by the State.  In this way, the white paper allowed the 
copyright industry to further its aims of monetising each use rather than possession of the 
content.300 
 
Generally, the recommendations made by the white paper carry the feel of parties lobbying 
for a change in the laws which do not support their cause. In other words, they argue that 
the rights of the public, as well as the importance of the public interests in copyright law, 
should give way to the newly acquired, and newly legislated, rights of the copyright 
industry. However, in spite of the misgivings noted above, the Clinton administration 
promoted this objective. On this type of political involvement in the copyright environment 
Benlker identifies that various parties in society engage in the production of information in 
varying ways. He further notes that  
“Once one recognises that intellectual property rules affect how our society 
produces information and who is likely to be an effective producer, not only how 
much information our economy produces, choices with respect to intellectual 
property rules become irreducibly normative, or political.”301  
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On the DMCA Benkler notes “when Congress passes a statute like the DMCA it is making a 
choice among types of information producers.”302 Thus, one could argue that greater 
control over digital content was provided to copyright owners in exchange for campaign 
contributions. Indeed, Okediji submits a similar proposition in viewing that the DMCA 
represents a shift away from the public interest and the public’s rights in relation to 
copyright works. She notes that legislative enactments such as the DMCA should arouse the 
concerns of consumers, both in terms of the process of their formation as well as in their 
substance. These factors should give consumers reason to pause and consider just how 
committed law makers are to the protection of the public interest.303  
 
Whatever the reasons were for the shift in the balance of rights, the intended effect was 
that the emerging superhighway would be transformed into a publisher-dominated toll 
road.304 Bearing in mind the stage on which copyright operates, one would need to pursue a 
global application of the goals of the white paper in order to ensure complete 
implementation of the recommendations of the white paper. Marsland notes that “in a 
global, digital market place, the risk is high that any country not providing protection to 
minimum international standards will also supply pirated material to the rest of the 
world.”305 The recommendations made in the white paper were pursued not only on a 
national scale in the US but on a global scale through Global Information Infrastructure 
meetings, held by lobbyists of the white paper in the US, through WIPO.306 Samuelson notes 
that it is from this situation that the main treaties, calling for anti-circumvention legislation 
from parties to these treaties, came about.307  
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3. International Recognition of Anti-Circumvention: Treaties 
Treaties can be seen as one of the main mechanisms for protection and change in the 
volatile world of copyright law. With the ever-increasing connectedness of the world, 
through processes such as globalisation, the cultural products of various regions become 
more common in areas away from those where they were first produced. This 
homogenisation of culture carries with it an implication that the laws protecting these 
cultural products need to be homogenised themselves. This thinking is clear from the near 
global adoption of The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.308 
 
The Berne Convention represents an international effort to protect copyright with the aim 
of allowing the free flow of ideas to the public through this protection. On the Berne 
Convention Davies notes that its aim is to “…stimulate the intellectual effort of mankind 
through the legitimate protection of works, the protection of authors’ rights being seen as 
one of the best means of developing letters and the arts and encouraging national 
production.”309 She goes on to point out “…it was also recognised that limitations on 
absolute protection were dictated by the public interest.”310 The Berne Convention thus 
recognises the importance of maintaining a balance between authors’ right and the public 
interest. This balance has been thoroughly discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
 
The Berne Convention is comprised of a number of member states.311 The large number of 
member states indicates a near global commitment to the application of copyright 
protection. It is out of this desire for global protection, in conjunction with the perceived 
threat of digital copying technologies, that the two main treaties relating to the 
implementation of anti-circumvention legislation emerged.  
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These two treaties are: the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty312 and 
the World Intellectual Property Organization Performance and Phonograms Treaty.313  
 
a. The WCT 
The WCT incorporates two anti-circumvention provisions in Articles 11 and 12 respectively. 
Article 11 relates to “Obligations Concerning Technological Measures”314 while Article 12 
relates to “Obligations Concerning Rights Management Information.”315 
 
Kruger submits that the WCT adopts a minimalist approach to anti-circumvention by 
providing a baseline from which member countries can develop their own anti-
circumvention legislation.316 The Treaty however lays out specific substantive points of law 
while largely leaving the procedural aspects up to signatories to the Treaty to decide for 
themselves. In order to understand the implications of Articles 11 and 12 one first needs to 
understand the so-called ‘access right’ which the WCT grants to the author.  
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i. The ‘Access Right’ Defined 
The term ’access right‘ is perhaps a misnomer as it denotes the idea of the public having a 
right to access works. Of course, in keeping with the purpose of copyright law, the public do 
indeed have a right to access works in exchange for the limited monopoly granted to the 
copyright owner. Gasaway identifies that the term, in its digital context, refers to the right 
of copyright owners to control public access rather than the idea denoted by the ’access 
right‘ term.317 The author goes on to point out that a right which allows for access control 
must invariably not only refer to general access to a work but also access to a work for 
specific purposes.318 Therefore the control of use would be implicit in allowing for the 
control of access. On this point Ginsburg notes that the access right concerns “the right to 
control the manner in which members of the public apprehend the work.”319 
 
These access rights are said to represent a clarification of the rights of copyright owners 
rather than granting them rights which they did not previously have. Davies notes that the 
access rights were implicit in the rights of reproduction, communication and distribution 
which had always been available to copyright owners.320 It has been argued that in an era 
prior to the availability of cheap copying technologies, which are now available to the 
general public, the access right was indeed implicit in other rights available to copyright 
holders. Ginsburg explains that copyright owners were able to control access by 
determining how their works would be made available.321 With the emergence of mass 
market copying technologies, this determination was largely removed from the control of 
copyright owners and, as such, that right which had previously been implicit in their other 
rights necessitated some sort of legislative intervention in order to survive. 
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ii. The Evolution of the ‘Access Right’ 
Ginsburg argues that the WCT in effect, “rewove the increasingly disparate strands *of the 
other available rights] into a general right of communication to the public, including a public 
whose members are separated in both time and space.”322 Uses which copyright owners 
were previously trying to include under reproduction, distribution, performance or 
communication rights, which were not created to govern the sorts of uses which digital 
technology allows for, had to be broadly interpreted to allow for protection of the copyright 
owner. These approaches were often hit-and-miss in nature and as a result of this the so-
called access right was created and given to copyright owners. These access rights were 
separate and distinct from the older rights under copyright law.323 
 
iii. The WCT and the ‘Access Right’ 
Article 8324 of the WCT has been said to grant what has been dubbed the “access right”.325 
Gasaway states that neither US legislation nor European Directives nor international 
treaties, such as the Berne Convention or the WCT, specifically mention this ‘access right’.326 
This right is said to emerge from a reading of Articles 8, 11 and 12 of the WCT for literary 
and artistic works, and Article 10, 14 and 18 of the WPPT for music and performance-based 
works. The effect of this, with regard to the WCT, is that authors of literary or artistic works 
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are granted the right to make their works available to consumers through mechanisms such 
as, but not limited to, the Internet.327  
 
Article 8 makes reference to making a particular work available to the public in such a way 
as to allow access to these works from a place and at a time determined by that member of 
the public. Based on this wording, it seems that this access right is granted based on the 
convenience with which consumers can access copy protected works through these 
networks. Ginsburg submits that the wording of this Article seems to place the access 
decision in the hands of the public, however it is the copyright owner who can control the 
terms of that access.328 Thus, control over what conditions the content may be accessed 
under are given to the copyright owner in exchange for the consumer being able to access 
the work at a time and place which best suits them.329  
 
Thus the ability of the consumer to constantly access works digitally can be controlled 
according to how much is paid for the particular use. One can be limited to certain kinds of 
uses of the work, for example read-only or the inability to make changes to the work. One 
could also be limited to a certain number of uses of the work, or only have parts of the work 
available to them. This sort of system is built on varying licensing systems. Greater access to 
a work would likely be predicated on paying more for that ability to use more of the work. 
This type of system, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, carries with it the 
problem of balance. While the so-called incentive aspect of the public/producer relationship 
is fulfilled the system may reduce public access. This argument is reliant on public access 
consisting of full access to a work. By that, it is meant that the public are able to make use of 
the fair use rights which serve to balance and protect the public interest aspect which 
copyright involves. Gillespie emphasises that “copyright is articulated in terms of social and 
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intellectual progress *…+ at its foundation, ’intellectual property‘ is a means to an end, not 
an end in itself.”330 
  
However such a right to control access would be rather hollow unless the author had some 
right of recourse were this right to be infringed. Thus, in conjunction with this access right of 
the author, member states are obliged to implement legislation allowing for the protection 
of the access right and grant recourse to the author should this right be infringed.   
 
This protection can be found in Articles 11 and 12 of the WCT. These provisions provide a 
basis from which copyright owners can control access to their works over the Internet, i.e. 
providing the technical means for them to exercise the access right. The provisions of the 
WCT thus legitimatise the use of technological measures of protection by copyright owners. 
These measures of protection are largely those which were discussed in chapter 3 relating 
to access controls, anti-copying devices and digital rights management. Davies notes that 
the effect of the WIPO Internet Treaties, one of these being the WCT, is that they have 
“…encouraged these developments since they provide international recognition of the right 
to use such technical devices.”331 While the WCT sets the framework for the protection of 
literary and artistic works, the WPPT sets up a similar framework for the protection of 
phonograms and performances of music. 
 
b. The WPPT 
The WPPT incorporates similar provisions to those contained in Articles 11 and 12 of the 
WCT, in Article 18, but the WPPT specifically focuses on phonograms. Article 2.b of the 
WPPT defines a “phonogram” as  
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“…the fixation of the sounds of a performance or of other sounds, or of a 
representation of sounds, other than in the form of a fixation incorporated in a 
cinematographic or other audio visual work.”  (i.e. music.)332 
The WPPT makes similar provisions to those granted under Article 8 of the WCT in that it 
grants performers333 and producers of phonograms334 an access right, i.e. control over the 
access of their works in a digital form. The effect of this is much the same as that mentioned 
with regard to the WCT. The copyright owner is granted control over access. The measures 
set in place to control public access to a work will inevitably equally serve as a control on the 
public’s use of that work. Ultimately, by controlling public use of the work, the copyright 
owner is able to control the use of the work beyond the original rights which they 
possessed. 
 
c. Effects of the WCT and the WPPT 
The effect which these Treaties ultimately have is that they serve to shape the copyright 
landscape in the digital age. It seems apparent that author rights, especially through the 
creation and/or clarification of the access right, promote and reaffirm the rights of the 
copyright owner in the uncertain digital environment. Commentators however criticise 
these treaties for failing to adequately address user interests.335 This failure arises from the 
numerous aspects mentioned above, as well as the fact that the users of copyright works in 
the digital environment were in no way represented when the provisions of these Treaties 
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were drafted. It is therefore inevitable that the interests of those parties involved in the 
drafting of such provisions, i.e. copyright owners, would greatly influence these Treaties and 
ultimately the digital landscape. 
 
These Treaties merely serve as the mould from which member states can forge their own 
national legislation regarding copyright and the digital environment. In order for the 
provisions discussed above to be anything more than guidelines, and for them to have any 
real affect, they obviously need to be implemented within the States which are signatories 
to them.  
 
As is the nature of public international law, signatories to these treaties are required to 
implement the various rules of the Treaties into their own domestic law. The national 
legislation implemented to give effect to these provisions varies according to the country 
concerned. These sorts of statues share many similarities however, as will be discovered 
hereafter. 
 
The most notable piece of domestic legislation relating to the implementation of anti-
circumvention laws is The Digital Millennium Copyright Act336 of 1998 in the US. Kruger 
states that the DMCA was enacted to largely deal with two issues. Firstly, to protect digital 
works from piracy; and secondly, to provide the legal framework in which business models 
which had initially been structured for the analogue world could be altered to suit the digital 
environment in which this content now found itself.337  
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4 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
This legislation represents the culmination of the efforts of lobbyists for the white paper and 
an implementation of the requirements of the WCT as well as the WPPT in the US, these 
two Treaties themselves having been heavily influenced by the white paper. Gillespie argues 
that the DMCA represents a shift in the copyright doctrine as an area of law which had 
previously been concerned with use of the work had now shifted its focus to regulating 
access to a specific artefact.338 Indeed, he even goes so far as to dispute the nature of the 
DMCA as being anything even closely related to copyright law. He submits: 
“…the DMCA shares neither the logic nor the strategy of copyright; instead, it 
anticipates a new technological regime where control depends on the tight coupling 
of technology and law, each sharing the task of regulation of not only copying, but 
access, use, and purchase.”339 
 
Some commentators believe that the paradigm shift which the DMCA represents is a 
positive step and this will be discussed in greater detail in part 5. i of this chapter.340 
Whether the impact of this paradigm shift is positive or negative in nature is a question 
which is largely dependant on which side of the debate the observer is sitting. Benkler states 
that this new legal framework for the production of information and the distribution thereof 
is largely being built on faith.341 He further notes that such a leap of faith is socially 
irresponsible given the tremendous impact it is having on user rights.342 For the copyright 
industry, the DMCA represents a somewhat greener digital pasture to the one which they 
were previously faced with. On this point Gillespie notes that by controlling copying it is only 
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future sales which are protected whereas, by extending control to controlling access, future 
sales are protected and current sales can be better regulated.343 
 
The Act itself contains fairly complex regulations concerning anti-circumvention. These are 
based on two facets. Of the first, Bechtold explains this to be way in which the DMCA 
differentiates between “access controls”344 and “usage controls”.345 Following on from this 
first differentiation, the DMCA then distinguishes between actual circumvention of access 
controls346 and the creation and dissemination of tools which can be used for the purposes 
of circumventing access controls.347 Gillespie provides a usefully diagram to illustrate how 
this system operates. See Figure 1 below. 
(Figure 1) 
With regard to usage controls, however, the DMCA only prohibits the preparatory activity 
aspect. The Act basically prohibits the creation and dissemination of tools for the purposes 
of circumventing usage controls. Oddly enough the Act does not prohibit the actual 
circumvention of these usage controls by a user. Kruger submits that the ultimate effect of 
this distinction is that a user may personally circumvent the protection in place to allow for 
their fair use rights to be exercised.348 This submission is predicated on technological 
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protection measures being construed as usage controls rather than access controls.349 Early 
decisions by US courts have interpreted technological protection as an access control rather 
than a usage control.350 As such, fair use rights have been greatly limited. 
 
It is submitted that even if the courts were to view technological protection as a usage 
control, then fair use rights would still be greatly hampered by the DMCA. Kruger submits 
that by prohibiting the manufacture and distribution of tools which circumvent usage 
controls, the Act ensures that circumvention is limited firstly to the situations in which it is 
allowed, i.e. the exceptions stated in the statute, and secondly that this circumvention is 
limited to a consumer-level rather than commercialising circumvention.351 The dilemma 
which is immediately apparent is: How can the average home user circumvent the 
technological protection in place without making use of circumvention tools? Thus a 
distinction is made between those who have the technical know-how to circumvent 
technological protection measures and those who do not.352 In such an environment the 
publics rights to fair use are limited to a select few and could no longer be said to be a right 
available to the ‘public’.  
 
Bechtold states that the reason for this omission is that traditional copyright covers those 
actions which fall into the circumvention of usage controls and as such legislating on this 
point would be redundant.353 Ultimately it could be argued that this statutory exception 
isn’t really an exception at all because it is covered by traditional copyright laws. The end 
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result of this situation is that both access and use of digital works are strictly controlled with 
little leeway for consumers to make use of the rights which they have been guaranteed 
under copyright law. 
 
a. Statutory Exceptions: Fair Use and Cases Considered 
The DMCA does incorporate certain exceptions which allow for circumvention under certain 
circumstances, but these are limited to particular kinds of users. Samuelson submits that 
these exceptions “are very narrowly drawn and fail to recognize many legitimate reasons for 
circumventing technical measures.”354 These exceptions may face an even greater problem 
than those submitted by Samuelson in that they may not be able to be used at all. 
  
In order to understand why technological protection measures have been viewed as access 
rather than usage controls and the subsequent impact of this on the rights of users, 
especially fair use, one needs to examine case law dealing with this issue. The Cases of 
Universal City Studios v Reimerdes355 and Universal Studios v Corley356 are useful in this 
regard. 
 
i. Universal City Studios v Reimerdes357 
This case concerned the use of CSS which, as mentioned in chapter 3 of this thesis, is a 
technological protection measure used in order to protect movies placed onto DVDs from 
being copied. A Norwegian teenager managed to crack this CSS protection, through a 
process of reverse-engineering, and created a computer program which he called ‘DeCSS’. 
Briefly, DeCSS operates by decrypting the CSS protection on encrypted DVDs. The end result 
of this decryption is that the DVD can be played on non-compliant computers and further 
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allows for the content of the DVD to be copied onto a computer hard drive.358 Gillespie 
identifies that the technique which CSS employs is a digital lock rather than a digital block of 
the content. He states that “instead of recognizing and prohibiting certain uses, it prohibits 
access, until access can be granted under controlled circumstances.”359 
 
The copyright industry, spearheaded by the film industry, launched a suit seeking 
injunctions against some of the websites who either posted the program on their websites 
or placed hyperlinks to other websites hosting such works. These injunctions were based on 
an alleged contravention of the DMCA.360 The defendants in the case relied on two 
defences. The first concerned the right to free speech, this discussion is possibly a thesis in 
itself and exceeds the bounds of this research, and the second defence was that DeCSS was 
protected under the right of fair use as it allowed users to use their traditional rights in 
terms of copyright law. In accordance with this second argument, the defendants submitted 
that the use of DeCSS allowed users of the Linux operating system, which had no authorised 
DVD player at the time the case was heard, to use their legitimately purchased DVDs on 
their computers. This claim, it has been argued, is probably more convenient than 
accurate.361 What is important however is the basis for the rejection of the defence rather 
than the defence itself. 
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In interpreting S1201 (a) (2) of the DMCA the court applied a literal interpretation to the 
section. The court saw CSS as being an access control. From this interpretation the use of 
DeCSS was immediately contrary to the DMCA and found to be a contravention of s1201 (a) 
(2). Gillespie argues that the because the court viewed CSS as an access control, the end 
result is that the DMCA prevented circumvention and as such DeCSS amounted to 
infringement.362 The court failed to consider the more poignant question of whether the 
subsequent infringing circumvention was done fairly.  
 
The court interpreted that the fair use defence, as was available to copyright users under 
traditional copyright law in terms of S107 of the US Copyright Act, was in theory available to 
parties under the DMCA but only in terms of the exceptions stipulated in the DMCA.363 
Regardless, the court held that fair use was not really in issue as the defendants were not 
being sued for copyright infringement but for offering to the public a tool which allowed for 
the circumvention of a technological protective measure which served to protect copyright. 
Thus the court rejected fair use as a defence to circumvention of a technological protective 
measure.  
 
The court identified that due to the potential risk which access controls posed in preventing 
lawful as well as unlawful uses of works, that such a fair use defence had been specifically 
left out of the statute by the legislature. Had the legislature wished to allow for such a 
defence, they would have made express mention of this in the DMCA.364 The outcome was 
that the defendants were found to have infringed the DMCA but not copyright infringement 
to which fair use applies. The court enjoined the defendants from posting DeCSS on their 
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website or from knowingly linking their website to any other website on which DeCSS is 
posted.365 
 
The distinction seems rather technical. The court considers fair use to be a defence only 
where circumvention of a technological protection measure, such as CSS, is for the purposes 
of unauthorised copying, i.e. where it would be considered copyright infringement. The 
court, however, considers technological protective measures, such as CSS, not to be a ‘usage 
control’ but an ‘access control’. The problem with this approach is that use first requires 
legitimate access. The ultimate effect being that a user will not be able make use of their 
rights in the manner which the court has envisaged in this judgment.366  
 
Put differently, if all technological protective measures are interpreted in such a way, then it 
becomes difficult to imagine a scenario in which a user will not be infringing the DMCA 
when attempting to make use of statutory exceptions allowed for by the Act. Technological 
protection measures on this basis are thus not seen as directly being forms of ‘usage 
control’ but indirectly they seem to have this effect. The problem is that the courts view 
them as being ‘access controls’. Thus they indirectly serve as ‘usage controls’ but enjoy the 
extended protection of ‘access controls’.367 This interpretation represents the best of both 
worlds for copyright owners. Mihet states that the decision in the Reimerdes case 
represents a first strike for fair use under the DMCA.368 The second strike comes in the 
Corley case. 
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ii. Universal City Studios v Corley369 
Before discussing the Corley case one needs to first identify that the case arose as a result of 
an appeal from the case of Universal City Studios v Reimerdes. The Corley case was largely 
concerned with free speech but the importance of fair use was also raised by the appellant. 
It is the way in which the court dealt with this aspect which is of importance for the 
purposes of this discussion. 
 
The facts of the case follow on from the problems of DeCSS discussed in the Reimerdes case. 
The appellant in this case was the owner of 2600 Inc and publisher of the magazine 2600: 
The Hacker Quarterly. The magazine had a corresponding website 2600.com on which the 
DeCSS code had been published and hyperlinks to other sites where either the DeCSS code 
or program could be found. The appellant had been enjoined from publishing this code on 
its website and had subsequently removed it. However, in what they termed an act of 
“electronic civil disobedience”, the appellant left the hyperlinks to other websites up on its 
own website. They then launched an appeal against the judgment in the Reimerdes case.  
 
This appeal was focused on three issues.370 The first being that the DMCA in effect oversteps 
the bounds of copyright law by using technological protection measures to increase the 
duration of copyright. Secondly, they argued that the DMCA violates freedom of speech 
rights contained in the US Constitution as, so the argument went, code was speech. Finally, 
the appellants argued that certain rights in the US Constitution, especially those relating to 
free speech and copyright, were underpinned by the right to fair use in order to realise 
those other rights. Thus the DMCA, in terms of the narrow recognition of fair use rights held 
by the court in the Reimerdes case, had the effect of preventing users from accessing 
content and making use of their fair use rights, and this narrow interpretation was 
inconsistent with the constitution. It is clear that these three arguments attack the 
provisions of the DMCA itself rather than attempting to justify its actions under that law. 
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This type of action is consistent with acts of civil disobedience which the appellant was 
attempting to emulate. Burk and Gillespie note that this kind of disobedience is an 
important tactic in pointing out the imperfection of systems because defying the law calls 
attention to its imperfections.371 
 
The Court rejected the arguments advanced by the appellant, holding that their first 
argument was premature and speculative as the copyright work concerned was not work 
which had entered the public domain. As such, this issue was not discussed in any real 
detail.372 The ‘code as speech’ argument was discussed by the Court at great length. The 
Court found that computer code constituted ‘speech’ in terms of the normal meaning of the 
word. The Court further explained that due to the nature of computer code it contained 
both a speech and a non-speech component.373 The Court held that the DMCA served as a 
limitation on the non-speech component of computer code and this ultimately prevented it 
from falling foul of the Constitutional right to free speech. 
 
The fair use argument was rejected by the Court for several reasons. Firstly, the appellants 
did not claim to be making fair use of any of the copyright material concerned. Following 
this, any evidence available regarding the impact of anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA 
on fair use was minimal and unconvincing at best. The Court also held that the appellants 
failed to offer support for their submission that making fair use of work in a digital form 
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required that the work be in its original form. On this point the court noted “We know of no 
authority for the proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright Act, much less the 
Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum method or in the identical format of the 
original *…+ Fair use has never been held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted material 
in order to copy it by the fair user’s preferred technique or in the format of the original.”374 
 
The outcome of the appeal was that the Court viewed DeCSS as a tool in terms of s1201 (a) 
(2), i.e. a tool which is provided for the circumvention of access controls, rather than a tool 
in terms of s1201 (b) (1), i.e. a tool for the circumvention of usage controls. In terms of this 
finding, Gillespie notes that the argument of Universal City Studios was persuasive in that 
“DeCSS was a device designed to circumvent a technological protection, and posting it on a 
website was ‘providing’ it”.375 
 
The case attracted various amicus curiae for both sides.376 Those supporting Universal City 
Studios were largely other copyright industry associations, while those supporting the 
appellants were largely made up of academics. Thus it is clear that this case was identified 
as an opportunity for those both for and against the DMCA to attempt to assert their 
interpretation of the law and thus ensure the evolution of the law in the direction which 
they preferred. Samuelson submits that the decision in the Corley case represents an 
adoption of the copyright industries preferred interpretation of the DMCA, in that its 
protection of DRM systems is almost unlimited.377 Gillespie submits that:  
“The DMCA itself returns the power of distribution to the hands of the movie 
studios, the kind of culture providers that copyright law privileges. The DeCSS 
injunction returns the power to distribute information tools to the traditional press.” 
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Mihet argues that what should be taken away from the decision in the Corley case is that 
fair use has some constitutional basis, however this is insufficient to allow it to invalidate 
the DMCA which allows for some forms of fair use, albeit rather ineffective.378 From this, 
one should question the DMCA and its treatment of over-reaching, as well as the message 
which this sends out to copyright owners and users alike. 
 
  b. The DMCA and Over-reaching 
The decisions of the courts in both the Reimerdes and Corley cases represent a watershed 
on the position of the DMCA and the protection it offers to users. This is clear when one 
views the reasoning for such decisions in contrast with section 1201 (c) (1) of the DMCA. 
Section 1201 (c) (1) specifically deals with the position of fair use rights under the DMCA. 
This section states: 
“Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations or defences to 
copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title.” 
 
The position of fair use rights under the DMCA are discussed in greater detail in part 5 (iii) of 
this chapter. The importance of this section, for the purposes of an analysis of over-
reaching, is the manner in which the courts have interpreted user rights, as discussed in (a) 
(i) and (ii) above, and the message which this interpretation sends out to the copyright 
industry as well as users. Before beginning this discussion one first needs to understand 
what is meant by ‘over-reaching’. 
 
Wheatley identifies the problem which anti-circumvention legislation poses to user rights in 
that such legislation will protect the rights of copyright owners which, in turn, limits user 
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rights.379 This situation is acceptable as such relationships require a balancing of rights 
between parties. Indeed, provisions are put in place to protect user rights in such legislation, 
for example s1201 (c) (1). The protection of these rights will however be seemingly 
insubstantial in practice without a limitation being placed on the extent of the copyright 
owner’s rights of protection. The problem is that copyright law and anti-circumvention 
provisions deal with different aspects of the same problem, yet there is an attempt to marry 
the two in certain situations. Anti-circumvention laws are used as a justification for 
prohibiting certain users access at the expense of certain user rights under copyright law.  
 
This is primarily due to the preliminary step in exercising one’s rights under copyright law in 
the digital environment, which predicated on being able to access the content. Thus, in 
order to be able to make use of certain rights, a user must first be able to have access to the 
content. However, if certain access is prohibited by the copyright owner, then a legitimate 
user cannot access the work for that particular usage due to anti-circumvention provisions. 
Over-reaching can thus be understood to mean a situation in which a DRM system is used to 
provide greater protection for a copyright owner than he is entitled to under copyright law. 
Wheatley articulates this problem as one in which the copyright owner distributes content 
in such a manner that the work is too encumbered, thus impeding legitimate uses by users 
of the content.380 It is from this situation that over-reaching becomes a problem. 
 
Wheatley submits that this over-reaching could be guarded against. He submits that where 
a DRM system exceeds the legitimate statutorily defined interests, then such systems 
should be capable of legal circumvention to the extent required to allow for the lawful use 
of these works.381 A failure by the courts to recognise such a right, which arguably exists in 
the DMCA under s1201 (c) (1), has proved to be a staggering blow to user rights and a 
bolster to such over-reaching by copyright owners. The failure to interpret s1201 (c) (1) in 
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this manner can be seen to have made an even graver error, in that the courts failed to take 
an opportunity to harmonise copyright law with anti-circumvention legislation and clarify 
the contradictions which currently exit between the two. On this issue Wheatley states that 
such a clarification of the law would “encourage copyright owners to harmonise DRM 
systems with the goals of copyright law” because a failure to do so would render that 
system legally circumventable.382 
 
As the situation currently stands, a copyright owner may put a DRM system in place which 
prevents certain uses which the user is legally entitled to under copyright law, for example 
fair use rights. The courts, in viewing that sections such as s1201 (c) (1) do not grant a user 
rights to circumvent such DRM systems in order exercise their usage rights under copyright 
law, have in effect rendered the users rights under copyright law as discretionary at the 
behest of the copyright owner. Such a situation is dangerous as it encourages a privatisation 
of knowledge at the expense of those who it is supposed to benefit. 
 
c. The Napster Case 
Ginsburg argues that the Napster case “while sometimes portrayed as an assault on a new 
form of communication in fact also is best understood as an attempt to tame a new 
technology into copyright friendliness, rather than an attempt to suppress it all together.”383 
As noted earlier in this research, the fear which digital technology carries with it is that of 
the viral dissemination in allows for and the implications this has for copyright owners. This 
fear is particularly present in the Napster case where the Napster MusicShare software was 
identified as a serious threat to the rights of copyright owners. 
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The case of A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc.384 concerned an appeal against an injunction 
which the plaintiffs had obtained against the defendants. This injunction enjoined the 
defendants from “from engaging in, or facilitating others in copying, downloading, 
uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' copyrighted musical compositions and 
sound recordings, protected by either federal or state law, without express permission of 
the rights owner.”385 The defendants had subsequently been granted a temporary stay of 
this injunction pending the outcome of the appeal.  
 
The defendants created and controlled a computer program, Napster’s MusicShare 
Software. This software was available as a free download from the defendant’s website. It 
enabled its users to share music files on their computers, in a format known as “MP3”. This 
system is known as a peer-to-peer file sharing network or, more simply, P2P. The program 
further created an indexed database of these files on users’ computers. This database was 
stored on centralised servers and could be searched by any user of the program. The court 
identified that this software allowed for three main processes.386 Firstly it allowed for a user 
of the program to make available any of the MP3 files on their computers hard drives 
available for copying by other users. Secondly, users could search for MP3 files on other 
users’ computers. Finally, users could transfer exact copies of other users MP3 files to their 
computers via the Internet. 
 
It was on this basis and the type of actions which the defendant’s software facilitated that 
the plaintiffs argued that they had infringed on their copyright both in the form of 
contributory infringement and vicarious infringement. 
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i. Contributory Infringement 
The court noted that contributory infringement requires two conditions to be satisfied. 
Firstly, there must be knowledge that the conduct amounts to a direct infringement of 
copyright; secondly, the party must have encouraged such conduct or materially 
contributed thereto.387 As to the question of knowledge, the defendants contended that 
they had no way of distinguishing between files which were protected by copyright and 
those that were not. Therefore they contended that they had no knowledge and could not 
be found liable for contributory infringement. The court found that the defendant had both 
actual and constructive knowledge that direct infringement was being carried out by its 
users as they were aware that music which was subject to copyright protection was being 
shared over its network. The defendants further argued that, if the court found that they did 
indeed have such knowledge, they were ultimately protected by the decision in the 
Betamax case.388  
 
The court rejected this argument on the basis that a distinction could be drawn between the 
circumstances in the defendant’s case and those in the Betamax case.389 The court 
distinguished between the cases on the basis that the defendants had specific knowledge of 
direct infringement by its users while the same could not be said of the petitioners in the 
Betamax case.390 The court further noted that the Betamax decision makes it clear that 
knowledge of infringement cannot be imparted merely because the creator is aware that 
the device/software etc. is capable of certain infringing uses. The presence of substantial 
non-infringing uses of the device/software is something which should also be taken into 
account.  
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The court departs from the decision of the district court in that it holds that the district 
court placed too great an emphasis “on the portion of current infringing uses *of the 
software] as compared to current and future non-infringing uses.”391 The court held 
“regardless of the number of Napster’s infringing versus non-infringing uses, the evidentiary 
record here supported the district court’s finding that plaintiffs would likely prevail in 
establishing that Napster knew or had reason to know of its users’ infringement of plaintiffs’ 
copyrights.”392  
 
The court thus avoided treading on the toes of the Betamax decision and its implications for 
emerging technologies in two ways. It firstly noted that it was not the Napster system which 
was at issue, i.e. the P2P file sharing type system, but their conduct in relation to that 
system. The second means of alleviating fears of a crackdown on emerging technologies is 
that the court distinguished between the two cases and based its decision on this 
distinction. 
 
Ginsburg notes that the effect of the Napster case was that it represented a shift in the 
courts’ approach to dealing with emerging technologies and copyright infringement.393 She 
argues that in the past, the situation was an all-or-nothing one. A machine which was 
capable of both infringing and non-infringing uses would inevitably require a determination 
of whether or not the device was allowed. The courts were reluctant to disallow the use of a 
technology purely on the basis that it allowed for certain infringing uses. The difference, as 
Ginsburg notes, could not be split in the past because certain uses could be deemed fair 
under specific circumstances but not under others and the device concerned was not 
sophisticated enough to make the distinction between the two.394 The situation in the 
Napster case was different in that digital technology in an online medium is capable of 
identifying which situation prevails in a specific circumstance and as a result the difference 
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could be split as the implementation of a new technology could be policed. She ultimately 
concludes that the finding of the court in the Napster case means that “infringing uses need 
not be bootstrapped to lawful uses in order to maintain the availability of the desirable 
technological advancement.”395 
 
ii. Fair Use Defence 
In order to try and exclude themselves from liability, the defendants argued that the users 
of their software were engaged in fair use of copyright material and were therefore 
excluded from liability under actions amounting to direct infringement. If its users were not 
found to be guilty of direct infringement, then the defendants could not have been liable for 
contributory or vicarious infringement. The court dealt with this issue in two parts.396 They 
first applied the fair use doctrine to users of the defendant’s software and then focused on 
the specific conduct which the defendants had identified as constituting fair use. 
 
The fair use doctrine is governed by s107 of the Copyright Act397 which stipulates that four 
factors need to be considered when determining whether use of a work constitutes fair use. 
These factors are (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyright 
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used and; (4) the effect of the use on 
the potential market for or value of the work.  
 
As to the first question, the Court held that case law indicated that reformation in the 
manner which occurred in this case, i.e. the format shift concerned with transforming a 
copyrighted work from a CD to an MP3, was not transformative enough for a finding of fair 
use.398 Furthermore, the Court held that this type of use was commercial in nature because 
it constituted a use which the user would otherwise have to pay for. As for point two, the 
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Court identified that these constituted creative works and that such works usually 
necessitate against a finding of fair use. The third point was understandably dealt with 
rather swiftly by the courts as the users of the software engaged in wholesale copying of the 
work. The court did however note that in certain circumstances, wholesale copying would 
not militate against a finding of fair use.399 As to the final point, the court identified that the 
sharing of MP3 files my serve to reduce the number of CDs sold by the plaintiffs and 
furthermore that the use of this program could operate as a barrier to the plaintiffs entering 
the MP3 market. Therefore the use would have an effect on the market and as such a 
finding of fair use by the defendant’s users could not be upheld. 
 
The specific instances of fair use identified by the defendants included: the downloading of 
music by users in order to sample it and from there purchase albums that they enjoyed;  
that downloading MP3’s from Napster allowed users to make use of space-shifting and; that 
downloading constituted permissive reproduction of copyright works. For the purposes of 
this discussion the second argument will be analysed in greater detail. 
 
The space-shifting argument advanced by the defendants relies on the premise that the 
users of its software make use of the software in order to download MP3 files for music 
which they have already purchased legal copies of in the form of a CD. Therefore the user, 
so the argument goes, does not infringe on the owner’s copyright as they have purchased a 
legitimate copy of the music and are making use of the Napster program in order to obtain a 
copy of that content in a different format. The court dismissed this argument on the basis 
that once a user uploads a copy of an MP3 file, which they may have legitimately purchased, 
they make that file available to millions of other users, a large majority of whom may not 
own that content in the form of an audio CD. This constitutes infringement. 
 
                                                             
399
 The court cites the Betamax case as such an example. 239 F.3d 1004 (9
th
 Circ. 2001) paragraphs 29. 
128 
 
Cimino submits that the use of this space-shifting argument was an attempt by the 
defendants to cash in on the decisions in the Betamax400 and the Rio401 cases in which 
copying of entire works for the purposes of time-shifting or space-shifting respectively for 
private use was deemed to be non-commercial in nature.402 These decisions were premised 
on the idea that private use protected the manufacturers of such devices from liability for 
any infringing uses carried out by the users thereof. The distinction between these cases 
and the scenario in the Napster case was not lost on the court. The court identified that 
“Both Diamond and Sony are inapposite because the methods of shifting in these cases did 
not also simultaneously involve distribution of the copyrighted material to the general 
public; the time or space-shifting of copyrighted material exposed the material only to the 
original user.”403 In other words, those decisions hinged on the shifting being carried out by 
a single user for their own private use whereas users of Napster’s software were 
disseminating shifted material to a mass audience.404 
 
iii. Criticisms of the Judgment 
The judgment is seen as a landmark one in the digital era as it has been seen as a watershed 
for user and owner rights respectively under copyright law. One could consider it ‘the 
Betamax’ case of the twenty-first century. It is because of the perceived importance of this 
judgment that many have questioned its implications for the direction in which copyright 
law will head in the digital era. In deciding that Napster was guilty of contributory and 
vicarious infringement of the rights of certain copyright owners the courts were seen as 
siding with copyright owners and nudging the digital environment towards being dominated 
by a pay-per-use model. In order to understand these views, and in order to determine 
whether or not the situation is as doom-and-gloom as it is sometimes made out to be, one 
needs to analyse the various criticisms of this decision. 
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It should be noted at this point that the Amicus brief referred to below specifically refers to 
the decision of the district court which granted the initial injunction. The principles 
underlying these criticisms can however be levelled at the Ninth Circuit decision as well. The 
reasons which the Ninth Circuit gave for its decision endorse the district court’s decision and 
in fact were based on much of the same reasoning. Where this reasoning does differ, these 
differences will be pointed out.  
 
It has been argued that the Napster case arose out of copyright owners’ fear of the viral 
dissemination which peer-to-peer networking systems were capable of. At the heart of this 
fear is the business model argument. The distributors of copyright works are primarily said 
to be reliant on centralised distribution. This allows them to maintain control over who 
obtains the work and certain usage thereof. Digital technology allows for these parties to 
have even greater control over not only usage but also access to copyright works.  Peer-to-
peer networking decentralises this distribution, which in turn limits the ability of copyright 
owners to exercise this extended control. An Amicus brief submitted to the court in 
response to the district court’s initial injunction, prior to the decision by the Ninth Circuit 
Napster case, noted that the case had been brought before the court by copyright owners in 
an attempt to protect this centralised distribution business model.405 Therefore any decision 
in favour of the copyright owners would be a judicially sanctioned protection of these 
business models. They submit that “this is not the sort of thing which copyright law was 
designed to redress.”406 They further state that a decision in favour of copyright owners in 
this case would have the effect of banning “…a new technology in order to protect existing 
business models, and would invoke copyright to stifle innovation, not to promote it.”407 
Thus, this argument can be distilled into the submission that a decision in favour of 
copyright owners in the Napster case would be incongruent with the purpose of copyright 
law. 
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One could argue that the above submission ignores the very rights which copyright law 
guarantees copyright owners. In other words, the limited monopoly granted to copyright 
owners to control their works in certain ways is to be ignored even where flagrant 
infringements of those rights are taking place. This consideration is taken up by the amicus 
brief where the authors note that, in misunderstanding the lessons of the Betamax case, the 
district court’s decision broadly concluded that Napster was prima facie guilty of 
contributory and vicarious infringement.  
 
The district court attempted to differentiate this situation from that in the Betamax case on 
the grounds that Napster maintained so-called ‘ongoing control’ over its software and, as 
such, was in a position to prevent users from infringing the rights of copyright owners.  
Therefore, Napster was in a position to prevent such infringement and failed to do so. As a 
result of this failure, they in effect allowed for their users to directly infringe the rights of 
copyright owners and were therefore guilty of contributory and vicarious infringement. The 
authors note that the lesson of the Betamax case is rather to be understood as meaning 
“‘Copyright owners’ interests in maintaining control over their works are very important, 
but not so important that society must forego useful technology capable of substantial non-
infringing uses in order to protect those interests.”408 Furthermore, the idea that Napster 
had this ongoing control over their software is perhaps a misnomer. The basis of such a 
system is that it relies on peer-to-peer transfers. Napster provided the tools but it is the 
individual users who control what is placed on the network as they decide what to share 
from their own hard drives. 
 
The Ninth Circuit agreed in part with the district court on this issue. They agreed with the 
district court on the point that Napster retained the right to control access to its system. 
This was evidenced by terms and conditions of usage on the Napster website which gave 
them the right to refuse service and terminate accounts at their discretion. This issue goes 
directly to a claim of vicarious liability as Napster could escape liability if it could be shown 
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that the ‘reserved right to police’ had been exercised to its fullest extent.409 The district 
court noted that Napster could alter its system in some way which allowed for infringing 
files to be located and removed or excluded from the system. Because they had failed to 
exercise these rights to their fullest extent, they were prima facie guilty of vicarious 
infringement. The Ninth Circuit however noted that the district court had failed to take into 
account that the ability of Napster to police its system was to be limited to the confines of 
the system’s current architecture.410  
 
The Ninth Circuit ultimately agreed with the district court anyway. The Ninth circuit 
contended that the architecture of the Napster system at the time did create indices of file 
names of files on the system. They argued that Napster could have searched those indices 
for infringing copies and removed them from the system. Does this not seem too heavy a 
burden for the defendants? Requiring them to search through every file name on the 
system and disregard those that were infringing copies seems to be a step too far in 
exercising one’s right to police to the fullest extent. This task is made all the more difficult 
by the fact that Napster users named the files which were on the system. Therefore certain 
files may be incorrectly named which would make finding infringing copies even more of a 
strenuous task for the defendants. 
 
The Amicus brief elaborates on the above point. They identify that the effect of the 
Betamax411 case was the following: where “a technological tool facilitates copyright 
infringement, the ‘Progress of science and the useful arts’ precludes an injunction so long as 
the tool is capable of substantial non-infringing uses. The balance rests on the side of 
permitting new technology, not of stifling it.”412 Therefore, it is submitted that the 
strenuous view which the court adopted of how the defendants could have policed their 
system is too heavy a burden and ultimately leads to a stifling of a new technology. 
Therefore the finding in favour of the plaintiffs is incongruent with the decision in the 
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Betamax413 case if it can be shown that the system is capable of substantial non-infringing 
uses. 
 
A further criticism of the Napster decision is that it equates unauthorised use with illegal 
use. In other words, the court held that any unauthorised use constituted an infringement 
of copyright. This, it was again argued, resulted from a misunderstanding of the Betamax 
case.414 The premise of the argument rests on the foundation of the purpose of copyright 
law, in that it was never envisaged that copyright owners would receive total control over 
every individual use of their work. The situation, as discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis, is 
more akin to a quid pro quo relationship between owners and users. In other words, a 
limited monopoly is granted to copyright owners in exchange for these rights being subject 
to certain limitations. The Betamax case is seen as protecting this relationship.415 Ray Ku 
submits that decisions, like that in Napster,416 serves as an example of the limitations which 
underlie the system. The limitation he specifically refers to is that of relying on the social 
value of a use in order to justify it as an exception to copyright law, particularly when that 
exception relates to user copying.417 
 
iv. Conclusion 
The ultimate effect of the Napster418 case is largely dependant on the side of the debate one 
sits. If one supports the distinctions drawn between this case and the Betamax419 case then 
one would fall on the side of the copyright optimists.420 They would argue that the message 
which this decision sends out with regards to, amongst other things, fair use rights could be 
seen as a positive one. The court dealt with the claims of fair use by making use of the 
                                                             
413 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
414 Napster Inc. v A & M Records Inc. - Amended Brief Amicus Curiae of Copyright Law Professors in Support of 
Reversal 16. 
415 The Court noted that “even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not necessarily infringing. An 
unlicensed use of the copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts with one of the specific exclusive 
rights conferred by the copyright statute.” Sony Corporation of America v Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 
417 (1984) paragraph 46. 
416
 239 F.3d 1004 (9
th
 Circ. 2001). 
417
 Ray Ku 2002 U. Chi. L. Rev. 292 – 293. The author notes that “In balancing copyright goals with the public’s 
interest in obtaining music for free, ‘free music’ loses because there is no overriding societal interest in it.” 
418
 239 F.3d 1004 (9
th
 Circ. 2001). 
419 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
420
 Coyright optimists can be defined as  
133 
 
traditional boundaries drawn by the courts.421 In relying on these familiar means of 
determining whether fair use applied in this case, the court alleviated the concerns of 
manufacturers and users alike by distinguishing the Napster scenario from those in other 
cases in which a device or system clashed with the rights of copyright owners. This decision 
does not represent a stance by the courts that fair use will not apply in such systems or in 
the digital environment in general, but rather that the specific facts of the case did not 
necessitate a finding of fair use. Had the court found that the various uses by the users of 
Napster constituted fair use then this decision would be of little importance anyway as it 
would be bad law. 
 
However, if one believes some of the criticisms of the judgment, particularly that it is based 
on a misunderstanding of the Betamax judgment, then one would likely fall on the side of 
copyright pessimists422. Proponents of the copyright pessimist approach would argue that 
the Napster judgement represents a disinterest by the courts in protecting user rights. This 
is as the quid pro quo basis of the copyright relationship is ignored in order to favour the 
business models of copyright owners. In this way, the original purpose of copyright becomes 
muddied. Ray Ku submits that the Napster decision along with the Reimerdes423 case, and 
others, “demonstrates the degree to which the copyright optimists have succeeded in 
framing the terms of the debate *…+ these decisions turn on the perceived importance of 
copyright and Congress’s determination that copyright owners should have the right to 
exploit any and all markets for copies.”424 
 
 d. Conclusion 
Ultimately, when one considers the impact which the WCT and the WPPT have had through 
the implementation of legislation such as the DMCA the loser always appears to be the 
consumers of digital copyright works. This has manifested itself, as demonstrated by the 
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case law on this issue, in the form of litigation over concerns of over-reaching by copyright 
owners and fair use rights in relation to these digital copyright works. In order to better 
understand this debate one first needs to understand what is meant by the term ‘fair use’. 
 
5 The Demise of Fair Use/Fair Dealing in the Digital Environment – Is it Fair? 
Understanding fair use requires a reiteration of how anti-circumvention laws operate. It has 
been explained previously in this chapter that anti-circumvention laws serve to prevent 
consumers circumventing the systems, put in place by copyright owners, which control 
access and usage of content. These systems prevent certain kinds of use which would 
previously have been available to legitimate users under copyright law. These usage rights 
which are granted under copyright law have differing formulations throughout the world. 
These include fair use (in the US);425 exceptions to copyright and fair dealing (in the EU426 
and South Africa427 respectively). Despite these differing formulations it can be said that 
these doctrines all have the same objective.428 The end result of anti-circumvention 
provisions is that a legitimate user is prevented from using the content which they have 
purchased in a way which is allowed under copyright law but technically barred by the DRM 
system and the circumvention of that system is made a crime. 
 
With the above in mind, and given the reasons for the emergence of these anti-
circumvention provisions, a question which immediately arises is whether or not this 
limitation on the fair use right is fair. In other words, does the supposed threat posed by the 
digital environment to copyright necessitate the derogation of the rights of consumers in 
order to ‘protect’ copyright owners? The answer to this question, like most in this debate, 
will depend on who is being asked. 
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a. The ‘Business Model Argument’ 
Benkler identifies that: 
“…we are moving towards law that supports the displacement of public 
determination of the scope and extent of exclusive private rights to information by 
private determination of that scope through a combination of technical control over 
the information and legal enforcement of contracts that must be signed as a 
condition of access to information so controlled. The most prominent expression of 
this trend is the DMCA…”429 
With this in mind one can consider some of the arguments made in favour of this move, 
bearing in mind the broader effects which they have on user rights, as well as criticisms of 
these arguments. 
 
One of the more common arguments used by those who advocate the use of anti-
circumvention provisions is that such provisions, coupled with DRM technology, reduce 
piracy. Indeed, as noted earlier in part 3.C of this chapter, this is said to be one of the main 
reasons for the enactment of the DMCA. 
 
Kruger adopts a stance which favours the copyright industry when considering the question 
above. His reasons for believing that the derogation of the rights of users should be allowed 
are largely based on what could be termed the ‘business model argument’. A trend present 
throughout the literature on this topic is that many have adopted similar kinds of arguments 
to this business model argument in support of the copyright industries positive stance on 
both DRM use and anti-circumvention legislation. So, ultimately, one needs to know what 
this argument means. This argument can be seen as encapsulating three distinct sub-
arguments. In order to understand some of these arguments and the criticisms thereof, one 
will need to bear in mind the public good aspect of copyright discussed earlier in chapter 2. 
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The first argument is often referred to as the simplistic defence. This argument advocates 
the use of DRM and anti-circumvention provisions on the basis that this pairing allows for 
the perfect exclusion from cultural products which in turn allows for more efficient 
production of information. This argument thus seeks to convert the partial excludability of 
copyright works into perfect exclusion and thus get rid of the problem of having a public 
good produced by private, rather than public, entities.430 
 
 
The second argument is based on the idea that the private industries which control 
information production and dissemination have greater information on this than 
governments do and that they are thus in a better position to determine the course that 
information production and dissemination should take.431 
 
The third argument relies on the importance of anti-circumvention provisions, in 
conjunction with DRM, in allowing for the use of price discrimination by the copyright 
owner. Kruger’s explanation of the business model argument is hinged on the importance of 
this third argument and the importance of price discrimination. In order to deal with this 
issue one needs to understand what price discrimination entails. 
 
This term can briefly be understood to mean selling the same product to different buyers at 
different prices.432 An example of price discrimination in action would be the way in which 
movie theatres charge different prices depending on the age of the viewer for what is 
ultimately the same movie.433 So access and use are determined according to different 
prices, depending on the user, for the same product. Furthermore, it acts by attempting to 
increase the excludability aspect of the cultural product in order for the owner to retain 
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greater control over it and be able to effectively price discriminate.434 With this in mind one 
can begin to consider the business model argument. 
 
This business model argument is premised on the idea that the analogue world did not allow 
for the sort of price discrimination which the copyright industry had in mind when it wanted 
to charge for various kinds of usage. On this basis, fair use was said to have been allowed 
only because of the failure of previous business models to allow for this extended price 
discrimination. The idea behind this was that the cost of setting up a means through which 
payment for these minor uses could be made would be too prohibitive and an unnecessary 
burden on the consumer due to the high transaction costs concerned. Thus certain uses 
were allowed for free. Basically, the copyright industry saw themselves as doing the 
consumer a favour.435 The words of Dusollier are of interest in relation to this type of 
contention. The author notes that “more than being a defence against a claim of copyright 
infringement, an exception *such as fair use+ is a natural boundary to an author’s monopoly 
power *…+ their exclusive rights stop where the exception begins.”436 
 
There is a distinct absence of any explanation by Kruger as to why the analogue world did 
not allow for the expanded pricing discrimination which the copyright industry is now trying 
to impose. The author relies on the assumption that such price discrimination was not made 
use of purely because of a lack of a means of doing so. Okediji identifies that due to the 
public good nature of copyright, the claim by owners to stronger copyright rights is not 
necessarily more legitimate than the claims of users of copyright works.437 One could indeed 
argue that such pricing discrimination was not available to the copyright industry out of 
recognition of the importance of not over-extending the monopoly of copyright owners and 
thus balancing the public interest with the interests of copyright owners. 
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This business model argument claims that DRM coupled with anti-circumvention legislation 
is a potential cure for the market failures which initially gave rise to fair use. The advent of 
digital technology gave rise to technology capable of controlling access and usage of 
copyright content in digital forms. This kind of technology thus allows for the business 
model types which the copyright industry now states they initially wanted but were unable 
to have due to technological limitations. As a result of this, the use of this kind of 
technology, so the argument goes, should be allowed and protected.   
 
The current importance of DRM systems and anti-circumvention legislation thus no longer 
requires consumers of digital copyright works to have fair use rights as the technology is 
available to allow for the copyright industry to practice the price discrimination it initially 
desired during the era of analogue technology. This argument basically can be distilled into 
the following: the copyright industry argues that it should be able to charge the appropriate 
price for any possible usage which a consumer may require because the technology is in 
place to allow it to do so.438 This submission on its own seems insubstantial. 
 
Kruger states that DRM reduces the transaction costs for the uses which previously fell 
under fair use exceptions in two ways.439 The first is that DRM is able to automatically 
impose restrictions on the use of the content by embedding these restrictions in the content 
itself and secondly, DRM allows for the pricing discrimination desired. Whereas the 
technologically unlimited-use album of the analogue era was the norm, the business model 
argument eagerly awaits for the pay-per-use system to become the norm of the digital era. 
This argument focuses on pricing structures and the maximisation of profit through making 
the most of the intellectual property at one’s disposal.440 Kruger submits that “…price 
discrimination, as an enabler of multiple price points, including price levels that can reach 
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low-value users, should diminish the importance of fair use as a response to market 
failure.”441 
 
 
b. The Fair User response 
“If the fear of the digital age has impelled and justified a rise in technological and 
contract-based protections, fair use must be made stronger to counterbalance this 
trend. It ensures that the boundaries of the copyright grant are traversed only as 
envisaged by the notion of progress”442 
It is with this in mind that one should consider the arguments advocating the continued 
existence of fair use. 
 
The argument which focuses on the importance of copyright owners being able to make use 
of pricing discrimination can be distilled into the following premise: the producers of 
cultural products will be better able to perform a public good if they are allowed to 
discriminate in terms of the prices they charge users for particular uses than if they 
cannot.443 The empirical research required to make this claim, Benkler argues, has not been 
carried out. Benkler further identifies that price discrimination in the context of intellectual 
products is not perfect and, as such, there is no way to determine the effects which it will 
have by merely theorising.444 The social welfare gain may increase in some cases and not in 
others. He argues that there are serious concerns with increasing the excludability aspect of 
digital information goods as it will negatively impact on public discourse and personal 
autonomy of users.445 
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A further criticism of this argument is that it treats all users as potential copyright infringers 
while the copyright industry is treated as a victim in need of protection. This in turn skews 
possible solutions to user rights problems which the digital environment presents, such as 
the applicability of fair use rights in the digital environment. The end result being that these 
user rights are forced into being frozen in time and ultimately they diminish because their 
failure to evolve with the changing copyright climate renders them ineffective.446 The 
problem is firmly entrenched by a reliance of these arguments on market-based analyses of 
consumer use within the digital environment.  These sorts of analyses, Okediji argues, rely 
on the concepts of infringement arising out of an analogue era. However, the analogue era 
concept of infringement “is often a functional or technical aspect of just being in” the digital 
environment, i.e. the way in which the internet generally operates results in regular 
infringement by users, often without their knowledge.447 
 
The so-called ‘simplistic defence’ argument is said to fail on the basis that it believes that 
the public good nature of information, particularly its non-excludability, can be altered. This 
theory argues that technology coupled with anti-circumvention provisions allows for the 
distributors of information to alter the character of information by excluding others from it. 
This creates confusion in that the public goods problem is said to be eliminated where in 
fact the argument concerns itself with an attempted elimination of the partial excludability 
of information.448 Even if this argument were forgiven for its failure to promote the 
economic agenda, which it initially seeks to, one cannot ignore the broader social 
implications which the argument still ignores. The fact that information, particularly 
copyright works in a digital environment, is difficult if not impossible to render perfectly 
exclusive is not considered by proponents of this argument. Ultimately, the use of 
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technology and anti-circumvention provisions may hinder the progress of those attempting 
to access the works, whether legitimately or not, but they are unlikely to completely alter 
the nature of the public good which copyright is intended to promote. 
 
The second argument is said not to fail but to be tenuous in that it cannot merely be proved 
by theoretical argument but also requires empirical analysis to truly be confirmed or 
denied.449  
  
The proponents of these business model arguments are understandably critical of those 
that argue for the retention of fair use rights. Kruger submits that those who propose the 
retention of fair use rights fail to differentiate between fair use, which was present as a 
result of previous market failures, and fair use rights in general.450 It is submitted that the 
argument put forward by Kruger is based on an incorrect view of the purpose of copyright 
law. The business model arguments which he and many others propose concentrate solely 
on the rights of copyright owners whilst completely ignoring the rights of the users of those 
works. On this point Cohen and others argue that the goal of copyright is merely to provide 
the author with some limited rights over the exploitation of their works and “not cover 
everyway of making money from, or of enjoying, a work of authorship.”451 Indeed Litman 
points out that copyright owners have never been entitled to control every use of their 
work.452 She further notes that “copyright’s current expansion has myopically focused only 
on the copyright holder’s side of the bargain.”453 
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Again, the public interest aspect of this argument is ignored with both eyes firmly focused 
on the glittering prizes that are DRM systems and anti-circumvention legislation. Indeed, 
Benkler notes a similar trend where he explains that increasing the excludability of digital 
copyright works enhances the welfare of owners of information goods at the expense of the 
public whose welfare is adversely affected.454 Okediji submits that the internet serves 
merely as a medium in which copyright law operates.455 While the medium may alter the 
ways in which these laws operate, they still require the purpose behind these laws to be 
considered and the balance between owner and consumer rights to be maintained. The 
influx of measures for the protection of owner rights should thus, Okediji argues, be 
counter-balanced by the protection of consumer rights.456 The means for this protection can 
be found in the doctrine of fair use which can serve as the means by which the public 
welfare can be ensured.457 
 
Kruger raises various concerns in relation to the criticisms mentioned above. He challenges 
the general theme of these criticisms, in that the DMCA and anti-circumvention legislation 
in general give too much power to the copyright owner at the expense of the consumer, by 
identifying that they fail to acknowledge the bargaining power of the consumer in the 
market place.458 He further submits that copyright markets, while lacking perfectly adequate 
substitutes, still provide a user with alternatives.459 He further identifies how consumer 
interests have failed to enter into the digital domain because consumers argue for usage 
rights available to them in the analogue era, such as fair use, to be carried into the digital 
one. Various criticisms can be noted on these submissions. 
 
Without wishing to sound overly dramatic, the submission by Kruger that consumers have 
failed to adapt with the times and enter into the digital domain is a rather hypocritical one. 
Consumers are berated for wanting to transpose rights which were available to them in the 
analogue era into the digital one. Copyright owners, in turn, desire to transpose business 
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models which are based in the analogue era into the digital domain. This situation is not 
seen as problematic by the author. Rather, he supports the contention that measures, such 
as DRM systems and anti-circumvention legislation, be put in place to protect the means of 
implementing those business models. Would it not be fair to argue then that the consumer 
is thus entitled to the implementation of similar provisions to protect their interests in the 
digital environment as is envisaged by copyright law? 
 
With respect to the failure to recognise the consumer bargaining power argument, Linchoff 
identifies that, in relation to recorded music in particular, there has been a failure by record 
labels to adapt, as they display an unwillingness to change the way in which they do 
business.460 He submits that DRM and anti-circumvention legislation worsens the problem 
as it provides a means with which the ailing analogue business model can continue to be 
kept alive.461 On the issue of consumer bargaining power it has been noted that the private 
regimes, which DRM and anti-circumvention provisions allow for, are dependent on 
socioeconomic factors such as bargaining power, to reinforce and extend the analogue era 
inequalities into the digital era.462 Thus the supposed cure that is said to save copyright and 
bring the copyright industry into the digital market place is the exact same thing which 
allows for its rigid adherence to its preferred sales based models and keeps it firmly 
entrenched in ideas of the analogue era. The end result of this is that it exists in limbo. 
 
With specific reference to consumer demand, Lincoff submits that the strategy of record 
labels to salvage these “sales-based revenue-models” has resulted in them having to resist 
the consumer demand for DRM-free music access.463 This in turn, he explains, has required 
a campaign to be waged against consumers, internet service providers and even the 
suppression of certain technologies and consumer electronic products.464 In spite of these 
attempts to retain this way of doing business, more the 20 billion recordings were 
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downloaded in 2006 without authorisation. The ratio of unauthorised to authorised 
downloads is placed somewhere near 40:1.465 Based on these figures one has to question 
the efficacy of these business models in the digital environment. Furthermore, if one of the 
major players in the copyright industry is resistant to consumer demands, then Kruger’s 
submission that consumer bargaining power and the effect which it can have on the 
promotion of their wants being underestimated seems unfounded. 
 
The figures noted above also raise questions over the efficacy of anti-circumvention 
provisions and DRM usage in reducing piracy. The use of these two features to reduce piracy 
necessitates a counter-balance in favour of the legitimate users of content. Okediji notes 
that fair use would serve this function well as it concerns the fair use of works for legitimate 
reasons and only allows for part of a work to be used.466 The author further identifies that 
“fair use vigilantly upholds the twin ends of the debate *these being the authors limited 
monopoly granted in exchange for their work being made available to the public] and forces 
a constant evaluation of each goal to ensure its nurturing as the work is accessed by takers 
and users.”467 Thus the rights of owners are maintained while still protecting the rights of 
the user.  
 
The above criticisms and the responses to them mean little when viewed in the void that is 
academic theory. The true impact of anti-circumvention provisions on the rights of users 
with regard to copyright works in the digital environment, particularly fair use rights, can 
only be fully understood with reference to practical examples. It is important to note that 
due to the varying nuances present in this legislation, depending on the country which one 
is looking at, some of the criticisms may be more applicable than others.  
 
The following discussion merely serves as an example of these various concerns in a specific 
situation. The DMCA seems an appropriate example as the purpose of copyright law is 
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enshrined in the US Constitution. Furthermore, the extent of the monopoly granted to 
copyright owners is limited by the public interest. The way in which user rights are thus 
perceived in the US context, and the way in which copyright is transitioning into the digital 
age in the US, serves as a prime focal point in an analysis of copyright in the digital 
environment with particular reference to user rights.  
 
The way in which courts have dealt with the questions raised over the continued 
applicability of these rights in the digital context are typified by the Reimerdes and Corley 
case. The way in which these cases were decided has severely limited any real access to 
those rights by consumers. Gillespie identifies that the argument which was adopted in the 
DeCSS cases was that the copyright industry was attempting to prevent consumers from 
making use of their fair use rights.468 This sort of argument was successful in the Betamax 
case but failed in the Reimerdes as well as Corley cases. The question is: Why? 
 
c. Fair Use under the DMCA 
In order for the DMCA to be found to prevent consumers from making use of their fair use 
rights it would have to be shown that a particular use met the exact usage allowed for in 
terms of a consumers fair use rights under s107 of the US Copyright Act. Following this, it 
would have to be shown that the DMCA served to prohibit those uses.469 These submissions 
were raised by the defendants in the Reimerdes and Corley cases but failed on the basis that 
the DMCA is not legislation which concerns possession, as copyright law does; rather it is 
legislation which concerns access. Gillespie states that this argument fails “precisely because 
the DMCA is a law of access and commerce masquerading as a copyright law…”470  
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Thus the DMCA serves to protect copyright content in digital forms from any sort of fair use 
rights which a consumer would usually have under copyright law. The copyright industry 
can, in turn, charge for every usage which would usually constitute such fair use under 
copyright law. Gillespie identifies that there is nothing to prevent copyright industries from 
imposing microlimitations on all aspects of usage.471 In other words the DMCA, in 
conjunction with DRM systems, creates a situation in which copyright owners can control 
the usage of their work by controlling access to that work. This is regardless of whether or 
not copyright is even concerned with such usage in any given scenario. He cites the idea of 
‘regional coding’ as an example of such microlimitations.472  
 
For the purposes of this discussion one needs to recognise that regional coding operates to 
ensure that a DVD, whether it be a console game or a movie, can only be used in a console 
or DVD player which corresponds to the particular ’zone‘ or ’region‘ of that DVD. Thus if one 
purchases a legitimate473 copy of a movie on DVD from a region which differs from that of 
their DVD player, the regional coding prevents the playback of that DVD. It is clear that such 
a control does not represent copyright concerns because the copy purchased was 
legitimate. Such a control represents the protection of a business model as it allows the 
copyright industry to sell DVDs in different regions and different prices according to supply 
and demand in that region.  
 
Another example of such a microlimitation, which allows for the imposition of a business 
strategy rather than concerning itself with copyright, was raised as an argument in the 
Reimerdes case. The argument concerns the circumvention of DeCSS, specifically, for the 
use of a legitimately purchased DVD movie for playback on computers using a Linux 
operating system. Users of this operating system would be prevented from making use of 
their legitimately purchased DVDs because Linux is an open source operating system and as 
such most of its software is user-created. Users creating DVD playback software for the 
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operating system would likely be unable to pay the amount required for a CSS technology 
license.474 On this point Gillespie notes “fair use gets hamstrung between access controls 
and hardware restrictions; there is simply no place for its consideration.”475 Thus 
technological protection measures in conjunction with the DMCA again prevent legitimate 
use not out of copyright concerns but from an attempt to preserve a business model. 
 
A literary example of such microlimitations can be seen when examining the limitations 
imposed by Adobe’s E-Book formats. One author identifies how the Glassbook format 
offered by Adobe has taken numerous classic novels, which have are freely available in the 
public domain, and digitised them.476 These digitised novels are then sold to users. Adobe 
however places various restrictions on the use of these works. The following are some 
examples of these restrictions. “Copy: No text selections can be copied from the book to the 
clipboard. Print: No printing is permitted of this book. Lend: This book cannot be lent or 
given to someone else. Give: This book cannot be given to someone else. Read Aloud: This 
book cannot be read aloud.”477 The almost farcical nature of these restrictions add an 
element of irony when one considers that the transcripts of many of these literary works 
were taken from ‘Project Guttenberg’ by Adobe.478 Adobe, in effect, downloaded these 
works from ‘Project Guttenberg’, repackaged them and stripped away the open permissions 
which ‘Project Guttenberg’ allows. They substitute these open permissions with their own 
restrictions on works and threaten to sue those who do not comply with these new 
restrictions.479 
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These sorts of over-reaching actions are being carried out by the copyright industry under 
the guise of copyright law. Indeed, it has been argued that that Act is more akin to computer 
security statutes in that its priorities relate only nominally to copyright.480 The technological 
protection in place allows for such control and the DMCA prevents a user from 
circumventing these controls. The effect of this is that a monopoly is granted to the 
copyright industry, as happens under copyright law. However, with none of the reciprocal 
rights being granted to consumers, the limited monopoly which serves as the foundation for 
copyright law is no longer a limited one.  As a result, the balance of this monopoly and the 
public interest is shifted in favour of the copyright industry. 
 
The end result being that the copyright industry can have their proverbial cake and eat it 
too. The greater issue is that this flagrant misuse of these measures of technological 
protection measures carries the backing of both the state and the courts. Are the rights 
which users had under copyright law now no longer important? The greater concern has to 
be whether the purpose of copyright law been ignored for a quick buck and campaign funds. 
 
This conclusion may seem to be jumping the gun somewhat as these technological 
measures coupled with the DMCA still face the problem that was facing the copyright 
industry prior to both of these ‘solutions’. The problem is one of sheer numbers. 
Technological measures for protection will never be 100 percent secure and the DMCA, 
while prohibiting certain actions, will not be adhered to by everyone. It is submitted that the 
problem which the DMCA does create, however, is that it creates a culture of civil 
disobedience. By merely paying lip service to the rights of consumers, it increases the 
disregard of consumers for the rights of copyright owners. Thus the problem is compounded 
by a cycle of the disregarding of rights by both the producers of cultural products and the 
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consumers thereof. The net result of this problem is that the rights of citizens have become 
a question of the preferences of consumers as envisaged by the producers.481  
It seems clear from the above that the contention by some commentators that fair use 
rights still apply under the DMCA seems ineffectual. The rights, in the form of limited 
exceptions allowing for circumvention of DRM systems, are technically there under US law, 
but they have been severely hamstrung by anti-circumvention provisions.482 This is in spite 
of the arguments favouring anti-circumvention provisions being flimsy in nature when 
viewed in light of the criticism levelled against them. As a result of this, anti-circumvention 
legislation’s disregard for user rights seems to have less to do with curbing piracy and more 
to do with the implementation of a system which allows for the copyright industry to charge 
for every conceivable usage of its content in the digital environment. This approach ignores 
not only user rights but the purpose of copyright as a whole. 
 
6 Anti-Circumvention in Europe: The European Copyright Directive 
The issue of anti-circumvention legislation in Europe is largely dealt with under the 
provisions of the European Copyright Directive.483 Like the DMCA in the US, the European 
Copyright Directive represents the culmination of lobbying by the copyright industry for the 
implementation of the anti-circumvention provisions in the WCT and WPPT. Chapter 3 of 
the Directive deals specifically with the “Protection of Technological Measures and Rights-
Management Information”.  
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a. The EUCD and the DMCA: A Comparison 
The provisions of the Directive are markedly similar to those in the DMCA. Article 6 (1) of 
the Directive requires member states to implement legislation which prohibits the 
circumvention of effective technological measures which the owner has put in place to 
protect their rights in work in a digital form.484 This provision is similar to s1201 (a) (1) (A) of 
the DMCA, in that is prohibits actual circumvention by a user of technological protection 
measures. The distinction which should be noted is that the DMCA refers specifically to 
technological protection which controls access to a work while the European Directive 
makes no such direct reference in Article 6 (1). However, access controls are specifically 
identified in Article 6 (3) along with protection processes generally. Kruger identifies that 
the provisions of the European Copyright Directive are broader in places than the DMCA. He 
notes the way in which the DMCA limits its ambit to access controls while the European 
Directive does not limit itself only to these access controls.485  
 
In this way, the Directive is said to favour the user in that it does not approach user rights at 
the stage of sanctioning circumvention but rather deals with these rights at an earlier stage, 
specifically, by providing for certain exceptions constrained by technical measures. This in 
effect means that user rights are built into the DRM system as a whole, whether it is in the 
form of technological protective measures or through private contractual terms. The 
ultimate effect, Dusollier argues, is that “the EU seeks to preserve fair use even before the 
enforcement stage”.486 
 
Shah submits that the DMCA limits itself to access controls, purposely excluding rights 
control measures from its ambit, in order to preserve the fair use exception which would 
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face interference from rights control measures.487 With the above distinctions in mind, one 
can undertake a comparison of these two anti-circumvention measures. 
 
Article 6 (1) can be criticised for its definition of an ‘effective technological protective 
measure’. Article 6 (3) defines an ‘effective’ technological protective measure to mean that 
“use of a protected work or other subject-matter is controlled by the rightholders through 
application of an access control or protection process, such as encryption, scrambling or 
other transformation of the work or other subject-matter or a copy control mechanism, 
which achieves the protection objective”. This definition is exceedingly broad in its scope as 
the rights holder is protected because they have put in place any technological measure 
which has the purpose of performing the above. Therefore the standards by which the 
effectiveness of these measures are tested are almost non-existent. All that is required of 
the rights holder is that some attempt at putting protective measures in place must be 
present. Bechtold identifies that the problem with this definition is that nothing would be 
excluded from its ambit as the standard for testing effectiveness is minimal to the point that 
it ultimately appears that there would be no uneffective technological protective 
measures.488 
 
If one looks at Article 6 (2) of the Directive, it deals specifically with the so-called 
‘preparatory aspects’ relating to the trafficking of tools which facilitate and/or allow for the 
circumvention of technological protective measures.489 The provisions of Article 6 (2) are 
similar to those in s1201 (a) (2) and (b)(1) of the DMCA in that they serve as a prohibition on 
the manufacture and dissemination of tools which facilitate the circumvention of 
technological protective measures. The effect of these sorts of provisions is that they limit 
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the ability of the general consumer market to circumvent these measures as the average 
user would likely be unable to circumvent the protection without the aid of tools. 
 
Ultimately these two provisions in Article 6 give one the impression that the European 
Copyright Directive operates by mandating broad protection of technological protective 
measures. This could lead one to believe that the Directive provides the copyright holder 
greater protection through its broad implementation of the anti-circumvention provisions of 
the WCT and WPPT respectively. There are, however, certain limitations imposed on this 
supposedly broader protection which distinguishes the Directive somewhat from the DMCA. 
 
The Directive, in Article 6 (1), imposes what has been described as a ‘knowledge-based 
criterion’ on the party circumventing the technological protection.490 This requires that the 
person circumventing the protection, knew or on reasonable grounds should have known, 
that they were circumventing an effective technological protective measure. Thus the 
Directive requires either intent or negligence on the part of the circumventing party before 
they can be deemed to have infringed this provision. The DMCA noticeably lacks this 
requirement as it imposes strict liability. The effect of this criterion is that the circumventor, 
under the Directive, would have a defence if they could prove that they lacked this required 
knowledge. Under the DMCA this lack of knowledge would not constitute an accepted 
defence.  
 
 b. User Rights under the EUCD: Fair Use by Mandate 
The Directive adopts a different approach to the DMCA when it comes to the 
implementation of user rights in anti-circumvention legislation. The Directive, in Article 6 
(4),491 leaves the implementation of user rights largely up to the content providers, as does 
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the DMCA by and large. It seems strange to leave the ability to facilitate the limitation of the 
copyright owners’ rights to the copyright owners themselves. It would seem that under 
most circumstances the content user would be unlikely to benefit from the rights to which 
they are entitled if, in accordance with the price discrimination argument, the reasons for 
the existence of those consumer rights had been remedied by the creation of DRM systems 
and the implementation of anti-circumvention legislation. In other words, if the copyright 
owner could charge for the particular use which the user sought, then why would they put 
in place a system which would allow them that use for free? It is here that the Directive is 
seen to differ somewhat from the DMCA. 
 
This difference emerges in situations where the content providers fail to make certain uses 
available to the appropriate entitled users. More specifically, in situations where the 
copyright owner fails to voluntarily limit its own rights and make those uses available to the 
consumer, the member state concerned can takes steps to allow those users to enjoy the 
rights to which they are entitled. These provisions have been hailed as revolutionary in 
Europe, as exceptions to the rights of copyright owners are given a positive meaning and the 
author is left to implement exceptions to their own rights.492 This is, however, a dangerous 
move which could prove to be ineffective and may in fact grant copyright owners even 
greater control at the expense of user rights.493 Indeed, this process may prove 
revolutionary but this may not be for the right reasons from the perspective of content 
users at least.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
necessary to benefit from that exception or limitation and where that beneficiary has legal access to the 
protected work or subject-matter concerned. 
A Member State may also take such measures in respect of a beneficiary of an exception or limitation provided 
for in accordance with Article 5(2)(b), unless reproduction for private use has already been made possible by 
rightholders to the extent necessary to benefit from the exception or limitation concerned and in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 5(2)(b) and (5), without preventing rightholders from adopting adequate 
measures regarding the number of reproductions in accordance with these provisions”. 
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i. Power of the state 
The provision allowing for State intervention, in order to protect user rights where a 
copyright owner fails to make certain authorised uses available, seems a good one in theory. 
It seems to force copyright owners into an active recognition of user rights and to the 
limitations of their own rights. Indeed, this may be what copyright in the digital era needs. 
The problem with leaving copyright owners in control of this situation, and leaving member 
states to intervene where the copyright owner has been unwilling to facilitate the users 
access, is that states have generally attempted to distance themselves from the battle 
between the rights of owners of copyright and the users thereof in the digital environment. 
Any such debates which have arisen have largely gone in favour of the copyright owners. 
 
A further problem is that member states are required to take necessary steps only when the 
copyright owner has failed to facilitate the user’s benefit of the exceptions to which they are 
entitled. The problem is that the Directive does not indicate “when the default by rights 
holders is sufficiently patent as to necessitate a State taking action”.494 If even the slightest 
attempt was made by the copyright holder to facilitate this beneficial use, would the state 
then be excluded from intervening or having to intervene? Given the generally poor track 
record of states in seeking to protect public interest in this particular area, this system may 
prove to have a seriously negative impact user rights. Dusollier identifies that if this were 
the case then “too much unrestrained power would go to authors and other rights holders 
of copyrighted works”.495 
 
The Directive states that a member state may intervene only where the copyright owner has 
failed to implement those benefits “within a reasonable time” and the member state may 
take “appropriate measures” in order to implement these benefits.496 The problem is that 
the Directive defines neither what would constitute a reasonable time nor does it qualify 
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what would be considered an appropriate measure. Therefore the state is given the power 
to intervene but is not told when it can intervene or in what ways. This provision thus seems 
to be an oasis in the digital copyright desert, offering shelter to the weary user, but in effect 
it is nothing more than a mirage. 
 
ii. The exceptions of article 6 (4) – A problematic provision 
The purpose of article 6 (4) is to permit state intervention in the digital environment in 
order to protect user rights. Article 5, specifically article 5 (2) and (3),497 identifies numerous 
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available to the public, that, unless this turns out to be impossible, the source, including the author's name, is 
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purpose; (e) use for the purposes of public security or to ensure the proper performance or reporting of 
administrative, parliamentary or judicial proceedings; (f) use of political speeches as well as extracts of public 
lectures or similar works or subject-matter to the extent justified by the informatory purpose and provided 
that the source, including the author's name, is indicated, except where this turns out to be impossible; (g) use 
during religious celebrations or official celebrations organised by a public authority; (h) use of works, such as 
works of architecture or sculpture, made to be located permanently in public places; (i) incidental inclusion of 
a work or other subject-matter in other material; (j) use for the purpose of advertising the public exhibition or 
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use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche; (l) use in connection with the demonstration or repair of 
equipment; (m) use of an artistic work in the form of a building or a drawing or plan of a building for the 
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exceptions and limitations to the rights of copyright holders. The problem is that the 
protection of these exceptions and limitations are not mandatory but rather voluntary in 
nature. One can only assume that the voluntary nature underscoring the adoption of these 
exceptions is out of a fear of treading on the sovereignty of member states. Whatever the 
reason, the end result is that it is left to member states to decide which of these exceptions 
they wish to enforce in their own national legislation. Certain of the exceptions identified in 
article 5 (2) and (3) were earmarked by the EU as requiring mandated protection rather than 
merely allowing for member states to voluntarily elect whether or not to protect them. 
 
It should be noted at this point that the Directive provides for certain exceptions. These 
exceptions are only available to those users who have a legitimate right to the use 
concerned. Article 6 (4) should not be seen as granting free access but rather serves as a 
means of allowing a user to benefit from any exceptions they may be entitled to once 
legitimate access has been obtained. In this way, as stated previously, the Directive does not 
specifically concern itself with access control, as does the DMCA, but rather concerns itself 
with measures of technological protection which control use of that work after legitimate 
access has been obtained. Dusollier submits that one must not interpret this as allowing for 
circumvention in order to exercise the exception.498 Rather the situation is one in which 
circumvention is not required due to either the voluntary implementation of user rights or, 
failing that, state intervention. 
 
The provisions of article 6 (4), in line with its purpose, provide for the mandated 
implementation of certain identified exceptions which the copyright owner may either 
voluntarily implement or face state intervention. So in effect, the exceptions in article 6 (4) 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
purposes of reconstructing the building; (n) use by communication or making available, for the purpose of 
research or private study, to individual members of the public by dedicated terminals on the premises of 
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498
 Dusollier 2003 Communications of the ACM 53. 
157 
 
must be allowed for by the copyright owner. The mandated exceptions are those falling into 
seven broad categories. Shah identifies these as relating to: “photocopying, archival 
copying, broadcaster’s, non-commercial broadcast, teaching and research, disability-related 
and governmental.”499 Dusollier notes that the preferential treatment received by only 
some of the exceptions in article 5 cannot be explained by the Directive or its legislative 
history.500 It is important to note that Article 6 (4) does not extend the state’s obligation to 
intervene when content is made available in the form of on-demand services.501 This has 
been identified by some as the Directive’s greatest flaw.502 In order to understand the true 
relevance of this, one needs to first understand what an on-demand service is. 
 
The concept of an on-demand service is encapsulated in the example of a pay-per-use type 
system.503 The content is made available to the consumer at a time and place chosen by 
them. The convenience which underlies the use and market for digital copyright content, 
and in a way controls the direction in which the market is developing, is excluded from 
mandated state protection under the European Copyright Directive. The problem with this is 
that a loophole is left in the Directive which could lead to exploitation by the copyright 
holder.  
 
The copyright holder in the normal course of events under the Directive is left to voluntarily 
facilitate user rights. If a particular business model allows for the copyright holder to 
remove the various exceptions to their rights, which users are entitled to, then it is 
submitted that this is the option which they would pursue.504 Dusollier identifies that the 
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inclusion of click-wrap licences is prevalent in most digital products. The presence of these 
agreements would meet the requirements for falling within this loophole. This in turn would 
mean that falling within the definition of this loophole would in no way be difficult for 
copyright holders. Thus the inclusion of this loophole could in effect derail the overall milieu 
of user protection which the Directive is striving to achieve. Even more concerning is that 
the loophole implies an acceptance by the EU that the privatisation of digital copyright 
content, in the form of DRM systems, outweighs the importance of copyright law in general. 
Specifically, this stance by the EU can be seen as having a disregard for the purpose of 
copyright law and the balancing of the rights of the parties concerned.505   
 
Despite the problems discussed above, article 6 (4) mandates the exercise of state power 
only with respect to certain exceptions mentioned therein. The adoptions of any other 
limitations are left up to each member state. One could envisage problems emerging from 
preferring certain exceptions to others. The Directive, it could be argued, in mandating the 
specific exceptions in article 6 (4) may have in effect diminished the importance of the 
remaining twenty or so exceptions in article 5. This would also be problematic in that the 
purpose of the Directive was to harmonise copyright law in Europe, specifically with regard 
to anti-circumvention legislation. If certain exceptions were merely voluntary then some 
member states would adopt them and others not. This would surely fracture copyright law 
in Europe rather than lead to a harmonisation thereof. A further problem with adopting this 
type of approach to limiting the rights of copyright owners is that the use of “such 
pigeonholed exemptions relating to technological developments tends to ossify the law in a 
constantly evolving area.”506 
 
 
 
                                                             
505
 See Dusollier who submits that “excluding the safeguard clause of article 6 (4)  *…+ means European 
Lawmakers want such contracts to prevail on fair use principles” 2003 Communications of the ACM 54. 
506
 Shah 2004 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. paragraph 10. 
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 c. Conclusion 
The provisions in article 6 of the European Copyright Directive are said to be aimed at 
balancing the rights of both copyright owners and users. The Directive promotes the idea 
that it champions the users more than other anti-circumvention legislation, such as the 
DMCA. By focusing on use rather than access the Directive attempts to protect the users’ 
rights before the enforcement stage is reached. This is further promoted by requiring that 
the copyright holder voluntarily facilitates these user rights and therefore implement the 
limits to their own monopoly. In doing this, the Directive can be seen as attempting to 
reduce the animosity which generally characterises the owner-user relationship in the 
digital environment. 
 
The numerous problems which arose from the poor implementation of the above has 
characterised discussions on the Directive. These problems range from the lack of 
definitions and general uncertainty as to the meaning of the terms ‘reasonable time’ and 
‘appropriate measures’; the loophole excluding the requirement for exceptions where an 
on-demand service is concerned; and the distinction drawn between voluntary and 
mandated exceptions to the copyright owners’ monopoly. These issues have all contributed 
to the apparent unsubstantiality of the promise that the Directive would protect user rights 
in the digital environment.  
 
In discussing the effects of the voluntary nature of some of the exceptions in the Directive, 
Shah submits that the Directive allows for member states to tailor the chosen exceptions to 
their specific national needs.507 Thus the Directive should be seen as providing the 
framework in which member states can distil their own legislation rather than as a definitive 
statement on what their national law should be.  Shah further identifies that the Directive 
should be seen as a step in the right direction despite its ambiguities. He submits that these 
ambiguities should not be an issue as it is up to the individual member states to implement 
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the provisions of the Directive in a manner which not only clarifies these ambiguities, but 
also approaches such implementation optimistically. 
  
Whilst not completely in agreement with the almost unworried manner in which Shah views 
the various ambiguities in the Directive, his submission concerning the importance of the 
implementation of the Directive on a national level should not be discounted. Indeed, due 
to this Directive being implemented on a near continental level, its overall impact is difficult 
to understand without making reference to specific examples. In order to view these 
provisions in action the attention of this research now turns to the UK and the Copyright 
and Related Rights Regulations of 2003.508 
 
 7. Implementation of the EUCD in Europe: The UK Example 
During August 2002 a consultation paper was released in the UK proposing various changes 
to its Copyright, Designs and Patents Act509. The consultation paper served two primary 
functions. The first was that it proposed to implement amendments to the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act in order to bring copyright legislation in the UK in line with its 
obligations under the European Copyright Directive. The second purpose of this consultation 
paper was to gauge public reaction to these amendments and to field comments in this 
regard. These comments were to be submitted to the UK patent office by the 31st of 
October 2002. The implementation date however was subsequently extended on numerous 
occasions as a result of the numerous comments received from the public.510 This is perhaps 
indicative of the public interest in copyright and the effect which legislative changes would 
have on them. Ultimately, most of the proposed changes identified in the consultation 
paper came into effect on the 31st of October 2003 and were implemented through the 
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 Hereinafter “the 2003 Regulations”. 
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 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
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 Shah notes that this implementation was postponed on several occasions, firstly until the 31
st
 of March 
2003, then to the 18
th
 of June 2003 and then on an “as soon as possible” basis. See Shah 2004 Duke L. & Tech. 
Rev. paragraph 12. 
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2003 Regulations.511 For the purposes of this discussion, the most important amendments 
stated are those in regulations 24 and 25 of the 2003 regulations. It is these regulations 
which concern “technical measures and rights management information” which will be 
focused on in this analysis. 
 
a. UK Legislation Prior to the EUCD 
Regulation 24 contains certain amendments relating to the circumvention of protection 
measures. This regulation makes amendments to s296 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act as well as to the heading of “Devices designed to circumvent copy-protection” which 
appears in the Act. Prior to the 2003 Regulations, s296 – s299 included provisions pertaining 
to the prohibition of the circumvention of copy-protection devices.512 These provisions only 
applied to a copyright work issued to the public in an electronic form which had copy 
protection in place.513 Most importantly, the provisions of s296 did not extend to the use of 
circumvention devices but rather only to the creation and distribution of these devices.514 
 
b. UK Legislation Post EUCD – The Impact 
The 2003 Regulations can be seen as having a tremendous impact on s296 by broadening its 
ambit from the previous position of only applying to ‘copyright works issued to the public in 
an electronic form which was copy protected’. Three distinct changes to s296 of the Act can 
be identified. Firstly, the 2003 Regulations broaden the ambit to include all technological 
measures of protection.  Secondly, the 2003 Regulations extend the legal protection of 
                                                             
511 See Shah who notes that the 2003 Regulations “by and large, maintain the same provisions for the 
prevention of circumvention of technological measures on works other than computer programs”. Shah 2004 
Duke L. & Tech. Rev. paragraph 28. 
512
See Esler who identifies that prior to the 2003 Regulations, s296 “broadly [prohibited] unauthorized 
circumvention of copy-protection devices, descrambling of encrypted transmission or reception of 
conditional access services, including trafficking in devices or services to aid in such endeavors”. BW Esler 
“Technological Self-Help: Its Status Under European Law and Implications for U.K. Law” (2002) Presentation at 
the 17th BILETA Annual Conference accessed 
http://www.bileta.ac.uk/Document%20Library/1/Technological%20SelfHelp%20%20Its%20Status%20under%2
0European%20Law%20and%20Implications%20for%20U.K.%20Law.pdf (accessed 15 August 2010). 
513 Shah 2004 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. paragraph 13. 
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 Shah 2004 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. paragraph 13. 
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these laws to include copyright works which are released in any form. Thirdly, the 2003 
Regulations include the actual act of circumvention as well as the use of tools which allow 
for such circumvention under its scope rather than limiting itself to the creation and 
distribution of circumvention tools only.515  
 
Specifically, the 2003 Regulations add sections 296ZA – 296ZF. Like the DMCA and the 
European Copyright Directive, on which the 2003 Regulations are based, a distinction is 
made between circumvention and the tools of circumvention. This can be seen in s296ZA 
which deals with the actual act of circumvention while s296ZB concerns the facilitation of 
circumvention (i.e. any act concerning tools which facilitate circumvention). In order to 
better understand these sections they will be briefly discussed in greater detail. 
 
Section 296ZA (1) is based almost verbatim on Article 6 (1) of the European Copyright 
Directive.516 Section 296ZA (2) includes one of the two main exceptions to S296ZA (1). This 
exception is noted as having eventuated from the public comments arising out of the 
consultation paper and constitutes one of the few criticisms of the consultation paper which 
was properly considered.517 Section 296ZA (2) applies to a person whose actions fall within 
the parameters of S296ZA (1). Those person’s actions are excluded from liability on the basis 
of them having undertaken such an action for the purposes of cryptographic research, so 
long as their actions do not prejudicially affect the rights of the copyright owner.518 The 
2003 Regulations further provides for the protection of rights other than those of the owner 
by allowing for a concurrent action of the copyright owner and any other person noted in 
S296ZA (3).519 
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 See Shah 2004 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. paragraph 14. 
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 S296ZA (1) This section applies where – (a) effective technological measures have been applied to a 
copyright work other than a computer program; and (b) a person does anything which circumvents those 
measures knowing, or with reasonable grounds to know, that he is pursuing that objective.  
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 Shah 2004 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. paragraph 28. 
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 See also Regulation 15 which amends the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act by including s50BA which 
allows for the reverse engineering of a computer program by a user. Such an action even where it results in 
the circumvention of a protection measure of the kind envisaged in s296A. See s50BA (2) in this regard. 
519
 See also s296ZA (4). 
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The provisions of s296ZB are those pertaining to the prohibition of facilitating circumvention 
through “devices and services designed to circumvent technological measures”, i.e. tools. 
The section identifies various actions in relation to devices which allow for circumvention 
including selling, hiring, importing (other than for their own private domestic use) and 
distributing such devices. The specific wording of the section relates to “any device, product 
or component which is primarily designed, produced, or adapted for the purpose of 
enabling or facilitating the circumvention of effective technological measures.” The net of 
this amendment seems as though it has been cast too wide as the provisions would catch 
the manufactures of products which are capable of circumvention, even though this may 
not be the main purpose of these products. 
 
Shah identifies that the phrasing of this subsection may offer some relief. He submits that 
the use of the word ‘primarily’ could be used to exempt manufacturers of the types of 
devices above which are indeed manufactured for a legal purpose but are capable of 
facilitating circumvention. Furthermore, a person found to have conducted themselves in a 
manner which falls under s296ZB has a defence in terms of subsection 5 of that section. This 
subsection provides:      
(5) It is a defence to any prosecution for an offence under this section for the 
defendant to prove that he did not know, and had no reasonable ground for 
believing, that - 
(a) the device, product or component; or 
 
(b) the service, 
enabled or facilitated the circumvention of effective technological measures. 
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Therefore the ‘knowledge criterion’ of the European Copyright Directive is carried over into 
the UK legislation in both the provisions relating to actual circumvention as well as those 
relating to tools facilitating circumvention. 
 
From the above it is clear that the 2003 Regulations implement the provisions of the 
European Copyright Directive in the UK in a manner which, so far, has seemed to require 
very little alteration to the provisions of the Directive. The true test for the 2003 Regulations 
however is how it deals with the ambiguities inherent in the Directive. This is especially so 
when one considers that these teething problems were earmarked for correction when they 
were implemented by the various member countries in their own national legal systems. 
 
c. Does National Implementation Remedy the Ambiguities of the EUCD? 
The 2003 Regulations, as noted earlier in this chapter, takes the provisions of s296ZA (1) (a) 
and (b) almost directly from article 6 (1) of the Directive. This renders s296ZA (1) (a) and (b) 
subject to the same problems which article 6 (1) faced. The most notable of these problems 
being the failure of the Directive to properly define what constitutes an ‘effective’ measure. 
To this end, the drafters of the 2003 Regulations included a section to aid in the 
interpretation of the s296 amendments. 
 
This interpretation section is dealt with in s296ZF.520 The section defines both ‘technological 
measures’521 as well as what would render such measures ‘effective’.522 Technological 
measures are defined as being “any technology, device or component which is designed, in 
the normal course of its operation, to protect a copyright work other than a computer 
program.”523  
                                                             
520
 S296ZF – Interpretation of Sections 296ZA to 296ZE.  
521
 S296ZF (1). 
522 S296ZF (2). 
523
 S296ZF (1). 
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i. Technological Measures Defined 
The reason for excluding computer programs from this definition can largely be said to 
result from the fact that computer programs have been the subject of their own legislative 
branch in both the UK as well as the EU.524 While s296 still pertains to the circumvention of 
technical devices applied to computer programs, the section does not alter the law as it 
stood prior to the 2003 Regulations. Thus the 2003 Regulations definition of ‘technological 
measures’ in no way includes computer programs in any way.  
 
The problem with this is that any technology or device which protects copyright works but 
which is a computer program will be subject to different protection to those technological 
measures which are not computer programs. In relation to computer programs, the 
facilitation of circumvention of copy-protection525 was prohibited only where the device or 
means used was specifically intended for such circumvention.526 Therefore copyright works 
which make use of computer programs as a technological measure of protection will enjoy 
less protection than other technological measures which do not. Such a distinction can lead 
to often absurd results as most encryption of digital content makes use of some form of 
computer program.527 
 
Shah submits that this problem is somewhat alleviated by s296 broadening its scope to 
include any technical device.528 This definition is said to afford greater protection to the use 
of computer programs, such as encryption, in the protection of copyright content.529 
Although this definition does indeed broaden the scope of protection it does not materially 
alter the protection itself. S296 still relies on the means used for the facilitation of 
circumvention of the technical device to have been manufactured, sold, hired etc. solely for 
                                                             
524
 See EU Software Directive. 
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 Shah 2004 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. paragraph 30. 
527
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the intended purpose of circumvention.530 Thus a party may still avoid this provision where 
the means of facilitation of circumvention has other purposes. 
 
ii. Effectiveness Defined 
The 2003 Regulations, in terms of s296ZF (2), state that a ‘technological measure’ will be 
‘effective’ where “the work is controlled by the copyright owner through –  
(a) An access control or protection process such as encryption, scrambling or other 
transformation of the work or, 
(b) A copy control mechanism, which achieves the intended protection.”531 
The drafters of the 2003 Regulations take this definition straight from article 6 (3) of the 
Directive. Thus the criticisms levelled at this definition under the Directive still hold true to 
the definition in the 2003 Regulations. 
 
A further issue which can be noted with both the definitions of ‘technological measures’ and 
what makes such measures ‘effective’ is that the definition of ‘technological measures’ 
specifically excludes computer programs from its ambit while the definition of ‘effective’ 
identifies encryption as an example of an effective technological measure. As noted earlier, 
encryption is largely based on computer programs. So while the definition of a technological 
measure excludes computer programs, the definition of an effective technological measure 
specifically refers to one. This could lead to tremendous uncertainty on this point. 
 
d. Conclusion 
It is clear from an analysis of the 2003 Regulations that the drafters of these provisions have 
managed to incorporate the provisions of the European Copyright Directive into UK 
                                                             
530 S296 (1) (b) (i). 
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copyright legislation. The drafters of the 2003 Regulations have however failed to take into 
account the shortfalls of the Directive and seem to have blindly implemented article 6 
without rectifying the issues inherent in that article. It is therefore submitted that the 2003 
Regulations fail to build on the framework which the Directive provides and, as such, are 
riddled with ambiguities. Such a situation does not bode well for user rights. A failure by 
legislators to clearly define user rights and the limits of the powers of copyright owners in 
relation to the digital environment has shown itself to be one in which the courts tend to 
narrowly interpret anti-circumvention provisions. This type of interpretation inevitably 
favours copyright owners at the expense of users. 
 
 8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the origins of anti-circumvention legislation have been explored. The 
underlying purpose for the creation of this legislation was noted by authors such as 
Samuelson. She identified that the copyright grab which the digital era brought on resulted 
in lobbying by copyright industries for anti-circumvention legislation in order to allow them 
to protect the extended control they wished to exercise over their content. This extended 
control would come at the expense of consumer rights. The purpose of copyright law would 
need to shift from a balancing of the copyright owners’ limited monopoly in exchange for 
certain usage rights by users to being based on a right by copyright holders to exploit all 
uses of their works. 
 
These parties identified that, given the global nature of copyright content, lobbying for 
extended control would be useless unless anti-circumvention legislation was implemented 
on a global scale. In this vein the WCT and the WPPT were created. These Treaties identified 
the so-called ‘access right’ which they submitted was implicit in other rights of copyright 
owners and its mention in the Treaties merely represented a clarification of their rights. The 
parties recognised that if you could control access then you could in effect control usage of 
the work. The effect of this was that it allowed for the prevention of usage which the user 
would ordinarily be entitled to under copyright laws and as such the copyright owner could 
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exploit all uses of their works, even those which extend beyond the scope of their rights 
under copyright laws.  
 
The two Treaties require member states to implement anti-circumvention legislation within 
their own countries. Examples of such legislation include the DMCA, the EUCD and the 2003 
Regulations in the UK. While the specifics of these pieces of legislation differ somewhat, the 
overall tone is the same. By examining certain case law it is apparent that this legislation 
represents a sufficient smoke screen in which the courts are forced to shift their focus 
largely from the quid quo pro of copyright to circumvention. Therefore, decisions in this field 
largely favour copyright owners as they have changed the rules of the game. Users’ rights 
technically still exist under copyright law, but anti-circumvention serves as a barrier which 
criminalises the access and usage of those rights. Therefore, the current incarnations of anti-
circumvention legislation serves as a boon to user rights in the digital era. 
 
Following this analysis, the next chapter aims to discuss anti-circumvention legislation in 
South Africa, specifically, whether or not South Africa should implement such legislation 
and, if so, the possible forms such legislation could take in order to best serve the purpose 
of copyright in balancing user and owner rights. 
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Chapter 5 
Copyright in the Digital Environment and the Ramifications for Developing Nations: A 
South African Perspective 
1. Introduction 
The global nature of copyright content, as noted in chapter 4, requires the international 
adoption of measures to protect this content. These measures include DRM systems as well 
as anti-circumvention legislation which allow these systems to operate effectively by 
prohibiting any attempts to circumvent these measures. In order for these measures to 
operate effectively, the international adoption of these measures would require a relatively 
standard set of legislative principles in order to ensure the optimum protection of copyright 
content in the digital environment. 
 
Completely preventing copyright infringement is an impossible dream which even the 
copyright industry does not buy into. The goal is rather to limit the infringement potential 
which the digital environment provides. The copyright industry identified that the means of 
achieving this goal would be through the use of DRM systems and the protection thereof 
through anti-circumvention legislation. A nation which failed to adopt certain basic anti-
circumvention provisions, such as those laid out in the WCT and WPPT respectively, could 
emerge as a safe haven for piracy. 
 
South Africa, through the Department of Trade and Industry, has signed both of these 
Treaties but has not yet ratified them. Some have argued that the failure to ratify these 
Treaties has resulted in copyright law in South Africa stagnating.532 This stagnation, so the 
argument goes, has petrified our law as it stood in the 1990s with local artists being the 
ones to suffer. One must ask whether the failure to ratify these Treaties is as grave as it has 
been made out to be. 
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170 
 
This thesis has analysed the approaches adopted by various nations and pan-national bodies 
in implementing the protection measures laid down in the WCT and WPPT. These analyses 
serve to provide a backdrop to the issue of whether South Africa should adopt anti-
circumvention provisions and, if so, the form which these provisions should take. This 
chapter will also discuss the implications of anti-circumvention provisions for user rights and 
the steps which could be taken in South Africa in order to provide greater protection for 
these rights than have been afforded in other countries. In order to truly understand the 
South African context, one needs to recognise its status as a developing African country and 
the importance of this will be also discussed. 
  
2. Developing Nations and Copyright Laws 
The rise of digital technology carries great potential for the development of developing 
nations. It allows for the dissemination of information relatively cheaply and more 
efficiently than in the analogue era. This is positive for developing nations in that one of the 
main keys to development is knowledge. This dissemination of knowledge is given greater 
credence when one considers that the purpose of copyright law is to promote the 
furtherance of the public knowledge. This is done, as explained in chapter 2, by recognising 
the dynamic tension which exists between the rights of owners and the rights of the public. 
The balance between these tensions is maintained by allowing copyright owners a limited 
monopoly over their work in exchange for certain usage rights being made available to the 
public. Pistorius notes that this balance has been upset by copyright works in digital form as 
copyright owners are able to limit the size of the public domain, because technology allows 
them to control access to works as well as demand payment for access and various uses of 
their works.533 It is apparent that this is in complete contrast to the purpose of copyright. 
This total control is detrimental to developing nations such as South Africa. 
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 T Pistorius “Developing Countries and Copyright in the Information Age: The Functional Equivalent 
Implementation of the WCT” (2006) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 10  
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The arguments put forward by proponents of this total control, see Kruger and others in 
chapter 2 on this point, submit that exceptions to copyrights were merely present in the 
analogue era because of the inability of the system to allow for owners to charge for every 
conceivable use of their works. The submission that because the means exist to allow for 
owners to charge for every usage of their works that this should be done and is in fact the 
natural order of things, is absurd. This type of argument conflates the purpose of copyright 
with economic incentives only, and fails to recognise the public interest aspect of the works. 
The sort of total control which DRM systems and anti-circumvention legislation allows for 
has the potential to further entrench western dominance of global commerce. Nwauche 
submits that this total control over works by copyright owners is problematic for African 
countries, as Africa is a net consumer of intellectual property.534 This means that poor 
countries are at the mercy of copyright owners with respect to access to information, as 
these parties can determine how their works can be used and at what price. The knock-on 
effect of this is that the dissemination of knowledge and the development of these nations 
is kept at bay by DRM systems and anti-circumvention provisions which limit information to 
those who can pay for it.535 
 
The idea which is being alluded to above is that of the digital divide. In the age of digital 
technology – where information is valuable and highly prized – the distinction exists 
between those who have access to information and those who do not. The situation is 
almost cyclical in nature, as information allows for the creation and dissemination of further 
information, while not having access to information can lead to stagnation of the public 
knowledge. The problem with allowing copyright owners total control over their works is 
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that it allows for the creation of an information elite and the further division between the 
‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’.536  
 
Indeed, the ability of stringent copyright laws to stifle development has been argued in a 
recent study. This study attributes Germany’s rise as an industrial power to its lax copyright 
laws of the 19th century.537 The researcher contrasts Germany and England during the same 
period and indentifies that publishers in England exploited their monopolies to the point 
where books were regarded as luxury items.538 New works which were published in limited 
editions would often exceed the weekly wage of an educated worker. In contrast, published 
works in German were often plagiarised because of the lack of stringent copyright 
protection. Publishers were able to stay in business through the publication of different 
works aimed at different customers.539 For example, the publishing of cheap paperback 
copies for the masses and special edition hardcovers for the wealthy. 
 
It should be noted that the above is merely an example of the effect which stringent 
copyright laws, with very few if any limitations or exceptions thereto, can have on the public 
knowledge and the development of a nation. At this point it should be noted that what is 
being submitted is not that copyright laws should be abolished in their entirety, as authors 
deserve remuneration for their works. What is being submitted is that this remuneration 
should not be the overriding feature of copyright law and that the public interest be 
considered, as the purpose of copyright requires. The International Federation of Library 
Associations and Institutions Committee on Copyright and Other Legal Matters notes that 
this is especially so in the context of developing nations. They submit that “if there were no 
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effective public interest exceptions, especially in the digital environment, this would lead to 
an even greater divide than already exists between the information rich and the information 
poor in both the developed and developing nations.”540 
 
a. The Dangers of the WCT for Developing Nations 
The Commission on Intellectual Property Rights was established by the British government 
in order to determine how intellectual property rights could better serve poor and 
developing nations. The Commission, based in London, identifies that developing nations 
should not lightly consider implementing the WCT.541 Where a developing nation, however, 
elects to implement the provisions of the WCT, they should avoid following the examples of 
the DMCA and the EUCD.542 The approaches encapsulated in these pieces of legislation are 
inconsistent with a balanced approach to copyright regulation, as they carry the potential to 
seriously undermine the existing limitations and exceptions to copyright law in those 
countries.543  
 
This means that a developing nation which elects to implement the provisions of the WCT, 
should do so according to the specific requirements of their own country.544 Okediji submits 
that “developing countries that have joined the WCT must carefully consider ways to 
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implement anti-circumvention provisions to ensure that the considerable potential of 
information technologies to facilitate use, access, and distribution of knowledge goods will 
not be unduly constrained.”545 
 
A problem emerges, however, when nations are required to tailor the provisions of the WCT 
to their individual contexts, as they seem to follow in the footsteps of the DMCA and the 
EUCD regardless of being cautioned against such an approach. 
 
i. The WCT and National Implementation – Lessons from up North 
Pistorious notes that the wording of article 11 of the WCT strikes a fine balance in which the 
rights of both copyright owners and copyright users are catered for.546 These provisions, 
however, merely serve as the framework in which individual nations may construct their 
own legislation. Where the construction of this legislation is done in accordance with purely 
economic principles, and ignores the public interest concerns which underscore copyright 
legislation, then the legislation is likely to reflect the economic interests of copyright owners 
only. Legislation concerning copyright content which is purely informed by such  principles 
may exceed the minimum guidelines laid out in article 11 and as such the delicate balance 
which it creates is upset. It has been argued that the reason for this imbalance is largely the 
result of the provisions extending beyond those outlined by article 11 of the WCT. 
 
The provisions of article 11 focus on acts of circumvention. In other words, the provisions of 
this article are said not to extend to devices which allow for circumvention. Some authors 
note that in order to effectively protect the rights of copyright owners, anti-circumvention 
legislation should include prohibitions against devices which facilitate circumvention of 
technological protection measures.547 This submission is based on the private manner in 
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which acts of circumvention are often undertaken and the reliance of the average user on 
devices to circumvent technological protection measures. By only prohibiting the conduct of 
circumvention, a heavy burden is placed on the copyright owner to monitor the private 
conduct of users of their works. This immediately raises issues of the right to privacy of 
users of copyright content. If devices which allow for circumvention are prohibited in anti-
circumvention legislation, then this burden is removed from the copyright owner.  
 
The prohibition against anti-circumvention devices, however, carries its own set of 
problems. The main issue is that the prohibition prevents legitimate users of copyright 
content from making use of that content as their rights under copyright law allow for. In 
implementing legislation which prohibits the use of circumvention devices, the legislator is 
valuing the rights of the copyright owner over those of the user. This type of thinking is 
encapsulated in Van Coppenhagen’s article where she notes that “simply because 
technology makes unauthorised reproduction and distribution and other uses of 
copyrighted works possible, however, does not mean that this should be condoned.”548 The 
author fails to note, however, that the converse is also true.549 
 
Thus, the tailoring of the provisions for each nation’s context ensures that the maintenance 
of the balance established in article 11, which is required by article 10 of the WCT, is not 
possible where the creation legislation of individual nations is framed purely by the 
concerns of copyright owners’ rights. The justification for this submission can be seen in 
various examples of the implementation of anti-circumvention provisions in other 
developing nations. 
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ii. Examples of Implementation in Developing Nations 
An example can be seen when considering several developing nations which have amended 
their copyright legislation in order to accommodate the provisions of the WCT.550 Botswana 
serves as an example of such a country. In 2005 Botswana amended its copyright legislation 
to incorporate the provisions of the WCT.551 The implementation of these provisions 
protects technological protection measures and provides for effective remedies where this 
technology is circumvented. Other examples include certain Asian Pacific countries552 which 
amended their legislation to include anti-circumvention provisions. The group “Consumer 
International” carried out a study in which it was noted that when implementing anti-
circumvention provisions into national legislation, legislators should ensure that these 
provisions are linked to copyright infringement or without the inclusion of limitations.553 The 
reason for these two recommendations is to allow for the protection of user rights against 
overly broad anti-circumvention legislation. The study further noted that out of those Asian 
Pacific countries which implemented anti-circumvention provisions, none of them linked the 
provisions with copyright infringement.554 
 
The examples above, like most of the amendments made in various other developed and 
developing nations, fail to incorporate any real limitations or exceptions to the rights of 
copyright owners. This is indicative of the over-reaching nature which copyright owners’ 
rights have acquired in the digital environment. Furthermore, the manner in which these 
nations have implemented the provisions of the WCT grants copyright owners much greater 
protection than the Treaty requires. The extension of these rights comes at the expense of 
user rights. In other words, the over-reaching effect of the implementation of the provisions 
of the WCT has lead to the erosion of the rights of users. This is because it prevents the 
circumvention of technological protection in order to access content in a manner which the 
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users were entitled to under copyright.555 Conroy identifies that international experience 
has unfortunately shown that copyright limitations and exceptions have not been reworked 
in the digital environment to ensure that user rights are not curtailed.556  
 
Where to from here? If the implementation of the WCT has lead to the diminishment of 
user rights in both developed and developing nations, then how should signatories to the 
WIPO treaties go about implementing the provisions of the WCT in their national legislation 
if they wish to continue to protect user rights in their country? 
 
iii. Article 10 - A Tailored Suit or a Straightjacket? 
A signatory to the WCT, wishing to implement its provisions into their own national 
legislation, should take cognisance of article 10 of the WCT. This article allows for 
signatories to the Treaty to put in place limitations and exceptions to the other provisions of 
the Treaty. It could be argued that this article provides the means through which a nation 
could protect user rights and return the balance which copyright law requires. The 
application of article 10, in the implementation of various national legislative endeavours, 
seems to either be totally absent or merely being paid lip service, as the provisions do not 
serve to protect the rights of users as they should do.557 The question which needs to be 
asked is: Why?   
 
There are numerous problems which can be indentified when considering article 10.  The 
first of these problems is that the provisions of article 10 can be seen as incorporating the 
three-step test relating to limitations and exceptions to the rights of copyright owners.558 In 
other words, the three-step test relates to the protection of users’ rights as they appear 
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under the Berne Convention. Okediji argues that the limitations and exceptions, as they 
exist under the Berne Convention, are insufficient to meet the bulk access needs of 
developing countries. She further argues that these limitations are necessarily broad and 
vague in order to allow nations to tailor them to their specific context, however, these 
limitations and exceptions are often incorporated in a wholesale manner by developing 
nations, without tailoring them to the specific circumstances of the particular nation. This 
only serves to inhibit the access to information required by these nations.559 
 
Another problem is that the Berne Convention relates to the rights of both copyright owners 
and copyright users, but its basis lies in the analogue era in which the tangible embodiments 
of works were the primary focus of copyright law.  In order to give effect to the rights of 
users, a country is required to create and incorporate limitations and exceptions to the 
rights of owners, in order to give effect to these user rights. The way in which the 
Convention deals with rights, especially user rights, is that it makes reference to these rights 
with regard to certain uses of a work and not to access thereof. The problem, which has 
been identified on numerous occasions in this thesis, is that technological protection 
measures effectively operate by controlling access.  
 
The difficulties which result from this application can be summarised as follows. Anti-
circumvention provisions prevent the circumvention of technological protection measures. 
This creates a paradoxical situation in which the user is given rights, in terms of the Berne 
Convention and national implementation thereof, which they are prevented from using 
because of further legislation, in other words the WCT and national implementation thereof, 
which prevents the user from being able to make use of those rights. The ramifications 
which these alterations have are, thus, detrimental to the rights of users as they stand 
under the Berne Convention.  
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The question which then arises is whether article 10 serves the purpose which it was 
designed to fulfil. The WCT’s reliance on the three-step test appears to be problematic for 
developing nations. This is especially so as the three-step test under the Berne Convention, 
and various other international agreements, dealt with content in an analogue environment 
and not a digital one. The shift in focus from use to access, which has become a key feature 
of the digital era, has resulted in uncertainty and an inability to convert the vague provisions 
of the three-step test into concrete limitations and exceptions which can be practically 
applied in the digital environment. Thus, it could be argued that the WCT fails to properly 
provide protection for the rights of users.  
 
Despite the failure noted above, it could be argued that article 10 does provide one lifeline 
for the protection of user rights. The article makes reference to “certain special cases” in 
which signatories thereto may grant limitations and exceptions. Can this proviso go so far as 
to preserve user rights in the digital environment? In order to properly determine this, one 
needs to take note of the provisions of article 10. 
 
Article 10 states that  
“(1) Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, provide for limitations of or 
exceptions to the rights granted to authors of literary and artistic works under this 
Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. 
(2) Contracting Parties shall, when applying the Berne Convention, confine any 
limitations of or exceptions to rights provided for therein to certain special cases that 
do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.” 
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While subsections 1 and 2 make reference to the right of a signatory to the Treaty to make 
certain limitations and exceptions in special cases, these rights may not be exercised where 
they would unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author or conflict with the 
normal exploitation of the work. It was noted earlier in this chapter, and indeed elsewhere 
in this thesis, that the effect which the WCT has had on copyright is to shift the purpose of 
copyright. This purpose has shifted from maintaining a balance between user rights and the 
rights of copyright owners, which are authorised by the limited monopoly that copyright 
provides, to the economic imperatives of copyright owners and the maintenance of the 
author’s incentive to create.560 This shift has been characterised by a reduction in the rights 
of consumers of digital copyright content.   
 
The shift, while already undermining user rights, could further be used to diminish these 
rights by validating claims of copyright owners. This is because copyright owners could 
argue, as has been done by various authors,561 that the use of DRM systems in relation to 
digital copyright content represents the normal exploitation of the work in the digital 
context. Furthermore, the author’s legitimate interests would be unreasonably prejudiced 
by not being able to make use of the business model which the digital environment allows 
for. This is premised on the idea that user rights were only present in copyright law in the 
analogue era because the mechanisms to allow for the business model which copyright 
owners desired were not present. In other words, because digital technology creates a 
situation in which it is possible for every conceivable use of a work to be charged for, and 
that this would have been the status quo in the analogue era had it been possible, that the 
limitations and exceptions which constitute user rights under copyright law are no longer 
required because a pricing scheme exists in which every user and their desired use can be 
included. 
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It could be argued, therefore, that any attempt to incorporate limitations or exceptions 
which seriously aim to protect the rights of users under the provisions of article 10, could 
not be justified by this article. Indeed they would be contrary to those very same provisions. 
 
When dealing with the WCT it is important to remember its origins, as discussed in depth in 
chapter 2 of this thesis. It is, in short, a Treaty which arose as the result lobbying by one of 
the world’s major producers of copyright content. Conroy notes that the US and the EU 
have adopted an aggressive approach to the protection of copyright by entering into 
bilateral trade agreements with various nations.562 These agreements establish a new 
minimum standard of protection which is higher than that which emerges out of multilateral 
agreements, such as the WCT. 
 
The author notes that the interaction between the TRIPS agreement and members of the 
World Trade Organization563 creates a situation in which a nation is required to provide the 
same protection to all other member nations equally and unconditionally.564 In other words, 
the interaction between the TRIPS, the WCT, and the standards established in bilateral trade 
agreements means that the higher standards established in certain trade agreements 
should then be afforded to the nationals of all other WTO member states.565 The author 
notes that the danger with this process is that these higher standards then become the 
minimum standards.566 
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b. Protection of User Rights in Developing Nations 
The increasing growth of the digital divide represents a danger to the development of 
knowledge societies in developing nations, especially in the African context.567 The 
provisions of the WCT, while providing for an effective means of protecting the rights of 
copyright owners, fail to provide the same level of protection to the rights of users.568 In a 
globalised environment, which is becoming more and more dependent on digital technology 
as a means of mediating not only societal interactions but also the dissemination of 
knowledge, how can the digital ‘have-nots’ prevent themselves from falling on the wrong 
side of the digital divide? 
 
c. Limiting the Growth of the Digital Divide 
The right of an author of intellectual property is subject to protection under the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.569 The nature of this right precipitates that it be linked to 
various other rights such as freedom of expression, development and education.570 The 
rights to development and education are linked as both require knowledge in order to be 
realised. Various international development programs, committees, agendas, treaties and 
other mechanisms for global back-patting identify that when considering the rights of users 
in the digital environment in developing nations, the right of access to information should 
be of paramount importance.571 Thus, the interests of developing nations would be well 
                                                             
567 Nwauche 2005 Paper Presented at the General Assembly of the Council for Development of Social Science 
Research for Africa. Nwauche defines a knowledge society as “…one in which the diffusion, production and 
application of knowledge are at their utmost and form the driving force for society [he continues] all 
components of a knowledge society depend critically on information, which is organised and represented in 
knowledge products that become commodities by virtue of copyright protection” (2005) Journal of World 
Intellectual Property 361 at 363. 
568 See Okediji who notes that the situation is ironic when one considers that the “*WCT] has a membership 
comprising mainly of developing countries with limited Internet penetration rates and significant levels of 
illiteracy and poverty.” 2005 UNCTAD 32. 
569
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights - Article 27(2) states “Everyone has the right to the protection of 
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the 
author.” 
570
 Conroy 2006 Thesis 227. 
571
 See for example WIPO Development Agenda – 45 Adopted Recommendations Under the WIPO 
Development Agenda – Cluster C: Technology Transfer, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
and Access to Knowledge http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf (accessed 10 September 2010). See also ‘A2K Draft Treaty’ 
183 
 
served by basing their intellectual property regimes on the right of access to information as 
it would assist in the continued development of that nation. 
 
On the role of access to information as a foundation for the protection of user rights in 
developing countries in the digital environment, two things should be noted. Firstly, it is not 
being argued that authors should not be entitled to benefit from their works, but rather that 
the interests of distributors muddy the waters of this debate, as it is their interests which 
anti-circumvention provisions and DRM systems largely serve to protect. Secondly, it is 
important to note that these regimes should relate to digitised content only.  This form of 
dissemination has a greater potential for user-based dissemination over the prohibitive 
costs of analogue distribution methods, which are primarily dependent on distributors 
independent of authors and users.572 As chapter 2 of this thesis submits, the greatly reduced 
investment from distributors which the digital environment allows for, provides a 
mechanism through which users can internalise the costs of distribution while allowing for 
the author of a work to derive real benefits from their monopoly, rather than allowing these 
benefits to accrue to distributors. 
 
With the above in mind, one can begin to determine what practical measures could be 
implemented in developing nations, premised on the right of access to information, in order 
to provide user rights with greater protection than they have generally been afforded in the 
digital environment. 
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3 Stagnation of the Law and the Rights of Artists in South Africa 
In a recent article, Dr Owen Dean stated that “SA is failing to keep up with international 
copyright treaties due to government ’ineptitude and negligence‘ and, as a result of this, the 
country’s musicians, filmmakers and other creators of content do not enjoy the same 
protections as their peers in other countries.”573 Others identify that, given the nature of 
digital technology and the global stage on which it operates, South Africa’s failure to 
implement the provisions of the WCT creates an environment which is less attractive to 
investors and purchasers of intellectual property.574 This situation creates further problems 
as local employment and international trade are then affected.575 
 
It is on the basis of some of the concerns noted above that Dean identifies that South Africa 
has an obligation to update its law and adopt anti-circumvention provisions because of its 
obligations under the Berne Convention. These submissions are correct but, it is respectfully 
submitted, they do not represent the entire issue –  the situation is more nuanced than he 
makes out. 
 
a. Does Anti-Circumvention Legislation Achieve its Goals? 
The issue which can be taken up with Dean’s submission is that the international adoption 
of anti-circumvention legislation has not been shown to reduce piracy in any significant way. 
The measures adopted to protect digital content fail to achieve the goals of protecting the 
rights of artists in that their intended effect has not been achieved, i.e. they fail to offer any 
real reduction in piracy levels. Recently, at the Technology Policy Institute’s Aspen Forum, 
the groups which spearheaded the creation of anti-circumvention legislation identified the 
inefficacies of legislation of this type. 
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It was stated that “the DMCA isn’t working for content people at all”.576 These groups argue 
that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and search engines should be made liable for any 
failure to remove content which infringes copyright which has been posted by their 
company.577  The current situation is that these companies cannot be held liable so long as 
they have procedures in place for the removal of infringing content once notified by the 
owner of that content. Put differently, the copyright industry is now lobbying for legislation 
or, absent this, agreements with these so-called intermediaries which require them to police 
copyright infringement and hold them liable to copyright owners where they fail to do so. 
This sort of argument is akin to holding manufacturers of motor vehicles liable for the 
speeding fines attributed to the drivers of their cars, as they could have built mechanisms 
into the car which prevented them from exceeding certain speeds. It seems completely 
inappropriate to argue that intermediaries should be required to police copyright 
infringement because of the inability of copyright owners to effectively do so. 
 
In other words, the argument by the content industry has shifted from requiring that anti-
circumvention legislation be adopted globally, in order to protect their content, to arguing 
that this approach is not enough on its own. It could therefore be argued that this type of 
legislation, of which the DMCA represents one of its strictest implementations, fails to 
achieve its intended purpose. It could be argued, however, that the purpose of such anti-
circumvention is not limited to the protection of digital copyright content, but has other 
functions which the implementation of such legislation would fulfil.  
 
In this vein, Van Coppenhagen argues that the importance of the provisions of the WCT lie in 
the maintenance of incentives for creators in the digital environment. If incentives to create 
                                                             
576
“RIAA: U.S. Copyright law isn’t working” CnetNews.com 23 August 2010 http://news.cnet.com/8301-
13578_3-20014468-38.html (accessed 1 September 2010). C Sherman of the RIAA explains that “You cannot 
monitor all the infringements on the Internet. It’s simply not possible. We don’t have the ability to search all 
the places the infringing content appears.” 
577 For an example of such legislation see the Digital Economy Act 2010 in the UK which has recently been 
enacted. 
186 
 
are maintained, then the purpose of copyright will be served as these creations will promote 
the public interest by ensuring the progress of the public welfare.578  
 
Van Coppenhagen’s submission that the implementation of the WCT provisions in South 
Africa will sustain the incentives of creators is debatable. If one refers to chapter 2 of this 
thesis, it was noted that the incentives maintained by copyright and especially those arising 
from the implementation of anti-circumvention legislation, such as that proposed by the 
WCT, fail to provide any real incentive to creators and mainly serve as a means of ensuring 
the livelihood of distributors. Furthermore, the author fails to consider the effect which 
technological protection measures and anti-circumvention legislation has on the rights of 
users. Copyright law’s success in improving public knowledge is hinged on the balance being 
maintained between the rights of copyright owners and users thereof. The implementation 
of anti-circumvention provisions serves to shift that balance greatly in favour of copyright 
owners. The argument put forward by the author in this regard is thus, it is respectfully 
submitted, incorrect. The question which must then be asked is: Should South Africa be 
required to enter into the often lengthy process of implementing such provisions, despite 
the noted failures of such provisions in other countries? 
 
With regard to the South African context, Dean acknowledges the ineffectiveness of anti-
circumvention legislation and DRM systems, but submits that South Africa should tow the 
line of the major nations despite the ineffectual nature of these measures.579 It seems 
strange to promote the idea of implementing such legislation when it has been shown that 
such legislation is ineffective in countries which have greater and more diverse digital 
environments than our own. It requires that South African legislation inherit problems 
which have already been evidenced with such protection measures in order to be up-to-
date.  The main reason for doing so, according to Dean, is to protect the rights of local 
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artists. This of course requires that these provisions provide greater protection for artists, 
not only in theory but in practice. 
 
b. Do DRM Systems and Anti-Circumvention Provisions Protect Artists? 
The short answer to the question posed in this heading is no. The position of the creation 
incentive in the digital environment has been discussed in great detail in chapter 2 of this 
thesis.580 In that chapter, it was noted that artists at various levels rely on monetary revenue 
gained through live performances and the emergence of secondary markets in order to 
survive, rather than on royalties, as few performers actually benefit from these royalties. 
The protection of works in digital forms through DRM systems and anti-circumvention 
provisions largely serve to protect the interests of distributors rather than the artists 
themselves. It is submitted that this situation would be no different for local artists, 
especially in a developing nation such as South Africa.  
 
Van Coppenhagen submits that “for a developing country such as South Africa, which finds 
itself in a global information economy, the core of which is creativity and its dissemination, 
intellectual property protection, and particularly copyright protection, is vital.”581 It is 
respectfully submitted that this argument fails to take into account the status of most 
developing nations, including South Africa, as being net consumers of intellectual 
property.582 
 
As pointed out earlier, there is a strong link between the use of intellectual property, such 
as copyright, and the improvement of public knowledge. The provisions of the WCT and 
technological protection measures, however, firmly place control over all conceivable uses 
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of copyright in the hands of copyright owners. Thus Van Coppenhagen’s submission, while 
correct, requires the implementation of legislation which will further entrench South 
Africa’s dependency on imported intellectual property. The dangers of this situation, as 
identified above, are that the public knowledge and the development of a nation are at the 
mercy of copyright owners who are intent on charging for every conceivable use of their 
works.583 This ultimately means that money, which developing nations could be spending on 
other much needed areas of development, is spent on the whimsical pricing determined by 
distributors for uses which a user would ordinarily have a right to under copyright law. 
 
Despite the criticisms noted above, one cannot merely argue that anti-circumvention 
legislation fails to achieve its purpose and then leave the argument at that. This type of 
approach would represent an analysis of the situation in a purely academic manner, as the 
situation is then only discussed in a theoretical vacuum without contributing anything real 
to the debate. In order to avoid this type of analysis and, in order to discuss these issues in 
any sort of practical sense, one is still required to consider where South Africa stands with 
regard to the protection of copyright content in the digital environment. 
 
c. The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
It has been argued that the anti-circumvention provisions of the WCT, although not adopted 
in the specific context of copyright in South Africa, have been adopted in South African law 
under the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act.584 Chapter XIII of the Act deals 
with the issue of cyber crime and implements provisions which prohibit the unauthorised 
access to, interception of or interference with data.585 The provisions of this section refer 
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specifically to ‘data’ which the Act defines as “electronic representations of information in 
any form”.586 This definition is wide enough to include within its scope copyright works in 
various digital forms, including E-books as well as music in various digital formats.  
 
i. The Provisions – Similarities and Differences with other Jurisdictions 
The provisions of section 86 incorporate prohibitions against acts of circumvention, s86 (1), 
as well as devices which facilitate such circumvention and the use of these devices, s86 (3) 
and (4) respectively. These provisions generally reflect the approach adopted under the 
DMCA, as they prohibit both acts of circumvention as well as tools which facilitate such 
circumvention. The prohibition against acts of circumvention, like the DMCA, are limited to 
access controls, while the prohibition against devices which circumvent include both access 
and copy controls. As a result of these similarities to the DMCA, one would expect these 
provisions to be subject to similar kinds of criticisms as those levelled at the DMCA.587  
 
Some noteworthy distinctions exist between the ECTA and other anti-circumvention 
legislation which has been discussed. Firstly, the ECTA requires that intent be present for 
the commission of an offence. This can be distinguished from the DMCA which imposes 
strict liability,588 and the EUCD which requires either intent or negligence as a basis of 
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fault.589 Secondly, the ECTA specifically includes computer programs under the ambit of a 
device used for circumvention. This differs from the implementation of the EUCD in the UK 
in which the specific exclusion of computer programs from the ambit of circumvention 
devices was recognised as having the potential for creating two different standards of 
protection.590 While the ECTA avoids some of the pitfalls inherent in anti-circumvention 
legislation, as it was implemented in other countries, it is not without its faults. 
 
ii. Criticisms 
Certain criticisms can be noted when one analyses the provisions of s86 of the Act. A 
general criticism relates specifically to the definition of the term ‘access’. Section 85 of the 
Act defines access as including  
“actions of a person who, after taking note of any data, becomes aware of the fact 
that he or she is not authorised to access that data and still continues to access that 
data.” 
The first issue which can be taken up with this definition is that the Act defines what 
constitutes access by referring to ‘access’ in that definition.591 There access is defined by 
way of reference to access. The definition is thus circular in nature. Secondly, the definition 
does not properly identify when a party would fall foul of its prohibitions. It fails to identify 
at what stage a party must become aware of the fact that their access is unauthorised but 
continues to access that data.592 Therefore, this section fails to properly define an integral 
term on which the anti-circumventions provisions of the Act rests and, as such, is of little 
use until these details are clarified through greater inquiry by a court. 
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 Article 6 (1) - Member States shall provide adequate legal protection against the circumvention of any 
effective technological measures, which the person concerned carries out in the knowledge, or with 
reasonable grounds to know, that he or she is pursuing that objective (emphasis added). 
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The Act, unlike other anti-circumvention legislation, avoids the criticism of being computer 
law masquerading as copyright law.593 While the provisions of the Act are broad enough to 
incorporate digital copyright works under its ambit, the issues which plague anti-
circumvention legislation in other countries are still of relevance to these provisions. The 
main criticism is that concerning the protection of user rights under anti-circumvention 
provisions. Although the Act does not proclaim itself to be copyright law, it could be seen as 
constituting so-called ‘para-copyright’ law. As such, it still has far reaching implications for 
the use of copyright content in the digital environment by South African consumers. 
 
The fundamental question which remains to be answered is whether the circumvention of a 
security measure by a person attempting to make use of particular content, in terms of 
certain user rights available to them under copyright law, would constitute a contravention 
of the provisions of s86. In other words, would a user, who has a legitimate right of fair 
dealing in particular digital copyright content, be able to circumvent protection measures 
preventing such access without being liable for the commission of an offence under the 
provisions of the Act?  
 
iii. User Rights Under the ECTA 
Section 86(1) of the Act stipulates that ‘access’, as defined in s85, must be carried out 
without authority or permission to do so. Would one’s right to fair dealing constitute 
authority or permission and, as such, allow a party to escape such liability? This question is 
not an easy one to answer in the absence of a judicial ruling. It has been argued that 
because the ECTA is legislation governing an area of IT law, that this means it is too far 
removed from the Copyright Act for the rights of fair dealing to constitute sufficient 
‘authority or permission’.594 Conroy argues that South African law is far stricter than the 
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 See generally T Gillespie “Copyright and Commerce: The DMCA, Trusted Systems, and the Stabilization of 
Distribution” 2004 The Information Society 239. 
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 Conroy 2006 Thesis 235. 
192 
 
provisions of either the DMCA or the EUCD. She argues that the only means of ensuring that 
user rights are protected, is through a Constitutional challenge.595 It is respectfully 
submitted that this approach is perhaps ‘jumping the gun’, as the Constitution should only 
be used to protect rights where the legislation enacted to give effect to those general rights, 
which the Constitution contains, fail to do so. It is submitted, as such, that the use of a 
Constitutional challenge is somewhat premature.  
 
It could be argued that the nature of copyright law in the digital environment necessitates a 
close interaction between copyright and the digital forms in which it appears. Any reference 
to an author’s ‘authority or permission’, where the data concerned relates to copyrighted 
material, would necessitate a consideration of whether the author has either granted a 
licence for such use or whether a particular use had been authorised. In terms of copyright 
law, as noted previously, the author’s rights are limited by certain exceptions. These 
limitations, as such, could constitute a form of ‘authority’ in terms of which the user’s action 
could be said to be authorised and, as such, the rights of users would be maintained while 
copyright owners would be prevented from over-reaching. Again, this is an issue which can 
only be clarified through judicial intervention.596  
 
In the absence of any judicial clarification on these issues, other practical measures which 
have been proposed and identified as possible measures should be explored, which could 
effectively maintain the balance between owner and user rights which copyright requires, in 
order to successfully fulfil its purpose. 
                                                             
595 Conroy 2006 Thesis 235. The author notes “Under certain circumstances, the provisions of section 86 of the 
ECTA could curtail users’ privileges in such a way that would impact on their rights of freedom of expression, 
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technological protection measures.” ACA2K “Country Report – South Africa” (2009) 
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4. Practical Measures for Maintaining Balance 
The maintenance of this balance has been the subject of much debate. The issues are 
divergent and include concerns over whether or not this balance is being maintained in the 
digital environment. The extent of this debate has received much consideration throughout 
this thesis, with both sides of the argument being discussed. It is submitted that sufficient 
evidence has been produced which supports the submission that this balance is not being 
properly maintained in the digital environment. This section aims to identify and discuss 
some of the varied practical measures which have been proposed to alleviate the 
degradation of user rights in the digital context, while maintaining the balance which 
copyright requires. The approaches identified are largely those applicable to developing 
countries as this is the context in which the maintenance of the copyright balance in South 
Africa needs to be understood. 
 
a. The Functional-Equivalent Approach 
The first approach to be discussed is the ‘functional-equivalent approach’. The differing 
nature of copyright content in the analogue and digital eras is problematic in that the way in 
which works present themselves, operate and are distributed in these environments, are 
not identical.597 Pistorius identifies that these differences require that the imposition of 
legislation, designed to extend the principles of copyright applicable in a paper-based 
environment into the digital environment, should not undertake a direct importation of 
those principles by attempting to identify and import analogous practices.598 The approach, 
the author submits, is better served by focusing on the objectives which specific copyright 
provisions in the analogue era aimed at achieving, and transplanting these objectives into 
the digital context.599 In this way, the practical problems which arise from trying to identify 
and transpose analogous practices into an environment which operates differently to the 
paper-based environment are avoided. 
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 See chapter 2 for an in-depth discussion of these differences. 
598 Pistorius 2006 PER 14-15. 
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 Pistorius 2006 PER 15. 
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Pistorius submits that “the rights of users and owners should be functionally equivalent 
irrespective of the media of embodiment.”600 Certain incongruence arises as a result of 
attempting to directly import legislation applicable in the analogue era into the digital 
environment. This type of legislation was not drafted to deal with the kinds of situations and 
media present in the digital environment. It is on this basis that the ‘functional-equivalent 
approach’ is identified as a possible way forward. What is this approach and what does it 
entail? 
 
The approach emerged from the ‘Guide to Enactment’601 which was published by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law.602 The guide was created in order to help 
alleviate the problems which were created by electronic commerce and the application of 
legislation which had been drafted for application in paper-based commerce.603 The means 
of alleviating these problems, proposed by the Guide, is to identify the objective which 
underlies a provision relating to paper-based forms. This objective relates to the purpose of 
the provision in its paper-based form. Once this purpose has been indentified, one can 
identify the requirements which the paper-based form needs to meet in order to obtain 
legal recognition and/or protection. From this, one can then determine the threshold which 
electronic communications, fulfilling the same purpose as the paper-based provision, would 
be required to meet, in order to obtain the equivalent legal recognition of the paper-based 
form. On this point, section 1 (E) of the Guide notes: 
This process “singles out basic functions of paper-based form requirements, with a 
view to providing criteria which, once they are met by data messages, enable such 
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 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996 with additional a 5 bis as adopted 1998 (General 
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data messages to enjoy the same level of legal recognition as corresponding paper 
documents performing the same function.”604 
 
This approach provided a means through which legislation could adapt to new technologies 
and scenarios which that technology created. This was done by providing a standard means 
through which the purpose of a legislative provision could be interpreted. With a 
standardised approach, the purpose for a provision would be maintained when interpreting 
it in a digital context.  The result of this process was that the effect of digital technology on 
commerce, although not having been considered when certain legislation had been drafted, 
was incorporated into the law. This served to limit the uncertainty which new technologies 
created in this environment by clarifying the application of the law.  
 
The drafters of the Guide were quick to identify the potential of new technologies, as they 
were not only able to perform the equivalent function of paper-based equivalents, but they 
also allowed for greater degrees of security, reliability and efficiency. While identifying 
these possibilities, the Guide also states that the use of the functional equivalent approach, 
in effect the use of electronic commerce, should not come at the expense of users of 
electronic commerce.605 
 
The characteristics embodied in this approach, functional equivalence and technological 
neutrality, are seen as two of the key principles underscoring the Guide.606 These features 
could serve to alleviate the copyright imbalance which the digital era has produced. 
Pistorius argues that the functional-equivalent approach is the type of measure which is 
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envisaged by article 10 of the WCT.607 While this submission is accurate in theory, as 
discussed earlier, it certainly does not represent the situation in practice, as the rights of 
owners are read as superseding those of users. The functional-equivalent approach offers a 
practical and sensible means for dealing with copyright in the digital environment and by 
adopting such an approach, the traditional balance of copyright law can be maintained. 
 
b. The Implementation of a ‘Foreseeability’ Criterion 
It has been suggested that South Africa should adopt legislation with regard to acts of 
circumvention and direct infringement of copyrights.608 In other words, acts of 
circumvention should be prohibited subject to an infringement clause and this would 
maintain the balance copyright law requires, as users’ rights of fair dealing would still be 
accessible.609 The difficulty which arises from this is that a user would be entitled to 
circumvent technological protection measures where this would not amount to 
infringement, not withstanding that, the majority of users would require a device which 
allows for the circumvention of the technological protection measures. According to Van 
Coppenhagen, the provisions of section 23(1) of the Copyright Act610 can be interpreted as 
including any person who provides or makes available a technological device for the 
purposes of circumventing a technological protection measure. Section 23 (1) would have 
the effect of prohibiting the provision of circumvention devices without which most users 
would not be able to make use of their rights under South African copyright law. The 
solution to this approach then requires one to implement provisions relating to devices 
which facilitate circumvention. This legislation then enters the realm of DMCA-like 
legislation. 
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The implementation of this type of legislation would be required to take into account the 
criticisms which have been levelled at the DMCA, and incorporate a few nuanced alterations 
in order to remedy the shortfalls. The main contention with this approach concerns the 
implementation of anti-circumvention provisions which exceed the minimum requirements 
of article 11 of the WCT. The situation, in other words, concerns the implementation of 
provisions which prohibit acts of circumvention, as well as devices which facilitate 
circumvention. Given the argued impact of Section 23(1) of the Copyright Act, one is 
required to ignore the way in which the copyright balance is upset by exceeding the 
minimum requirements of article 11. Even where one ignores such considerations, however, 
the implementation of such legislation is still subject to several major flaws.  
 
The first issue which one must consider is that legislation prohibiting both acts of 
circumvention and devices which facilitate such acts inevitably necessitates a level of 
interplay between the two. This is because of the way in which acts of circumvention are 
carried out by users possessing devices which allow them to do so, rather than possessing 
the knowledge of how to circumvent protection measures themselves. In other words, the 
“scope of the device prohibition affects the scope of the prohibition against acts of 
circumvention.”611 If the device prohibition were too strict, then most users would be 
unable to circumvent technological protection measures. They would, therefore, be unable 
to give effect to their rights in terms of fair dealing. This would result in the copyright 
balance, therefore, not being maintained. 
 
The success of this approach hinges on ensuring that provisions prohibiting devices which 
facilitate circumvention are not so strict that they remove the ability of users to make use of 
their rights to fair dealing. Van Coppenhagen argues that the way in which this can be 
achieved is by incorporating a foreseeability criterion into provisions which prohibit 
circumvention devices.612 Such a foreseeability criterion immediately denotes that the 
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devices which: 
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standard of liability can be determined with regard to negligence. 613 If the ECTA were to 
constitute South Africa’s implementation of the WCT, then the imposition of a forseeability 
criterion would have the effect of increasing the scope of the Act by including negligence. It 
has already been identified that the ECTA determines the standard of liability by requiring 
the presence of intent.  
 
The implementation of a foreseeability criterion into provisions which prohibit devices 
which facilitate circumvention is further problematic when one considers the following. 
Every device of this kind, due to its nature, would foreseeably be capable of an infringing 
use. Van Coppenhagen argues that, if such a criterion is adopted then, it should be left to 
the manufacturer of a device to show why an infringing purpose was not reasonably 
foreseeable.614  
 
The issue of infringement is one, as noted earlier, which largely depends on the specific 
circumstances of the user and the usage of the content. By implementing a foreseeability 
criterion, the party in charge of either manufacturing or distributing the device is then 
required to monitor the usage of their device by users in order to avoid liability because, in a 
practical sense, their device would always foreseeably be capable of an infringing use. 
Placing this responsibility in the hands of these parties may be too heavy a burden as it 
would require monitoring the use of every user who obtains the device. This seems too 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
 Are promoted, advertised or marketed to circumvent, where it is reasonably foreseeable that such 
circumvention is for the purposes of infringement; or 
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onerous. Furthermore, issues of privacy and the global application of monitoring measures 
would be problems in the practical implementation of such a criterion. 
 
Van Coppenhagen notes that these problems may be overcome by the manufacturer of a 
device incorporating a licensing agreement into the use of their device. This licence 
agreement could incorporate conditions of usage of the work, which prohibit use of the 
device for the purposes of infringement, as well as allowing for the manufacturer to monitor 
usage of the device. In other words, the incorporation of such a licensing agreement could 
be a reasonable step taken by the manufacturer of a device and as such, they could avoid 
liability on this basis. 
 
It is respectfully submitted that the incorporation of such an agreement would have little 
effect on the usage of devices. One could look at the discussion of shrink-wrap and click-
wrap licence agreements, in chapter 3, in this regard.615 The licensing agreement would 
basically serve as a means through which device manufacturers could shield themselves 
from liability through the assent by users of their devices to these licensing agreements. If 
the usage of the device would not really be affected in any practical sense by the 
implementation of a licensing agreement, and the implementation of such a licensing 
agreement would allow for the manufacturer of a device to avoid liability, then the adoption 
of provisions which incorporate a foreseeability criterion seems to be a superfluous exercise 
and, ultimately, a redundant one. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The calls for South Africa to amend its current copyright legislation in order to keep pace 
with the current global anti-circumvention trends are largely uncalled for. Although South 
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Africa has not approached the issue of anti-circumvention through amendments to the 
Copyright Act, it could be said that it has taken steps to implement such provisions through 
the ECTA. Section 86 of the ECTA could be seen as allowing for the protection of copyright 
users’ rights in the digital environment, depending on how these provisions are interpreted 
by a court, when/if such a case comes before the courts. 
 
South Africa’s dual position as both a developing country and a net importer of copyright 
content, places it in a precarious position when it comes to copyright law and the 
implementation of anti-circumvention legislation. Any such legislation should be interpreted 
in a manner which ensures that user rights are maintained in the digital environment. A 
failure to do so would result in a degradation of the rights of users to copyright works. This 
has the knock-on effect of negatively impacting on access to information. By limiting the 
access to information of a developing country, that countries development would likely 
become stagnated. 
 
Various approaches have been identified when it comes to the protection of user rights and 
the maintenance of the copyright balance in the digital environment. The application of a 
foreseeability criterion seems too strenuous a burden to place on manufacturers of devices. 
The functional-equivalent approach perhaps offers the best means of preventing the 
degradation of user rights, which characterises anti-circumvention legislation in most 
nations which have implemented such provisions.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
1. Introduction 
So, do DRM systems represent the end of the road for copyright law? This issue has been 
dealt with throughout this thesis in discussing both the theoretical underpinnings of 
copyright, as well as the practical implications of this for DRM systems, anti-circumvention 
legislation and the South African context. Two questions have constantly informed these 
analyses. The first being: What effects, if any, do DRM systems have on the operation of 
copyright? Second: if any effect is to be found, what are the ramifications of these for user 
rights and the rights of owners under copyright law?  
 
As to the first question, it cannot be doubted that the impact of DRM systems, in 
conjunction with anti-circumvention legislation, on copyright is rather dramatic. Indeed, 
various examples of this impact have been identified throughout this thesis. For example, 
some authors have argued that certain factors which make up a DRM system, such as click-
wrap licence agreements, have allowed for the privatisation of the law in this field.616 This 
so-called privatisation operates in a way which allows copyright owners to bypass those 
aspects of copyright law which do not suit their needs.617 
 
As has been discussed throughout this thesis there are various strands which make up the 
‘mesh’ that is a DRM system. These various strands work in conjunction with one another to 
allow for copyright owners to maintain control over works in the digital environment. The 
protection offered by these systems would be ineffectual, however, in the absence of anti-
circumvention legislation. This legislation protects the integrity of DRM systems by 
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prohibiting either acts of circumvention, devices which facilitate circumvention, or both. The 
prohibition against circumvention creates a scenario in which the owners of works in the 
digital environment can legitimately determine every usage of those works. In other words, 
they can determine what uses are allowed and what uses are not. This includes the ability to 
control uses which do not fall within the scope of their rights. 
 
Copyright owners are placed in a position to establish any hierarchy they desire with regard 
to both their rights and the rights of users. It seems obvious that this is a tremendous power 
which has been granted to one party. This is problematic as this power then becomes open 
to abuse by copyright owners. The abuse of this power carries with it its own set of 
problems. First, copyright operates on the basis of a quid pro quo relationship existing 
between users and owners of copyright works.618 Second, granting such a power to owners 
often leads to situations where the extent of the limited monopoly which copyright law is 
supposed to provide is exceeded. Why then has such a power been granted when its 
provision clearly runs contrary to the purpose and fundamental principles of copyright law? 
 
2. The Dangers of the Digital Environment 
Copying technologies were not widely available to the average consumer in the analogue 
era. This was largely due to restrictive factors such as the cost of this technology and the 
amount of space which this technology required. Copyright law was thus suited to the 
analogue era as it protected the physical embodiment of works and made provision for the 
rights of both the users and owners thereof in accordance with this protection. 
 
The rise of digital technology made copying technologies available to the average consumer 
in a manner which was cheap and easily accessible. Added to this, the Internet provided a 
platform from which copyright work could be sent around the world almost instantly and en 
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masse. This presented a problem for copyright owners. The ability to control the copying of 
copyright works allowed copyright owners to control the physical embodiment of a work in 
the analogue era. This, in turn, allowed copyright owners to control the dissemination of a 
work. By controlling dissemination, the copyright industry was able to ensure that it 
benefitted from copyright. Digital copying technology allows for work to be copied on a 
large scale and distributed virally over the Internet. The digital era allows for the users of 
copyright to gain a greater level of control over the dissemination of work. How has this 
problem been dealt with? 
 
As was noted in chapter 4, it was argued by copyright owners that the digital environment 
posed a danger to the rights of copyright owners.619 This danger, it was argued, could only 
be remedied through DRM systems and the legitimation of these systems through anti-
circumvention legislation. Therefore, in an environment which is perceived, and indeed 
portrayed, as being hostile to copyright law and largely ambivalent to the rights of owners, 
it is important that owners are able to exercise some level of control over their works. 
 
One could respond to this argument with a simple “fair enough”. It seems fair that the 
owner of a copyright work should be entitled to benefit from the ownership thereof and the 
rights which this ownership entails. The problem is, however, not the argument being made 
by the copyright industry but the approach which they have adopted to remedy the 
situation.  
 
3. The Erosion of User Rights 
The level of control which DRM systems allow for exceed those which copyright law 
provides owners. The power granted to copyright owners is thus open to abuse. They go 
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 See P Samuelson “The Copyright Grab” Wired February 1996 
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beyond merely seeking to protect their rights under copyright law and instead grant 
themselves greater rights in order to secure new markets for themselves. The inevitable 
effect of this process is that user rights are eroded in order to give way to the expanded 
rights of owners.  
 
The justification for this abuse takes various forms.620 It is often argued that such stringent 
controls are required as users are unable to police themselves. Even if one were to accept 
the premise of this argument, the problem is that the argument still stumbles at one very 
basic question. Why does the level of control required exceed that which copyright law 
grants copyright owners? One possible answer proposed by copyright owners answer to this 
question can be found in another argument which supports the erosion of user rights in the 
digital environment. 
 
Kruger submits that the erosion of user rights is of no consequence.621 He argues that user 
rights were only present in the analogue era because of a failure of the technology of the 
time. Technology in the analogue era, so the argument goes, did not allow for the pricing 
mechanisms necessary to charge users for particular uses. As a result of this failure, certain 
usage rights were granted to users as rights to fair dealing. This argument is said to justify 
the extension of owner’s rights at the expense of the rights of users.  
 
The types of arguments noted above fail to take into account the purpose of copyright law.  
Providing both an incentive to creators to continuing creating while simultaneously 
providing a public good in adding to the public knowledge is the fundamental purpose of 
copyright law. Contracts drafted by copyright owners tend to favour copyright owners at the 
expense of authors. Authors therefore receive very little in terms of an incentive to continue 
creating because the royalties from which they supposedly benefit barely cover the costs of 
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producing the creation. Agreements between authors and owners have led to the continued 
applicability of the ‘incentivist purpose’ of copyright being questionable.622 
 
The uncertainty over the applicability of the incentive to create is not immediately apparent 
unless one distinguishes between the incentive to create and the incentive to distribute.623 
As discussed in chapter 2, the nature of the digital environment diminishes the need for the 
rights of authors to be bundled with those of distributors. In this scenario, the rights of 
authors are not connected to the physical embodiment of works. The role of distributors is 
therefore diminished as the bulky and expensive copying technology of the analogue era, 
which required investment from distributors in order to allow authors to mass produce their 
works and disseminate them, has since become cheap and easily available to home users. 
Add to this scenario the distribution capabilities of the Internet and the function of the 
analogue era, and the distributor becomes largely obsolete.624 The erosion of user rights in 
the digital environment thus seems rather ironic when one considers that the group whose 
rights have been expanded are the very same group which the digital environment may no 
longer require. 
 
A great danger emerges where, as Cohen submits, a system equates property with progress. 
In such a scenario “…the public good nature of creative and informational works cannot 
assume equivalency between private wealth and social gain.”625 By focusing entirely on the 
incentive aspect of the purpose, and ignoring the public good aspect thereof, copyright 
owners and legislators alike have muddied the waters of the true nature of copyright law. 
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4. The Necessity of User Rights in Developing Nations 
The digital environment carries distinct implications for developing nations. These 
implications relate indirectly to the development of these nations. They carry the potential 
to either educate the citizens of those nations or to set them back even further in the 
development process. The digital environment carries with it the potential to improve the 
dissemination of, and access to, information in developing nations. The acquisition of the 
physical embodiments of ideas, for example books, which characterises the analogue era is 
not necessarily easy or cost-effective for many citizens in developing nations. As noted 
above, digital technology removes the hindrance of only having access to information where 
the physical embodiment of that information is available. One access point, for example one 
or two computers with an Internet connection in an indigent community, would allow for 
access to information in a manner which is much wider and more cost-effective than in the 
analogue era.  
 
This potential, however, is largely underutilised because of the expansion of the rights of 
copyright owners through international mechanisms such as the WCT and the WPPT. 
Mechanisms such as these facilitate the erosion of user rights and the expansion of the 
rights of copyright owners in the digital environment. The knock-on effect of this erosion, as 
noted above, is that the public good aspect of copyright is diminished. Few users in 
developing nations will have the means to pay for the numerous conceivable uses which 
copyright owners have become entitled to charge for. Furthermore, user rights which had 
previously been available under the analogue era allowed for certain uses where that use 
was required for research or educational purposes.  
 
The potential which the digital environment holds for developing nations is being 
undermined by the erosion of user rights. The diminishment of user rights has become an 
international trend through international mechanisms such as the WCT and the WPPT. 
These mechanisms serve to widen the gap in the digital divide, further increasing the 
division between the information ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. Ultimately, this enforces a system 
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of dependence on the producers of information, i.e. the US, the UK and the EU.626 The 
encroachment of the rights of owners on those of users thus presents a real threat to the 
development of developing nations. In light of this, what should South Africa’s response be 
if it indeed wishes to promote the development of its citizens while maintaining some level 
of protection for copyright owners? 
 
5. The South African Perspective 
Certain South African academics have called on the country to implement the provisions of 
the WCT and the WPPT.627 These authors argue that doing so will provide incentives for 
foreign copyright owners to expand their markets in South Africa. This, the authors submit, 
will stimulate investment in South Africa and thus benefit the economy. It is respectfully 
submitted that such calls fail to perceive the full ramifications of these actions. 
  
As discussed in chapter 5, the implementation of the WCT should be avoided by developing 
nations. The repercussions for these nations after the implementation thereof tend to result 
in user rights being trampled on.628 The erosion of user rights, as probably seems a banal 
statement at this stage, is damaging to the development of public knowledge and contrary 
to the purpose of copyright law. 
 
                                                             
626 ES Nwauche “A Development Orientated Intellectual Property Regime for Africa” (2005) Paper Presented at 
the General Assembly of the Council for Development of Social Science Research for Africa 
http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/nwauche.pdf (accessed 29 August 2010). See also RL Okediji “The 
International Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions and Public Interest Considerations for Developing 
Nations” 32 http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc/200610_en.pdf (accessed 30 August 2010). 
627
 “SA Copyright Law Under Fire” Techcentral.co.za 3 March 2010 http://www.techcentral.co.za/sa-copyright-
law-under-fire/13185/ (accessed 4 March 2010). V Van Coppenhagen “Copyright and the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty, with Specific Reference to the Rights Applicable in a Digital Environment and the Protection of 
Technological Measures” (2002) 119 South African Law Journal 429. 
628
 Consumer International “Copyright and Access to Knowledge – Policy Recommendations on Flexibilities in 
Copyright Law” (2006) http://www.cr-international.com/2006_Consumer-
International_Copyright_and_Access_to_Knowledge_16.2.pdf (accessed 1 September 2010). See Nwauche 
2005 Paper Presented at the General Assembly of the Council for Development of Social Science Research for 
Africa. See also Okediji 2005 UNCTAD 32. 
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South Africa’s status as a developing nation places it squarely in the context described 
above. One might argue that South Africa’s context differs somewhat from that of other 
developing nations as the distribution of wealth in the country could be seen to create 
pockets of ‘developed areas’. It could thus be argued that the only parties who benefit from 
South Africa not having amended its copyright legislation and implementing the WCT or the 
WPPT are those who fall within these ‘developed pockets’. Whether or not this assumption 
is true is a matter open to debate. Even if one were to assume that this assumption was 
correct, this would still not change the benefits which the digital environment holds for the 
development of both citizens and the country.  
 
The benefits of the digital environment for users are hamstrung by the implementation of 
DRM systems and the protection thereof through anti-circumvention legislation. In order to 
truly benefit from the advantages of dissemination which this environment allows for, user 
rights need to be preserved in a manner which goes beyond merely paying lip service to 
these rights. By maintaining those user rights, available in the analogue era, in the digital 
environment the advantages of the digital environment are available to users in a 
meaningful manner, i.e. absent the severe curtailments on usage implemented by copyright 
owners through DRM systems. 
 
The above should not be seen as a complete disregard for the rights of copyright owners in 
the digital environment. Rather, what is being argued for is a balancing of the rights of users 
and owners in a manner consistent with the purpose of copyright law. The functional-
equivalent approach argued for by Pistorius is perhaps one of the best means of achieving 
this balance.629 
 
 
                                                             
629
 T Pistorius “Developing Countries and Copyright in the Information Age: The Functional Equivalent 
Implementation of the WCT” (2006) 11 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 10. See Chapter 5 – Section 4.a 
for a detailed analysis of this approach. 
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6. Conclusion 
The analyses undertaken in this thesis indicate that the implementation of anti-
circumvention legislation and DRM systems are a hit and miss affair. The balancing of the 
rights of owners with the rights of users is discussed in great detail in many debates 
concerning this issue but the end results, i.e. actual implementation, greatly favour the 
rights of owners. The required implementation of anti-circumvention legislation by the WCT 
and the WPPT pose a tremendous risk to user rights on a global scale. Although the greatest 
loss of these rights will be felt by users in developed nations who have the means and 
access to technology of the digital age, the greatest travesty will be that the benefits which 
digital technology provides will be prevented from aiding those who require it most. 
 
On this basis, it is submitted that South Africa should not ratify the WCT or the WPPT, as the 
digital environment, in conjunction with copyright works and if managed correctly, has the 
potential to greatly assist in the dissemination of knowledge and the education of South 
Africa’s citizenry. 
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